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Abstract
After two decades of almost complete isolation, Cambodia was rather suddenly integrated in
1991 into the global ‘free world’. As a result, the function and the role of the administration
had to be modified. These transformations in the name of modernization and development
have led to a significant rise of professionals, as these provide the necessary knowledge to
manage the ongoing socio-economic and political transformations. Due to their educational
socialization in urban centers and overseas, they consider themselves the most modern
section of their society. Their common objective is to make the organizations they work for
less rigid and to reform them along lines of technical-pragmatic concepts. Especially for the
professionals working within the Cambodian state, the movement towards more efficiency
and effectiveness in the administration and the strengthening of the rule of law is seen as a
means to increase credibility of the Government on one hand and to attract foreign investment
on the other. However, due to their functional specialization and expertise, professionals in
Cambodia are marginalized from the overall socio-political changes in their environment. This
has led to the reduction of their possibilities to communicate and organize effectively. Instead,
their knowledge is applied to serve the requirements of their organizations/ patron-client
networks and not as a resource to form alliances on a national or on a transnational level. A
potential exists though for the professionals working in the state administration to either form
a strategic group through processes of hybridization, or to form a ‘neutral’ rational
administration after the ceding of the ‘old guard’ and thus their ‘disentanglement’ from old
clientele structures.
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[…] transformation requires a reflexive critique, or critique turned upon oneself. Reflexive
critique sees through the purportedly atemporal and universal validity of the procedural,
evaluative, and interpretative categories which govern an agent's field and allows the agent to
discover the true nature of these categories as "symbolic capital”. As symbolic capital, a
field's categories of understanding are tools of dominance suited to certain historical situations
and tailored to the needs and abilities of agents from certain social spaces, these being the
social spaces that produce agents who will dominate within that field. It is the recognition of
symbolic capital within their field, and of how much of it they possess, that allows agents to
stop cooperating in their own domination and in the domination of others.
James Cunningham, 1993
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1. Introduction
After two decades of almost complete isolation, Cambodia was suddenly integrated in 1991
into the global “free world”. As a result, global dynamics are affecting the Cambodian society
and require specific adaptations. This transformation, in the name of modernization, includes
an economic change towards a market economy and a political change from a socialist to a
democratic governance system. Such a process is based on internal pressures initiated by self-
organization within the bureaucracy, and external pressures with regards to problem solving,
not the least initiated in Cambodia by foreign donors. Thereby, the function and role of the
administration have to be modified. The modernization of the bureaucracy can, according to
Weber (1978) be described as a rationalization process in which efficiency, predictability,
calculability, nonhuman technologies, and professionalism become important. In other words,
this implies that highly educated professionals, who enjoy considerable work autonomy and
economic security, become essential within the bureaucracy. It is thus suggested that during
the successful transition towards a modern bureaucracy, professionals and knowledge-based
discourse play a dominant role.1
Evers citing Moore (1978) describes the professional as being committed to a calling, i.e. he
treats his occupation as an enduring set of normative and behavioral expectations; he
furthermore identifies with his peers, often in formalized organizations and is in the
possession of useful knowledge and skills based on specialized training or education of
exceptional duration; He finally is also committed to rules of competence, conscientious
performance and service and least but not last he enjoys autonomous working owing to his
high degree of technical specialization. As Evers (1978) rightly points out these definitions of
the professional are more or less congruent with, or at least overlap largely with, definitions of
‘modern’ man: ‘modern man has faith in Science and technology, he believes in man's domi-
nation of the environment […]; he plans his life and is punctual, regular and orderly in
organizing his affairs […] He is an individualist, reads the newspapers, prefers to live in urban
areas and makes his way up the social ladder through own achievement, starting off with a
good education […]. Education is indeed the most powerful factor in making man modern. In
short, we have a very close interdependency between professionals and modernity’ Evers,
1978:4.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the transformation of the public sector at the national
level with regard to the question: to what extent is it developing towards a rational
administration based on professionalism or, in other words, to what degree are
professionalism, efficiency, and knowledge substituting ‘traditions’ and values as basic
rationalities of administrative work? While looking at ‘modernization’/development,
processes by which structures are changed play the important role. The question is thus who
changes the structure, who has enough political relevance and a key position in the society to
induce change. Using Cambodia as a case study, the goal is not to provide a thorough analysis
of Cambodia’s administration but to use it as a case study to relate to the relationship between
agency and structure within processes of administrative reform.
1 While over-bureaucratization implies that ‘traditional’ bureaucrats and their vested power play the main role.
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Professionals in Cambodia, particularly young professionals, are at the interface between
national and global, between politicians and development actors, between bureaucrats and
businessmen, and between the past and the future. They are, on one hand, part of the
‘traditional’ bureaucracy,2 and on the other, agents of change towards a modern
administrative system. Their rise is certainly a result of the demand to manage the ongoing
specific socio-economic and political transformations.
1.1. Theoretical framework
The modernization of the Cambodian administration in the last two decades has involved a
large element of global mainstreaming through the importing of technical-economic
institutions from OECD states.
However as pointed out by Neubert (1999a), the transfer of European/North American models
of democratic, multiparty systems has often overlooked existing socio-structural requirements
for their functioning. Basically, state structures and regulations can neither be planned nor
decided upon. They occur and proceed in combination with social change and internal
dynamics, because internal restructuring implies new power-differentials among different
actors such as bureaucrats, different units, and requirements made on the civil servants3.
Certainly structure and agency can hardly be discussed separately. As Giddens (1986) has put
it, the constitution of social structures can hardy be understood without human agency. In
other words, social life is more than just the accumulation of micro-level activity but the
continuous alteration and reproduction of social structures-such as traditions, institutions, and
moral codes- by the repetition of the acts of individual agents. At the same time, these acts are
continuously determined by the structures they seek to alter. Human agency and social
structure, hence, share a dialectical relationship.
Similarly the transformation from a ‘traditional’ administration to a modern administration in
Cambodia is not linear and clear cut. Mixtures of administrative forms evolve because
changes affect different parts (departments, ministries, levels etc.) and actors in diverse ways.
Thus, the co-existence of modernity and ‘tradition’ or forms of ‘hybridization’ is the rule.
Syncretist rather than distinct forms of administration evolve in which ‘traditional’ aspects,
such as patronage, are combined with modernization4.
To understand this ‘syncretist’ nature, the Strategic Group Approach developed by Evers &
Schiel (1988), the Patron-Client Concept used by Eisenstadt (1981, 1984), Roninger &
Gunes-Ayata (1994) and the Actor Oriented Approach developed by Norman Long (2001)
provide interesting conceptual tools.
2 Co-opted into bureaucratic patronage networks on the basis of their qualifications.
3 Another relevant factor is external pressures, for example, from donor organizations. However, these as such
do not affect changes within the administration, but are translated into internal factors.
4 See the study on ‘The Bureaucratic Polity’ by Riggs (1966).
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The Strategic Group Concept initially developed by Evers (1966, 1973, 1978a, 1978b, 1982,
1983, 1988, 1999, 2001, 2006) and later taken up by Schiel (1988, 1992), Korff (1986, 1990,
1992), Berner (1991, 1995), and Tetzlaff, Vennewald, & Schubert (1994) aimed at providing
a theoretical framework that merges elements of the social class analysis with elements of the
classical elite analysis. Thereby they claim the vertical networking of persons beyond their
social class.
Evers (1982) argues that globalization or capital accumulation on a global scale has not led to
the formation of a single universal social order. On the contrary, vastly different special
formations and political systems have evolved, whose differences rather than similarities need
explanations. Essentially, the formation of a state or a political system and the exercise of
political power need organization. Hence, collective action is taken by different groups who
are bound to each other by a common interest in the preservation or expansion of their control
over material and non-material resources.5 The common interest produces strategic behavior-a
long-term program for the preservation or improvement of their appropriations chances
(Evers, 1988).
Strategic groups emerge in societies where resources become available after organizational/
geopolitical change, a power vacuum, or technological innovation (Evers & Gerke, 2006,
Evers, 2001). At the first stages of group formation, incumbents of new positions have little in
common and form what Evers (1983a), using Dahrendorf’s category, calls ‘quasi groups’.
Horizontal alliances through the formation of a common identity are at first weakened by the
identification with the immediate social surrounding. This is changed after a sudden increase
of members, major socio-political upheavals, and dramatic events that affect members of a
quasi group in a similar way. Theses changes lead to internal reconfiguration and organization
of quasi groups into strategic groups, which are then bound together by a common interest to
secure the resources that ensure their self-reproduction.
As a result, they develop strategies that have the power to mold the political, social, and
economic structures of a society in order to secure the long-term acquisition of national
resources6. In other words, during and after processes of social change, they aim at
establishing a superstructure, i.e. political, economic, and normative system that is most suited
to their interests.
Following Korff (1986, 1990, 1992), strategic groups develop from social differentiation.
Their emergence implies the formation of new concepts, consciousness, experiences, and
social positions. It also indicates the creation of new social systems that connect positions
with actions and thus foster the emergence of new social groups that constitute a distinct
lifeworld. These groups try to improve their position or maintain their status quo by gaining
additional resources and strength.
5 Such as goods, power, prestige, knowledge, or religious interpretations.
6 As Evers & Gerke (2006: 5) put it “[a] strategic group defines itself through a common interest in maintaining,
or if necessary, expanding the resources that will ensure the functioning of the entire complex of the strategic
group, but does not necessarily imply the existence of specific links through interactions. The membership in a
strategic group is therefore a theoretical construct. It does not necessarily create an identity or assume the
existence of social interaction among actors through interactions”.
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Strategic groups, like professionals who base their mode of appropriation on a personal mode,
seek to create organizations that would best promote their interests. These organizations can
be professional or job-specific, such as chambers of commerce or alumni associations.
Following Evers (1978a), they also favor a political system in which political parties play an
important role as these parties enable them to shape the political system. Professionals in
Cambodia however, are active in just a few parties such as the Cambodian People’s Party
(CPP) and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). However in Evers and Schiel’s (1988) concept of SG,
professionals are dealt with in an ambivalent way due to the focus on individual professionals
on one hand and their societal differentiation into for example the state administration, the
private sector and civil society on the other. These differences put obstacles on professionals
in organizing on the horizontal level.
In contrast, strategic groups, such as government bureaucracy and military, tend to pursue a
collective mode of appropriation so as to increase their share of resources by enlarging their
power bases, namely their state organizations. These organizations are used to shape the
political system in such a way that it benefits their structures of appropriation. As pointed out
by Evers (1973), civil servants might be the most coherent strategic group as they draw their
resources from the state budget.
Strategic groups that increase their appropriation chances through a corporate mode of
appropriation, such as businesses, tend to build political support through “resource” and
patronage networks (Evers, 1982).
All three types of strategic groups can enhance their modes of appropriation by either
processes of hybridization or by forming effective alliances with each other. Similarly
Schubert, Tetzlaff & Vennewald (1994) argue that modernization (in general) and
democratization as one of its variants is a result of changes in the inner-social power relations
between these strategic groups. In this process, different endogenous or exogenous factors
such as the degree of integration into the world market, cultural legacies, and foreign policy
dependencies that extend or reduce the social structural distinction, can strengthen or weaken
the relative power position of a single group or several groups. To analyze the conditions
leading to political change, it is hence important to identify these groups and understand their
agency. Schubert & al (1994) argue that the formation and organization of political opposition
is necessary for the introduction and particularly for the successful consolidation of a
democratic reform process. When the opposition is lacking, the regime determines the speed
and the quality of the democratic transition.
The regime refuses to share power and only induces a controlled liberalization of its system.
As a consequence, the democratization of the society is delayed and, in the worst case,
blocked. But what happens in a case where a potential strategic group, such as professionals,
is not split along the binary lines of Government and Opposition but are instead scattered all
over the different institutional fields of a given society?
Strategic groups such as professionals are supposed to produce practices that are not
consciously organized but fluid and indeterminate. The specific orientation of the set of
practices can be defined as ‘strategizing’. This reflects the fact that actors do have goals,
interests, and motivations according to their own experience and their practical sense of logic,
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i.e. reality. Their strategies, in this view, are the continual interactions between different
lifestyles and the constraints and possibilities of reality. Thus, they become a product of the
lifestyle that is not based on conscious calculation but on unconscious dispositions towards
practice and power (Korff, 1992).
The basis of this practical sense of logic is generated through negotiations at specific
‘interfaces’ (Long, 2001) of different knowledge systems. In the age of globalization, national
groups of actors, such as minorities, tend to build alliances with international and
transnational organizations to pressure their respective states to consider and secure their
livelihoods. Similarly, as professionals become highly globalized and well connected on the
national and international level, they develop the potential to form alliances with international
professionals/donor organizations to push their interests as one global strategic group.
However, even though professionals in donor organizations have a strong impact on state
formation, Cambodian professionals find it difficult to ‘interface’ with donor agencies, as
their integration into different organizational and vertical networks determines their
allegiances.
Following Long (2001), ‘interfaces’ are arenas in which interactions center on problems of
bridging, accommodating, segregating, or contesting social, evaluative, and cognitive
standpoints. Although interface interactions presuppose some degree of common interest, they
usually generate conflict due to contradictory interests and objectives, or to unequal power
relations between actors who represent particular constituencies, groups, or organizations
(Long, 2001). In this view, social actors are not simply ‘disembodied social categories’ or
‘passive recipients of intervention’. On the contrary, they follow patterns of ‘strategized’
agency by negotiating, interacting, and engaging in social struggles with other institutions and
actors.7 Interface analysis hence makes a useful contribution to understand how these
processes first enter the lifeworlds of the actors involved and then come to form part of the
resources and constraints of the social strategies they develop. It highlights the nature of
contests over the dominance and legitimacy of particular socio-cultural paradigms or
discourses.
The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF), the Government Donor
Cooperation Committee (GDCC), and the Technical Working Group (TWG)8, constitute three
of these ‘interfaces’. These three levels represent the policy arenas where, since the early
1990s, negotiations have been held between aid agencies and the Cambodian Government.
Thereby, policies are formulated and operationalized not simply as technical processes or
within the frames of specified plans of action and guidelines, as it is often implied, but within
the frame of a highly contested political exercise with no predefined outcomes.
The professionals that met between 2005 and 2007 at one of these interfaces, namely the
Technical Working Group, to negotiate the conceptualization of the Public Administrative
7Actors who influence their situations, actions, and outcomes either directly in face to face encounters or
indirectly through established frameworks.
8 Comprised mainly by professionals.
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Reform did not have the feature characteristics of a homogenous group, but were a group of
multiple social actors with different realities and experiences. As a result, interaction and
negotiations were accompanied by conflicting social and normative interests and
discontinuous configurations of knowledge.
Following Korff (1992), knowledge is always dynamic and unequally shared between all
actors within a network. From this it follows that no agency external to socio-political
processes can exists to define neutral or objective knowledge, truth, and reality. Hence in
order to understand human agency and its embeddedness in social structures, it becomes
important not to understand the “truth”, but to depict the practices resulting from power
interactions and knowledge differentials.
An important part of Foucault’s (2002) power/knowledge is the belief that those in power
have specialist knowledge. In Cambodia, the production of knowledge and the exercise of
administrative power are intertwined. Thus, the reform of the bureaucracy reflects the use of
different strategies supporting, and supported by different types of knowledge.
Indeed, owning specific and ‘right’ knowledge implies controlling the attributions of meaning
and convincing the other to accept one’s own frame of meaning. For Baudrillard (1995)
knowledge is, in a sense, the codification of simulacra, defining what practices are real and
those that are not. It is not a given material thing that is owned by actors, but a result of
dynamic interactions and struggles over meaning and representations and more importantly,
over the control of strategic resources (Long, 2001). Since the overall aim of strategic groups
is to impact state formation, i.e. on the institutionalization processes within the state, they
need specific technical knowledge as their main means. However, this knowledge is not ‘just’
produced as the Actors Network Theory argues, but is itself the result of power differentials.
In this regard, professionals in Cambodia stand in an ambivalent situation as they have the
knowledge to define the normative frames but on the same time remain co-opted by the
guidelines and political agendas of their own organizations.
Foucault (2002) interprets discourse as the combination of knowledge and communication
with practices9. If practices are included, power differentials are addressed. Thus, knowledge
implies power over others and the power to define others. Furthermore, as institutions regulate
the ability to communicate, they also become connected to power. In other words, institutions
are the ‘infrastructure’ that provide continuity of power differentials. Foucault (2002) ideas of
power/knowledge illustrate that in the field of specialized knowledge, such as in the field of
Administrative Reform, actions are governed by the constituents of the power structures.
Similarly Giddens (1986) who maintains that power is the ability to act, or to do something,
defined practices not only as actions but also as practices of applying power. The explanation
and the attunement/affinity or understanding of practices among different people is mediated
through communication. In order to avoid the clarification and definition of interaction
meanings each and every time, this attunement is established or ‘institutionalized’ in a more
lasting way. 10 Through the institutionalization of these relational practices, knowledge is re-
9 It is generally assumed that communication and acting (or practices) are two different spheres: what people say
they will do or are doing does not necessarily imply that they are doing so. Discourse however combines both
spheres.
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produced. However sometimes agents involved in these processes, are unable to recognise
these new relational practices. As a result meconnaissance10 is generated.
This relationship between power and knowledge resulting in various social differentials are
most obvious within the Council of Ministers. Interestingly, professionals working within the
Office of the Council of Minister (see Annex 14) are those who continually define and
redefine what is within the competence of the state and what is not. They thereby demark
themselves from other bureaucrats by the use of specialized knowledge. However, this
knowledge advantage does not yet confer to them a power base from which they can make
political decision on their own. The reasons for this are manifold and will be discussed later.
But before we continue, let us have a brief look at the Office of the Council of Ministers.
The Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM), which is mainly staffed with members of the
Cambodian People’s Party (CPP)11, represents the institutional focus of power in the
Cambodian political system. Important strategies for administrative reform are drafted under
its supervision. The OCOM itself is based on various networks that compete for agents with
technical-pragmatic know-how so as to implement their agendas; in other words, networks
that compete for professionals. These patron-client networks are characterized by moral and
emotional obligations, the sharing of common ‘pure pristine values’ (Eisenstadt, 1984), and
the emphasis on trust and empathy. They are generally based on hierarchical differences
between the patron and their protégés. But even here, a moral equality is implied. Similarly
Korff (2006) argues that clientelism is a “specific form of the institutionalization of
interpersonal relations and trust. [It] emerges in those societies where the degree of internal
cohesion and solidarity within a society as a whole, as well as among the elites, remains
limited” (Korff, 2006:77). Following Roniger (1994) patronage and clientelism are
characterized by a certain logic of social exchange. They are built around asymmetric but
mutually beneficial and open-ended transactions and predicated on the differential control by
social actors over the access and flow of resources in stratified societies. In some cases they
produce a social order of their own.
Since the transformation of Cambodia from a socialist system to a market system during the
last 30 years, monopolistic power domains have been challenged and alternative clientelistic
avenues have developed as new sources of bargaining for clients. New patrons of various
sorts emerged: politicians, administrators, and organized bodies such as political parties.
Indeed professionals have turned into patron-brokers that constantly have to demonstrate their
close relations with the powerful, here the leaders of the Cambodian Peoples Party (CPP),
10 Meconnaissance or misrecognition is a term coined inter alias by Pierre Bourdieu. According to Acciaioli
(1981), Bourdieu invests it with a specific sense that is not captured by conventional concepts such as
misappreciation. Meconnaissance describes a process whereby agents involved in a given field share
'misrecognition' of the true relations between the structure of that field and the structures of economic and
political power. More generally, it denotes the rejection of ambiguities or the rejection to recognise something.
More precisely, it describes an objectifying process through which the group teaches and conceals from itself its
own truth. Thereby the group inscribes in objectivity its representation of what it is (Bourdieu, 1977).
11 The CPP also known as the Kanakpak Pracheachon Kâmpuchéa (KPK) is the current ruling party of
Cambodia around Prime Minister Hun Sen.
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who at the same time are the most influential leaders in the Royal Government. As shown
during a visit to Takeo, they invest energies and resources to express hospitality, generosity,
benevolence, and concern for their clients. The public display of wealth and grandeur are also
extremely important for conservation of the power position (Günes Ayata, 1994).
Indeed, the CPP is one very important means of establishing patron-client relationships. It
creates at an ideological level a strong sense of belonging and hence a new kind of identity,
serves as a potential means of access to power centers and provides mechanisms for
establishing networks in which the resources are preferentially allocated. For professionals
party patronage and clientelistic networks are seen as an important pragmatic avenue of
controlled freedom, useful for advancing in social, economic, and political domains that are
regulated by competition for access to power, resources, and services (Roniger, 1994).
These patronage networks encourage and reward party activists by offering public offices in
accordance with politically sensitive stances. Within such a framework, clientelistic com-
mitments can be converted into political influence and can become entrenched in the actual
workings of democratic polities. They are useful in the competition for power and, once
power is achieved, for effectively formulating and implementing long term strategies
Furthermore Roberts (2001) argues that this system of clientelism seeks to maintain the power
base of the political leadership by lower ranks. Loyalty, he maintains, passes upwards thus
ensuring that leaders remain leaders. As a result, positions within the administration and thus
security and privileges are passed downwards as rewards. Likewise the Office of the Council
of Ministers is marked by a series of hierarchical relationships that are determined by politics.
Roberts (2001) further argues that the administrative organization in Cambodia is the legacy
of a vast system of bureaucratic patronage that constitutes the main means by which ordinary
people gain access to a guaranteed personal social security net.12
This special type of interpersonal relation exhibits an ambivalence towards formalized,
organized structures; hence, we observe tensions emerging from personal
loyalty/complementarity versus general reciprocity and interpersonal trust versus trust in the
anonymous institutional matrix. The lower the social cohesion and integration, the more are
relations arranged according to personal selection criteria (Eisenstadt, 1984). In the same way,
the higher the degree of trust exists within a given society, the less hierarchical the
relationships are within it. Trust is then used as a security mechanism to assess the
consequences of certain types and patterns of behavior, and to allow for calculability.
Despite their rationales, these relations are often treated by the current modern governance
systems of OECD countries as negative illustrations of collective forms of organization. They
are seen as differing from the corporate kind of relations emphasized in the dominant
discourse of New Public Management.
Neubert (1999a, 1999b) warns of falling in the trap of reducing patron-clients networks to
backward and traditional products of an “uncivil nationalism”. In the same vein, he warns
against equating them with corruption or nepotism (Neubert, 2004).
12 “[…] more of the population generated a greater degree of personal wealth through a combination of an
expanded bureaucracy and private economic freedoms, the nature of the hierarchy around them […]” (Roberts
2001:33).
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Similar to small farmers in Kenya and Mali, those in Cambodia, who constitute the majority
of the population, live for the most part from self-sufficient farming, wage labor, and petty
trading. As a result, party politics are structured in a distinct way and patronage becomes an
effective means to secure the flow of information and resources from the local level to the
central level and vice versa. In other words, the patron represents the local interest of his
regional constituency of origin. He is part of a wider chain of patron-client relationships and
networks that reach from the village to the cabinet. National resources are thus distributed
along these channels. Since these networks are based on temporary personal relationships,
they require few institutional prerequisites, and trust and control are related to few known
persons. Thereby, trust in anonymous organizations and abstract institutions become
irrelevant.
As further pointed out by Neubert (2004), with the introduction of multiparty systems, patrons
are held accountable to their clients and are challenged by other patrons. The voters are thus
not voting for anonymous political programs but for publicly known political figures who are
able to secure them access to contacts outside their localities for the further acquisition of
power and resources and who are willing to share their resources. Where the formal
instrumentalities for popular control are, if not absent, at least weak, Riggs (1966) argues that
national politics become a struggle for power as an end itself among competing cliques and
factions. These cliques generally consisting of friends and long-standing acquaintances know
each other from school or universities. Sometimes they also include kinship ties, often
through marriages. “In [this] context such ideas as ‘right’ and ‘left’, ‘conservative’ and
‘liberal’, ‘clerical’ and ‘anticlerical’ have no meaning. The question is merely ‘who rules’ not
‘what does he [she] stand for?’”(Riggs,1966:212).
Election campaigns are thus used as a legitimate arena of contestation and political struggle
for the different patron-client networks (Neubert, 1999a; 2004). This kind of
political/competitive clientelism consisting of formal participation through elections and
informal participation through patron-client networks can be described as an innovative
reaction, a result of increased participation and public communication. It allows for an
effective socio-political mediation between the private and the public sphere. Because they
are based on a voluntaristic model (Neubert, 2004), these patron-client networks break rigid
bureaucracies and allow for dynamic contextualization and adaptation to new situations.
Through the provision of a certain level of information, they further cross the distance
between ‘center’ and ‘periphery’ within centralized political and administrative system
(Korff, 2006). At the same time, because of their low institutional requirements, these patron-
client relationships remain effective only as long as resources are available. Contrary to what
was believed in the 1970s, they do not disappear with the establishment of democratic
regimes or with economic development and modernization; while some types of patronage
may disappear, new types constantly add to the already existing and great variety of forms of
patron-client networks (Eisenstadt, 1984). These networks, which include highly qualified
professionals, cut across different levels of economic development and perform important
functions within modern frameworks of administration. Professionals working within key
state agencies are an integral part of most bureaucratic patronage systems. At the same time,
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they are members of political parties and professional organizations; they also fill roles of key
negotiators and policy makers at the interface with donor organizations.
1.2 Instruments and selection criteria
The collection techniques used were drawn from documentation and secondary data analysis
on one hand and participant observation coupled with intensive expert interviews on the other.
Prior to my field research I established various contacts with professionals working at the
Secretariat of the Council for Administrative Reform13 located at the Office of the Council of
Ministers and the Royal School for Judicial Professions, and scrutinized the available
literature on governance reform in Cambodia. The fieldwork itself was split into two periods.
During my first field research, contacts were made with professionals from different
organizations and agencies, alumni associations (Australian, Japanese, Fulbright, AIT
Thailand, L’IDEE KHMER), research and extension organizations (CDRI, CICP, EIC),
academic institutions (Royal School for Judicial Professions, Royal Academy of Cambodia,
Build Bright University), different departments (Secretariat General of the National Strategic
Development Plan at the Ministry of Planning, National Institute of Statistics, Cambodian
Development Council), bilateral and multilateral agencies (German Technical Cooperation
Agency (GTZ), Swedish Development Agency (SIDA), Department for International
Development (DFID), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the World Bank
Office and the United Nations Development Program), NGOs (Cambodian Center for Human
Rights, Licado, Ad Hoc, NGO Forum, Buddhism for Development, Community Legal
Education Center), and the private sector (textile, construction, tourism, and trade). During
the first period of fieldwork in Phnom Penh Cambodia, which lasted from November to
March, I spent half of each day with a young professional at the Secretariat of the Council for
Administrative Reform, and the other half of the day at the head office of the GTZ. The
second part of my fieldwork was dedicated to intensive open interviews with selected
professionals from different occupational spheres.
13 The Secretariat of the CAR has the mission to plan, implement and evaluate the administrative reform agenda
of the Royal Government of Cambodia.
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2. Professionals and state-formation: continuity and
change
Professionals have always played an important role in state-formation processes in mainland
Southeast Asia. Their position is marked by a cyclic dismiss and surge over time within the
prevalent social structures. In other words, their position is either reduced, increased, or
polarized depending on both the type of political system and the prevalent type of
administrative structure introduced.
The professional’s role has continuously been to mediate between the ‘cosmos’ or the vision
of a better life, and everyday life, the ruling class and the population at large, the centre and
the periphery, the protectors and the protected, and those who produce social riches of which
others receive a share. This role implies that they have to connect everyday practices with
‘cosmological’ reason and vice versa. In the Angkorian period, this role was played by priests
or brahmans and the Buddhist clergy. With the rise of modernity, the cosmological order was
replaced by instrumental rationality (science, technology), and the intellectuals of the past
became professionals who connect every day practices with the technical, pragmatic order. In
this context they change, shape, and impact the institutional arena in which they act. At the
same time they are themselves influenced and conditioned by these structures.
2.1. Professionals during the Angkor period
Proto-professionals such as brahmans, monks, and priests that emerged during the so-called
Indianization process,14 appear to be the first group in Cambodia that used economic and
symbolic capital to influence various processes of state-formation. Thereby the power to attribute
meaning or ‘Sinngebung’, i.e., giving agency and objects a specific meaning was combined with
the appropriation of land, temple treasures, and other resources. In other words, they linked
horizontally disparate agricultural regions into an expanding economic network and generated
cultural symbols to vertically connect the higher and the lower levels of the Khmer society at that
time (Hall, 1985).
Following Chandler (1993), the emergence of the Khmer state was closely connected to the
introduction of ‘new Indian’ institutions and the emergence of elaborate hierarchic temple
networks.15 These networks were crucial for territorial domination and the legitimization of
more or less centralized rule and state formation.16
Several early Southeast Asian societies went beyond these primary levels of
integration, developing organizational mechanisms for the acquisition, control,
14 Where Indian cosmological concepts were merged with existing ‘indigenous’ ideas (Coedes, 1968).
15 The prevalence of rice terraces nearby temples during this period suggests that common ritual centers that
connected networks of villages had already emerged.
16 Although these multiple centers (organized into a what Tambiah has coined the ‘galactical politiy’)
predominantly acted independently from each other and derived their wealth from coastal trade, various alliances
between the decentralized segments for collective activities, such as the cultivation of rice, and thus systematic
irrigation, the mobilization of war force, and especially common rituals became important (Korff, 1990).
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and disposal of resources in pursuit of collective goals, most of which were
political […] The Khmer state […] demonstrates this transformation thesis.
Especially noteworthy is the development of Khmer temples as centers of
redistribution and the “continuous and massive movement of products” from
villages toward temples […] With the temple network as its base, Khmer society
went beyond primary redistributive integration and reached a higher level of
centralized economic control.
(Hall, 1985:136).
Along this increased coherence, population growth, and protracted peace, peasants became
the major source of labor power and agricultural products. The increased production of
surpluses for the temples and the court had a direct influence on the political institutions
structuring the state. Hence during this time, the region around Angkor, Aninditapura, grew in
importance and hierarchical structure, while administrative procedures and rituals intensified
with the increased extraction of surpluses (Korff, 1990).
This pooling and administration of resources from villages within the temple system, as
mentioned agricultural surpluses and labor force in the form of slaves, led to the emergence of
supra-village organizations that were controlled by priests. Similarly Chandler (1999) refers
to the existence of books in Sanskrit and archival texts referring to priests residing in the
cities. Priests had control over the rites and symbols used for the legitimization of these states.
Their responsibilities included such various tasks as assisting at land demarcation
commissions,17 administering religious foundations, dispensing feudal patronage and the court
affairs of high dignities, controlling the labor for the construction of public buildings and
infrastructure, securing agricultural improvements, guaranteeing fertility, and collecting taxes.
Although separate mechanisms of administration were developed in each temple,
Khmer temples were never autonomous from Khmer society and its stratified
political order. At the primary level, Khmer temples were subject to the
authority of a landed elite and were an instrument by which the elite reinforced
its economic and political control. Temple staff [priests, etc.] were often members
of the local landholding elite who entered the clergy or by priests who owed their
positions and their prosperity to continued patronage by that elite.
Hall, 1985:137
Beside their tasks of administering the flow of resources and allowing for greater
interconnectedness between different rural units, the proto-professionals of the Khmer state
had the important task of mediating between the elite ‘descending from the gods’ and the
commoners, the nak ta or ancestral people without family names (Chandler, 1993). In other
words, the temples and their staff were also responsible for the ‘redistribution of symbolic
capital (Hall, 1985:137).
By constructing complex symbols for collective identities marked by a vocabulary of religious
grandeur, praising the kings by magnifying and transforming them into divine and poetic
figures of legend (Mabett, 1977), they reflected their conceptions and realities of the social
17Recording the demarcation of bought or donated land or slaves.
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order. High sounding titles, myths of origin, and religious devaraja18 cults simulated the
grandeur of Southeast Asian rulers and described a political system that represented what Geertz
(1980) has coined ‘theatre state’.
[…] priestly and bureaucratic functions, seldom separate in practice, were
institutionalized. Government sponsored religious foundations became conduits
for Government revenue and largesse in ways that remain obscure but that
probably were connected with the power of priestly bureaucratic families around
the king.
Chandler 1993:43
State power was indeed based on ritualized redistribution of resources, the loyalty of the
provincial officials, and the ability to raise armies for short-term military campaigns (Evers,
1987). Interestingly, the priests were not mere propagators of new cosmologies and ideologies,
but also clients in powerful networks of their time. In order to extend its territorial control, the
ruler had to surround himself with competent, loyal friends and clients whom he would assign
the role of administering royal affairs in exchange for honor, dignities, land, and royal
patronage. In this context, priests were either direct beneficiaries of the ruler19 or clients of the
powerful local landholding elite.
Normally the consolidation into an estate of an elite’s land rights in regional
agrarian communities was legitimized by the construction of a temple, with
income from specified estate lands designated to support the temple’s activities.
Collections, gifts, and offerings flowed to the temple as part of a cycle of
economic redistribution. They flowed outward in the form of support for the
performance of rituals and construction and in so doing reinforced the prowess
of the elite as patrons of the temple deity and as the source of prosperity in the
eyes of the local inhabitants.
Hall, 1985:137
However, the multiplication of competing city/temple systems in the region, the increased
challenges posed by population growth, and the silting of the irrigation system (Schiel, 2007)
weakened Angkor in the fourteenth century. During the following centuries, no similar Khmer
state emerged that was powerful enough to unify the region or to define a center of power.
At the end of the Angkorian Empire the landholding, priestly elite was transformed and partly
replaced by patron-client elites interested in trade (Mabett, 1977). Moreover, state
organization changed towards patrimonialism (Korff, 1990) as the Cambodian state was
periodically subjugated and torn between Champa and Ayutthaya.
18 Although many scholars have translated the term as ‘God king’, Schiel (2007) based on Golzio’s personal
communication contends that the devaraja cult represented the cult of a special God, the kamrateng an jagat ta
raja; a God that would protect the king. In other words, ‘devaraja’ in his view rather means ‘God of the King’.
19 Following Mabett (1977), brahmans frequently married into the royal family thereby securing their privileges
and indirectly guaranteeing the union between ‘castes’. People were identified by their castes within a complex
social network divided into three groups, one comprising the ruling elite. There were four hierarchal levels from
the capital down through provincial centers to villages. The king and his entourage lived in the palace. His court,
including its brahmans, consumed the produced surplus (Mabett, 1977).
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Professionals, qua para-professionals,20 resurged to play a major role again only during the
colonial administration. During the first decades of the twentieth century, they actively
engaged in political and social struggle for independence and nation-building (Evers, 1982;
Korff, 1998). Thereby, they wielded considerable political power, as they pushed for change
and the introduction of a political culture of parliamentary democracy. Indeed, besides their
relative position, vis-à-vis other potential power elites, their emergence as a sufficiently large
group was an essential precondition for the establishment and maintenance of a multi party
democratic system.
2.2. The early modernizers: paraprofessionals and nation building
Independent or free professionals founded their first platform for self-organization at the
Institut Buddhiste, Cambodia’s first research and publications institution on Buddhism and
Khmer culture, in the early 1930s. The Institute’s journal, Kambuja Surya, thematized
political issues21 of the time. Another weekly journal, the Nagara Vatta22, founded in 1936 by
three young intellectuals-Son Ngoc Thanh (see Annex 4), Pach Chhoeun, and Sim Var-
reported and informed readers about the activities of Cambodia's educated elite. The paper
advocated more participation in commerce by Cambodians as well as greater educational
opportunities for all (Vickery, 1982). During the 1940s and 1950s, Thanh represented an
important figurehead for the progressive urban Khmer.
The goals of the Thanh-Nagaravatta nationalists seem moderate today, but they
shocked the traditionalists and may have contributed to the alacrity, even
enthusiasms, with which the latter greeted British, then French troops who began
[…] to disarm the Japanese […].
Vickery 1982:10
Generally, the urban intellectuals who led the country towards independence had some
experience in the colonial administration, which helped them shape their visions of new
political and administrative orders after independence. However, this proved to be more
difficult than expected. Instead, after the dissolution of the colonial system, legitimacy and
support from the people to build a new administration and economy was derived from the
charisma of the new leaders (Korff, 2003).
20 Para-professionals or the ‘Literarti’ were generally less specialized and could thus act in various fields. They
would primarily be the classical intellectuals.
21 Especially issues affecting Khmer monks in Cochinchina.
22 The newspaper opposed and cautiously criticized French colonial policies, their in-egalitarian tax policies and
their foreign domination of the economy. They also criticized the privileged position of the Vietnamese in
Indochina and urged Cambodians to awake and compete with the Chinese and Vietnamese minorities in
commercial life. The paper was forbidden in July 1942 following the participation of Thanh and 700 people,
among them 500 monks, in an anti-French march during the Japanese occupation against the Resident
Supérieure, who had ordered a few days earlier the arrest of two Cambodian monks in their orange robes, of
whom, one died in custody—an act that was perceived as despising the symbols of Cambodian identity.
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The occupation of Cambodia by the Japanese military opened new space for the action of the
newly organized professionals and with them, diverging visions of the how to modernize
Cambodia emerged. Some favored armed resistance by forming the anti-French Issarak
movement, while others opted for a process of dialogue by formulation of a national policy, a
declared set of ideas, and a national organization in the form of the Democratic Party.
However, professionals involved in both movements felt that they were working for the same
goals, while using different means.
The Issarak who marked the first certain appearance of communist or Marxist organizations
included professionals who had studied in France, in Thailand, and at the Buddhist Institute as
well as Cambodian leftists, Vietnamese leftists, and anti-monarchical nationalists loyal to Son
Ngoc Thanh. Among them were Nuon Chea Son Ngoc Thanh, Son Ngoc Minh, and Tou
Samouth (see Annex 4). Support came from the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) and the
Communist Party of Thailand (Slocomb, 2003).
The Democratic Party in the mid-1940s, headed by Dr. Sisowath Yuthevong, introduced an
European-type parliamentary system (Vickery, 1982) and made a serious effort to organize
and mobilized thirty-one regional and provincial branches, effectively taking advantage of
traditional patronage and communications networks in Buddhist monasteries, schools,
ministries, and Government services. These communications were largely word-of-mouth,
among people who trusted each other. The party also took care to nominate candidates who
commanded widespread local support, often choosing former monks or achars, whereas its
leaders were drawn from Cambodia's elite (Chandler, 1993). Many of the men who joined the
Democratic Party had been educated at the prestigious French Lycée Sisowath in Phnom
Penh.
Intensive networking of democrats, their linkage with monks and activists with charismatic
leaders such as Prince Yuthevong and Son Ngoc Thanh (see Annex 4), and their literacy
fostered their ability to create a new sense of solidarity among the Cambodian professionals
(Chandler, 1999). The professionals within the Democratic Party presented themselves as
carriers of modern values, of equality, justice, progress, and as the critics of nepotism and
corruption. Social, upward mobility along the lines of competence and qualification became
important thereby challenging long-standing hierarchies. This period marked their first
appearance as a group that aimed at changing the existing state structures according to their
understanding of a “good life”.
An important step to materialize their vision was to conceptualize a new constitution that was
based on the French model of the time. Another step was to modify the structure of the
administration. However, the democrats of the first ‘vintage’23 were soon weakened and
challenged politically by an alliance of right-wing groups in the early 1950s.
Indeed the right-wing groups grew quite rapidly, and eventually out numbered the democrats
within the National Assembly, thereby incrementally changing the political rules. The rapid
23 A term introduced by Egon Kunz ( 1973;1981) for different groups of people, specially refugees that made
the same experiences in a certain period of time in a particular place.
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dominance of the alliance of landowners, members of the military, and conservative bureaucrats
ruled the country, destroyed all opposition, and introduced an authoritarian political culture
that lasted for almost two decades (Vickery, 1982).
As the political role of professionals declined, parliamentary democracy broke down and was
replaced by an authoritarian, one-party regime24 led by the charismatic Prince Sihanouk. His
charisma, amplified by his breakthrough during negotiations for independence, was never
however really quotidianized (veralltäglicht). During his reign, the bureaucracy was limited to
larger cities; control over the country and its resources was rather low. When he proclaimed
the independence of Cambodia in 1954, half of the country was under the control of the
Khmer Issarak.
After the conference in Geneva that proclaimed officially the independence Cambodia, most
Issarak fighters, among them Nuon Chea (see Annex 4), were relocated to North Vietnam.
Khmer Communists such as Keo Moni, Sieu Heng, Tou Samouth, and Son Ngoc Minh (see
Annex 4), as well as three of Sar's friends from Paris, Sien An, Rath Samseunn, and Yun
Soeum were also evacuated to Vietnam. A handful of these Khmer, including Tou Samouth
and Sieu Heng, came back to Cambodia in 1955-1956. The rest remained in Vietnam for
many years, only to return sixteen years later in 1970 to overthrow Cambodia from the pro-
American Government under General Lon Nol alongside the Khmer Rouges25 (Slocomb,
2003). Other former guerrillas, including Sok Knol and Saloth Sar, were sent to Phnom Penh
to work for the Indochina Communist party.
2.3. Professionals and leftist movements
As Chandler (1999) maintains, to many of the young professionals, communism promised a
better future. Some of them, while they were young students at the French École Miche,
College Norodom Sihanouk and Lycée Sisowath, had supported the early Democrats in their
struggle for Cambodia’s independence. During their studies in France between 1951 and
1953, they had joined the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers and became members of the
French Communist Party (Chandler, 1999).
The adaptation of leftist ideologies, combined with the grandeur of Cambodian history,
played important roles in the development of the resistance movement. For them, Cambodia’s
modernization program could only be reached through a Marxist-Leninist framework. They
perceived the monarchy as a doctrine that gave power to a small group of people who did
nothing to earn their living but exploited the greater population at every level. In effect, they
believed that the monarchy was an unjust political system that had to be eliminated.
24 Knows as well as the Sangkum Reastr Niyum (‘People’s Socialist Community’)
25 The majority of the party was purged during the Democratic Kampuchean regime. At the time of the purges
Cambodia lost a whole mass of highly trained, experienced, and committed cadres (Slocomb, 2003).
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Another important source of recruits for Cambodia’s communist movement was
Cambodian university students from France. Between 1945 and 1960, several
hundred of these young men and women, drawn largely from the country’s small
elite, were exposed to an intoxicating mixture of radical politics, personal
freedom and anticolonial solidarity.
Chandler 1993:183
However although all followed the same vision, the different groups chose to follow different
strategies to reach their aims.
While radicalized professionals such as Keng Vannsak and Thioun Mumm (see Annex 4)
focused on operating within the remnant structures of the Democratic Party (Kiernan & Boua,
1982), other radicalized professionals such as Saloth Sar, Ieng Sary, Khieu Ponnary, Khieu
Tiririth and Son Sen (see Annex 4) infiltrated the education system to mobilize students from
schools, universities, and the Buddhist order, thereby creating a network of militants and
potential cadres (Chandler, 1999). Those who were attracted to these networks came from the
urban middle-class and shared the same vision to renovate Cambodian social arrangements
and to enlighten the population in cities. According to Chandler (1993), by 1969 hundreds of
young Cambodians had joined the communist movement.
The third group of communist professionals, among them Penn Nouth, Khieu Samphan, Hou
Youn, and Hu Nim (see Annex 4), similar to the Democrats of the 1940s, perceived the need
for a more flexible political approach through legal struggles, including a process of dialogue
and cooperation with Sihanouk’s Sangkum Party and its administration (Kiernan & Boua,
1982).
However, in the second half of the 1960s, Sihanouk condemned the left-wing press, closed
their newspaper down and imprisoned their editors, including Khieu Samphan. Hou Yuon fled
to the countryside joining a group of antigovernment insurgents. Shortly after, Sihanouk
changed his strategy and re-invited several radical intellectuals, to run in the National
Assembly elections. In the early 1960s, some leftist professionals opted for an anti-Sihanouk
stance and joined the underground insurgency led by Saloth Sar at the Vietnamese border.
In the meantime, bureaucrats who had grown wealthy through their uncontrolled
appropriation of resources from state industries and nationalized enterprises during the 1960s
(Vickery, 1982) could not maintain their power position within the state and were overthrown
by the military and urban business elite in 1970. Their newly introduced harsh policies against
communists and the War in Vietnam that involved an intensive bombing of Cambodia,
provided increasing legitimization for the radicalized professionals’ ideologies. Indeed
because the Government’s territorial control remained restrained to bigger cities, the Khmer
Rouges around Sar, Sary, Samphan and the Ponnary sisters could quickly gain power. Their
aim was to rapidly build Cambodia into a developed industrial country with great strength for
national defense by means of a ‘super great leap forward’ (Kiernan, 1982).
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After taking over Phnom Penh in 1975, one of their first moves was to establish the National
Front’s Council of Ministers to draft a new constitution and elect a new Government. One of
the first reforms of the new Government was to extend territorial control over the whole
country by restructuring the administrative division.26 A party political commissar was placed
at each administrative level. In their vision, control had to be exercised through cooperatives,
run by solidarity production teams,27 based in the communes (Slocomb, 2003). Other
organizations, such as the Youth League, the Women’s Association, the Farmers’ League and
the Trade Union Federation, were introduced as mass organizations to mobilize popular
support. Interestingly political studies in schools, on the radio, in magazines and theatrical
performances were maintained to raise socialist consciousness.
To break with unjust past ideologies and start a new era, the radicalized professionals
unleashed an unsystematic onslaught against liberal professionals who they regarded part of
the old feudal, exploitative system. This differed from the systematic purges at Tuol Sleng/S
21, which were primarily directed at eliminating internal cadres28 who were suspected inter
alias of treason by cooperating with the Vietnamese administration. In fact, some
professionals were spared from the purges, as the new Government needed their technical
expertise for its industrial plan. However, the radical policies of the Khmer Rouges effectively
disrupted the development of a vintage of professionals, albeit for a brief period of time.
The salient velocity and intensity of their reform, combined with the complete dissolution of
personalized networks of relations and the fatal loss of control over the administration, the
military, and the economy led to the catastrophic implosion of all mechanism of control and
redistribution.
The central leadership attempted to monopolize power from Phnom Penh.
Information and goods moved between the capital and the regional zones, but
rarely between the zones. This hub-and-spoke system proved to be extremely
inefficient, impeding what the Khmer Rouges claimed to want most, the
integration of its various regions into a seamless cooperative system. It was also
counterproductive in that it undermined the leadership’s effort to ensure
centralized control. […] in the absence of any local bureaucracies or indeed of
decent communications with Phnom Penh, the individual zone secretaries rose to
positions of unprecedented regional power. In the end, the Party had only one
way to control events in the countryside: the removal and execution of the zone
secretaries […].
Gottesman 2003:29
26 The former administrative system was replaced by a system of zones/regions (Slocom, 2003). The zone,
phumipheak, was divided into sectors: damban, the sectors into districts; srok, the districts into communes;
khum, and the communes into villages; phum. On each level, except for the commune level, a Party Political
Commissar was nominated and a Committee that was in charge of its administration.
27 Each solidarity team comprised ten to fifteen farming families. The people in the cooperatives were divided
into Permanent Labor Teams and Mobile Labor Brigades.
28 Like Hou Youn and Hu Nim.
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In 1978, in a desperate move to correct the disastrous results of their policies, the Khmer
Rouge leaders ordered the reintroduction of former organizations and institutions such as the
Technological University29 and primary schools within cooperatives. Geography textbooks
and mathematics came into use and plans were formed to reinstate a mixed-currency economy
in 1979. Amnestied people connected to the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes were re-
employed in these newly created positions to legitimize the weakened regime. In this respect,
the Central Committee hoped to increase their anti-Vietnamese allies (Chandler, 1999).
Although executions of former cadres increased during this period, the situation
of the average Cambodian generally improved in 1978: intellectuals were better
treated, the distinctions between “new” and “old” people became less severe,
more food was allocated for domestic consumption and Sihanouk’s name began
to be used again in Public.
Metzl 1996:106
However, these reforms came too late, and in 1979 former Khmer Rouges cadres30 trained in
Vietnam overthrew the Government of Democratic Kampuchea.
2.4. The figuration of strategic groups after the Khmer Rouges
Once the former Khmer Rouges seized power, with Heng Samrin as its leader, they
immediately started with the aid of the Vietnamese administration to rebuild a new
administration. Cadres and future professionals were recruited from the camps around the
capital. However, these groups were too small in number and the main administrative tasks
had to be completed by Vietnamese adviser31 at the national and provincial level. Many
former soldiers of Democratic Kampuchea were integrated into the new administration.
[…] the selection of people to enter the ministries [was made] without a clear
understanding of their personal histories and is instead based only on requests
from particular persons that they come to work […] the bureaucracy was
growing uncontrollably because state officials were making decisions to put
people to work with a salary without any clear discussion as to how many will
enter the organization.
Gottesman 2003:52
29 Under the leadership of Thiounn Mumm a former member of the Democratic Party and student in France (see
Annex 4).
30 Soldiers included former Issarak Fighter such as Chea Soth, Penn Sovann and Chan Si, individuals who had
deserted from Democratic Kampuchea, such as the former Regimental Commander of the Khmer Rouge Army
Hun Sen, former Khmer Rouge Party Secretary Chea Sim, and the former Khmer Rouge Commander of the
Fourth Division of the Eastern Zone, Heng Samrin. A small number of professionals and bureaucrats of the
former the Sihanouk and Lon Nol regimes joined them as well.
31 The employment of ‘privileged’ Vietnamese experts caused considerable tension in the Ministries. As a
consequence each year, from 1979 on, hundreds of cadres were sent to Vietnam for the new administration. Two
years later, in 1989, their number was reduced considerably.
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The new Government s’ efforts to recruit professionals, who had survived the last four years,
remained fruitless. Frustrated by the reappearance of a communist rhetoric and being
subjected to the leadership of partly uneducated revolutionaries, many migrated outside the
country or fled to the Thai border. Others integrated into the newly created state positions.
At the provincial level, the People’s Revolutionary Committees implemented policies of the
Political Centre under the supervision of the Provincial Party Committees. On one hand, the
Provincial Party Committees, composed of three to five officials, had generally the task to
secure ‘the base’, frame and supervise agricultural production, and formulate viable working
plans. On the other hand, the Provincial Mass Organizations of the Front had the same
functions as those of the Centre, namely to recruit party members and mobilize the masses. In
this context, the Provincial Party Secretary usually acted as the chief of the People’s
Revolutionary Committee and held direct responsibility for the economy and livelihood of the
people. Similarly, the Political Commissar of the Battalion was also a member of the People’s
Revolutionary Committee but in charge of Military Security. Other members of the People’s
Revolutionary Committee were in charge of organization and monitoring, on one hand, and
propaganda, education, culture and social action on the other.
However, despite this more differentiated organization of the state at the central and
provincial level, overall territorial control remained difficult to realize. According to
Gottesman (2003), the Vietnamese authorities found fewer Cambodians who had been
refugees in Vietnam or spoke Vietnamese as they went further up the administrative pyramid.
As a result different political factions could emerge within the Kampuchean People’s
Revolutionary Party.
The creation of positions in the state administration in the 1980es as well as in the 1990es
became rewards for loyalty. The need to reward loyal followers for the purpose of pacification
and to share resources through civil-service salaries-even where this only meant, as Evers
(1987) argues, the ‘sharing of poverty’- became the major reasons behind the rapid
bureaucratization. In Thailand these positions were commonly referred to as “inactive posts”32.
The hope of gaining a civil-service position was a major motivating force and source of
individual ambition for leaders and followers alike. Having a position within the bureaucracy
was not perceived as merely occupying an office position, but as a means to first secure one’s
own livelihood and second, to push forward political agendas through the targeted control and
allocation of aggregated resources.
However a career within the administration was only possible through protection by superiors
and the loyalty of subordinates, in other words though patron-client networks. Cadres who
raised to higher positions kept their power position by funding those who put them in power.
Hence a source of income came from within the administration itself (Hugues, 2007). On the
same time, for officials in higher positions, having a powerful client base was necessary for
successfully handling conflicts; for the subordinates, the protection of higher officials
32 One might call it, using Geertz terminology, ‘administrative involution’ (Evers, 1983b, 1987).
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facilitates a swift and quick advancement within the administrative system towards important
positions.
In the 1980es, as skilled cadres were still rare, the party committees were granted the right to
choose their staff for the various sections through patronage networks. Thus, departments
within the same ministries sent their correspondence to the leadership instead of directly to
the responsible departments causing the relationship between the Ministry and the Provincial
Departments to remain ambiguous (Slocomb, 2003).
In the second half of the 1980s, a new group of ‘progressive’ cadres within the Cambodian’s
People Party (CPP) emerged around Hun Sen, Cham Prasid, Sok An (see Annex 8), Hor
Namhong and Keat Chon (see Annex 4). Its political agenda centered on the peaceful
withdrawal of the Vietnamese administration from Cambodia, the integration of opposing
military forces such as the Khmers Rouges and the introduction of a market economy. These
new directions were somehow in contrast to the political agenda of the other, older cadres of
the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) like Chea Sim, Say Phouthang and Heng Samrin.
Indeed the provision of positions within the state administration after the fall of the Khmer
Rouges was the base for pacification after the political crisis and civil war situation. By
offering a position within the administration of the Royal Government, the CPP could disarm
the Khmer Rouges. Later, this strategy was applied again with the integration of former
FUNCINPEC party. Thereby, people obtained employment, had a share of influence (power)
and status, and their support could legitimately be demanded, because the administration had
to serve the Government.33 .
In contrast to the older cadres-who used his position to appoint hundreds of police, prison
officers, interrogators, and other security officials into his konchau34- the ‘progressive’ group
demonstrated an affinity to bureaucratic patronage.
I agree with what comrade Hun Sen has suggested, that there be at least one
assistant for every comrade. So it is necessary to request more cadres to help the
Council of Ministers. In the future, each Deputy Prime Minister shall have two or
three assistants who will be cadres with good, firm political stances, who know
how to keep secrets, and who are highly educated and have clear expertise.
Dang Long cited in Gottesman 2003:133
A second feature, which distinguished them from the other high cadres of the Party, was their
focused leadership role in the provinces.
I propose that comrade prime minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers[…] visit,
examine and follow the situation in the provinces and that in accordance with this
work system, we visit the provinces two months out of the year.
Dang Long cited in Gottesman 2003:133
33 As Hugues remarks “given the increased number of politicians and the need [in 1998] to accommodate them
in positions of power and authority from which to generate cash remuenration, the solution layed in creating
more jobs while at least maintaining the forms of the democratic process. In accordance with this, a new political
structure was created on the form of bicameralism” (Hugues, 2007:38).
34 According to Gottesman (2003) the ‘children and grandchildren’.
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This practice of spending two months of the year in the countryside (from the province to the
communes) is still followed today, especially before elections.35
Moreover, the new leadership of the CPP was aware that the preservation of their domination
was, and still is, highly dependent on the development of a considerable national economic
surplus. Hence a crucial point in their economic reform was the need for qualified young
professionals to attract effective Foreign Direct Investement (FDI), to implement
administrative reforms, and to develop the domestic market strategies. They were further
aware that a strong and competent administration from the top level to the field level
generally governs more effectively and efficiently, and thus is more capable to manage
expected economic growth.
Consequently highly qualified professionals were given positions in key state function in
order to orchestrate, transform and adapt the economic framework of the country to
international standards. The strategy employed so far has been successful; Cambodia's
economy gained momentum and dynamism by growing on average 9.4% per annum during
2000-2006. Specifically, economic growth peaked at 13.5% in 2005 and economic growth
was at 10.8% in 2006. The average per capita income almost doubled from 288 USD in 2000
to 513 USD in 2006. The country's international reserves have increased a threefold, from
about 500 million USD in 2000 to more than 1.5 billion USD (Cambodian Embassy, 2008).
Although bureaucrats around the CPP dominate the political and economic space,36 economic
development and the transformation of the economic landscape have led to the emergence of
an important private sector. Indeed, the rapid transformation of the Cambodian society during
the last two decades can also be understood as a continuous re-institutionalization of
inequality towards patterns of domination and subordination, and inclusion and exclusion of
different groups of actors. The formation of the business sector as a strategic group is
certainly a result of these structural changes.
2.5. Cooptation of professionals? From bureaucratic polity to bureaucratic capitalism
The Cambodian administrative structure resembles what Riggs (1966) has coined the
bureaucratic polity, a style of politics in which the actual political arena, the struggles for
power, prestige, social status, and wealth are dealt with by the bureaucracy. In other words, a
bureaucratic polity evolves in a situation where the bureaucracy dominates the economic and
political sphere (Korff, 1998, 2003). Hence, it is not a rational, legal bureaucracy in a
35 In 2006, I participated in a ‘field visit’ with five professionals of the Council of Ministers who went to see the
work in progress of the school and football field they had financed in ‘their commune’. As they explained to me,
every bureaucrat of the CPP was assigned to a team of four to six persons responsible for one commune. The
aggregated teams with their superior were responsible to the district etc.
36 Indeed the CPP and still is successful in maintaining political stability and economic growth on one hand and
by successfully controlling counter movements. As Evers argues, ‘political stability’ through an alliance between
strategic groups […] might produce economic growth but also increased chances for enrichment and
exploitation, which in turn provoke reactions, movements, uprisings and possible revolution. Controlling these
movements from below and checking the growth of counter strategic groups thus becomes a major aspect of the
political system (Evers, 1982: 7-8).
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Weberian sense, but as a system that tends to valuate itself. Korff (1990:187) citing Scott
notes: “Standards of performance do exist, but they are essentially political rather than
administrative. Thus an official does not evaluate his subordinates’ performances by how
efficiently they do their work, by how closely they adhere to regulations, or by their technical
virtuosity. He is instead likely to value them according to how loyal they are to him
personally, how effectively they advance his interests and those of his allies, and how useful
their own network of personal contacts may be to him.”
Access to a position within this bureaucracy allows further admission into a wider range of
other resources. The tenure of an official position within the bureaucracy is not only seen in
the Weberian sense as a position of service or a place for clerical work, but also as a
multifaceted place where elements of a home, court, and place of business are brought
together. Thus, Cambodia shows on one hand elements of a functionally specialized state that
controls itself and is thus immune to external control, and on the other elements of a dynamic
and competing system of personalized relationships, such as patron-client networks and
networks based on friendship (Eisenstadt 1981, 1984; Korff, 2006).37 The latter complex
patterns of personalized vertical and horizontal linkages38 energize the internal mechanism of
the administrative system and connect the bureaucracy to the society at large. Hence, we have
a situation in which the formal organs of state power such as the Council of Ministers act with
considerable effect, but where rights and obligations follow personalized line of relations. At
the same time, the formal organizations of representation remain without any effect and
power.
Interestingly, this bureaucratic polity increasingly has taken characteristics of what Weber has
coined bureaucratic/political capitalism, a system in which the military and the bureaucracy
extends its agency into the corporate economy. Thereby the demarcation between public
service and private interest becomes distorted. As a result, various officials either control
major banks, industries, and businesses or participate in the distribution of their profits.
In the Cambodian context alliances are forged between high-ranking bureaucrats and wealthy,
generally Sino-Khmer business families (see Annex 7). These business families who are
closely related to each other through kinship or joint shareholdings have a strong power base
in the control of the economy, controlling most of the enterprises and financial institutions. To
change the economic institutions and state regulations or ‘normative system’, they engage in
relations with high-ranking civil servants and politicians. Being ‘connected’ to the high ranks
of the bureaucracy or even being directly involved in politics allows for an easier access to
loans, good price determinations, licenses, etc.
37 Horizontal networks include graduates of the same faculties such as the Faculty of Law and Economics,
friends from the same region, family members, etc.
38 To keep this alliance among the different fractions of high officials, alliances have been formed through
intermarriages: Hun Sen’s daughter, Hun Malay, is married to the son of Sok An the Minister of the Office of the
Council of Ministers. His son Hun Manet is married to the daughter of the Secretary of State of the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs Piech Sophan. Both studied together in the US. Manet is currently completing his PhD
in Economics in London. His other son, Hun Manit, is married to the daughter of the Secretary of State of the
Ministry of Rural Development H.E. Yin Chy Lee. Both studied together in Singapore. His other son, Hun
Manith is married to the daughter of the police chief, Hok Lundy. His second daughter, Hun Mana, is married to
the son of the Secretary of State of the Ministry of Defense. Both also studied in Singapore (see Annex 7).
37
Indeed, on one hand the businessmen/women needs the political elite’s support and
protection, as the legal frameworks for business are yet to be fully formalized and
institutionalized. In other words, processes of hybridization instead of functional
differentiation take place. On the other hand, the political elite, particularly the CPP, needs
big businesses to finance their political agendas. The relations between business groups and
the CPP are regulated through trust and hence, are highly dependent on the calculability and
accessibility of the other group’s behavior.
These networks of relations are organized horizontally as well as vertically, thus incorporating
elements of friendship and paternalism. So far, both groups see gains in pooling their
resources, namely capital and connections on the one hand, and security, peace, charisma,
legitimacy and prestige on the other.
Hence, valuable public assets are put under the private control of individuals who are
themselves part of the political elite. In an illustration of this overlap between politics and
business, six of the most prominent tycoons (see Annex 6) have recently been appointed
senators for the CPP. The six are Kok An, Kong Triv39, Ly Yong Phat, Yeay Phu’s husband
Lao Meng Khin40, Men Sarun, and Mong Reththy41 (Global Witness, 2007).
Essentially, professionals are important for both groups-the political leadership and the
business people surrounding them- as both seek to develop the economy. Indeed, economic
development implies the need for an efficient management and thus the demand for
‘managers’. Similarly, the bureaucracy develops a need for efficiency and coordination as big
businesses increasingly pose demands for security and calculability. As a result, professionals
become important for the effective running of key state and business organizations.
39 Oknha Kong Triv, a senator of the CPP and Deputy Governor of Phnom Penh city, is said to be one of the
richest businessmen in Cambodia. Founder of the KT- Pacific Group Limited, the senator has set up a business
network that in 2004 consisted of ten associated companies in Cambodia and eighteen joint ventures. He is
shareholder and chairman of British American Tobacco, president of Eastern Steel Industry, president of the
Cambodia World Trade Centre, president of VEGA Asia Trading Co. Ltd., president of Cambodia Electric
Import Export Co. Ltd., Chairman of Kwang Fu Computer Label Weaving and Tatsumi Knitting Cambodia Co.
Ltd., shareholder of Societe Concessionaire de L’aeroport, shareholder of the Pacific Commercial Bank and
trading representative of Mercedes Benz and Mitsubishi Electronics.
40 Lao Meng Khin and Choeung Sopheap (also known as Yeay Phu) run Pheapimex together, arguably
Cambodia’s most powerful company. Through its logging and economic land concessions, Pheapimex controls
7.4% of Cambodia’s total land area.
41 Oknha Mong Reththy, senator of the CPP and member of the agricultural sector of the Phnom Penh Chamber
of Commerce, known as the ‘rubber tycoon’ and the ‘palm oil king’ is founder of the Mong Reththy Group Co.
Ltd. His Group comprises the Mong Reththy Investment Cambodia Oil Palm Co. Ltd., the Oknha Mong Port Co.
Ltd. at Sihanoukville,41 the MRT-RML Livestock Co. Ltd., the Mong Reththy Group-Tiwanon Construction
Joint venture Co. Ltd., the Mong Reththy Steel Industries Co. Ltd. and the Samnang Khmeng Wat Construction
Co. Ltd. The senator, a good friend of the prime minister, was born in a rural family from Takeo. He started his
career at the Ministry of Public Affairs from 1979 to 1989. With the withdrawal of the Vietnamese
administration, he founded the Import Export Company and is said to have been illegally trafficking drugs.
Today the Mong Reththy Group is the first exporter of rubber, palm oil and livestock, build roads and buildings
and operates its own port.
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This leads us to the question whether their rise as a group potentially enables them to modify
the social structures that facilitate and constrain the agency of bureaucrats, the military, and
big businesses. In other words, it leads us to question their formation as a strategic group.
2.6. Conclusion
Professionals have always played an important role to modify and conceptualize given state
structures. Their positioning is marked by a cyclic dismiss and surge over time and thus has
been either reduced, increased, or polarized depending on prevalent political system.
One reason for this cyclic dismiss and surge over time could be a dynamic of fragmentation
and differentiation or integration among them. There is an interdependency between
integration as a strategic group and enhanced political power in terms of decision making and
fragmentation and reduced political relevance. One aspect that can lead towards
fragmentation or loss of integration are vertical relations-relations to political or economic
elites into which professionals are always integrated.
The rise and demise of the professionals during and after the struggle for independence can be
discussed in terms of the competition of various groups for the inheritance of former colonial
power positions. A growing bureaucracy and military soon replaced independent
professionals who led to the formation of the parliamentary democracy.
The reconfiguration of the social structures in the last two decades reflects the re-figuration of
the bureaucrats and the military, and the (re)emergence of professionals as well as other new
groups such as business groups and aid agencies. In fact, we currently observe a merger of
interest of the politically powerful military-bureaucratic elite with the economically strong
group of businessmen/women into business ventures. However, whereas the business sector
increasingly denotes characteristics of a consolidated strategic group, professionals still lack a
strong horizontal institutionalization of their agency to promote and push forward their
interest in a long-term perspective. Rather, they still seem to exist as instruments to modernize
and adapt the interests of the business sector, the aid agencies, the bureaucracy, and the
military.
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3. Professionals today: a strategic group?
Young professionals today in Cambodia are dispatched in diverse occupational fields. All
share common traits of apolitical functional specialists. Although they act as leading groups
of modernization, they also tend to consolidate and push their vision of the ‘urban good life’
and thus foster the continuous process of social differentiation and inequality between the
urban and rural space (Evers, 1978c) by translating global inequalities into national ones and
vice versa. At the same time, their expertise is required on one hand for the reform and
conceptualization of new state institutions and on the other hand for the introduction of
development concepts to realize the ‘common good’ of society. This puts them in an
ambivalent situation. To solve their paradoxical condition, in which they have to start a
political career but prefer to remain apolitical, they have chosen to create a ‘modern’ life for
themselves in a process we have coined ‘the secularization of professionalism’. This process
diminishes their agency as it reduces their potential for communication and self-organization.
As a result they follow different strategies.
The arguments presented in this chapter are based on secondary data from the Ministry of
Education and data from first hand interviews. For the study, forty young professionals (see
Annex 15) in leading positions in the Cambodian society were interviewed over a period of
two months using specific questions formulated as general guidelines (see Annex 2). These
rather intensive interviews lasted between two and three hours and were kept open. The
interviewees did not see the questionnaire as I memorized them before the interview.
3.1. Educational background
After the consolidation of the Cambodian bureaucrats and military under the supervision of
the Vietnamese administration in the middle 1980s, the modernist fraction within the
Government turned its attention on the formation of skilled professionals by promoting
programs for overseas studies. This emphasis on university training was based on the newly
adopted ideology of economic pragmatism and technological necessity. As a result, in the
mid-1980s many Cambodian students were officially sent to study economics and engineering
in socialist countries like the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Vietnam.
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Fig. 3.1. Number of Cambodian who studied in the former Soviet Union
Number of Cambodian students sent abroad to former socialist
countries from 1980 to 1987
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Source: Ministry of Education, 2005
Since the mid 1990s, the number of private students has increased significantly. Still, the
majority of students specialize in economics. The second largest field of studies is technical
sciences such as engineering. Professionals of both fields of study become the major carriers
of instrumental rationality, a shared quality of the group. However, despite this
distinguishing feature, they remain politically irrelevant. In effect, they are unable to
transform symbolic power into economic and political relevance and they become what
Evers (1973) coins “politically castrated technocrats”.
Structurally, three vintages of young professionals can be identified, despite the fact that they
were socialized in different political settings, and share this similar ideology of technical,
economic pragmatism. The first-vintage are graduates from the Soviet countries, the second
studied in Asian communist countries and other countries of the OECD such as Japan. The
last vintage, the youngest, children of the urban wealthy mainly study in elite universities in
the United States, Vietnam, Japan, and Australia.
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Fig. 3.2. Number of Cambodian students who studies outside Cambodia
Number of Cambodian students sent abroad to countries who
have established special agreements for student exchange
programs
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Source: Ministry of Education, 2005
I distinguish between the old Vietnamese generation who is against technology,
use of computers, who accepted the French, then the senior Russian generation of
young professionals who uses English as a working language and who is open and
dynamic, then finally on one hand the junior Japanese generation of young
professionals who is struggling to survive in the government, and on the other
hand the junior Australian generation of young professionals [ .] The younger
graduates constantly bring in new knowledge, and sometimes work as civil
servants for economic matters but they prefer to work for NGOs and the private
sector. They are very successful in leading their own businesses. Interestingly
most of the returnees from the United States work for civil society organizations
when they come back.
Deputy Director General of Finance and Accounting of the Ministry of Labor and
Vocational Training, 200642
Within professionals’ circles, the first-vintage of professionals is known as the ‘Russian
professionals of the professionals of ‘l’IDEE Khmer’.43 Indeed, its prominent figures44
graduated with PhDs in economics in Russia during the 1980s and were the first
‘intellectuals’ chosen by the state and integrated as clients into networks of very high cadres
of the CPP, including those of the Prime Minister. They are now for the most part
42 This reflects comments made by professionals that participated in case studies directly related to this study.
See section 3.5.
43 The alumni association of the first-generation of professionals among them the prominent officials of the
Ministry of Economy and Finance who studied in Russia; the majority graduated with PhDs.
44 Such as Aun Porn Moniroth, Hang Chuon Naron (see Annex 9), Him Sahip.
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counterparts of the World Bank and other important donor agencies at the Ministry of
Economy and Finance (MEF). Initially, these members did not belong to the established
economic and political elites. However, they orchestrated the transition from the planned
economy to the market economy by which state-owned enterprises were privatized,45 state
assets were transferred into private ownership, and price and trade policies, among others,
were codified. New Government Offices and Agencies were created under their leadership,
such as the Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC) and the Cambodia Investment
Board (CIB) under the Council for Development (CDC). Their expertise was crucial for the
introduction of new laws on investment and taxation and hence for the constant average GDP
growth of 10% from 2005 to 2007 (Hughes, 2008). The fact that they studied in systems with
a planned economy does not hinder them from working within liberal economic systems. The
different departments in which they work could potentially become politically important since
they design policies that have an impact on politics. The most prominent figures of this group
(see Annex 9) are often mentioned as role models for other younger professionals who admire
their open, egalitarian, and horizontal working style.
The second and even more so, the third vintage, are more professionally diversified and
engage in different fields of occupations. Professionals employed in key positions within the
Council of Ministers (COM) and other related agencies generally were students from the
second vintage, whereas the professionals from the third vintage can be found in all sectors of
society. In contrast to the second vintage, the third vintage, with some exceptions, has
successfully been integrated into the growing private sector. Interestingly, professionals of the
first two vintages are eager to court these highly qualified professionals into their own
organizations. They tend to recruit from within their own, in an attempt to create horizontal
networks, by bringing in other, much younger professionals to implement the reforms they are
working towards. Their aim for modernizing these sectors is to catch up with other dynamic
economies of the region, such as Thailand, thus increasing Cambodia’s regional standing.
The age distribution of professionals working within the state shows that most of those
working in the civil service after studying abroad were less than thirty-nine years old in 2005.
In a national survey of the Ministry of Education, among the 365 civil servants who had
graduated abroad from 2000 to 2005, the majority was strikingly below the age of thirty-
five.46
45 Interestingly an important number of state enterprises and collective land went into the property of the CPP as
party property as well as into the hands of CPP officials.
46 This is partly due to the specific context of the Cambodian history; during the Government of Democratic
Kampuchea (Khmer Rouges (1975-1979)) most of the professionals were either wiped out or had to flee outside
the country.
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Table 3.1. Degree distribution of Cambodia graduates
Bachelor in % Master in% PhD in %
2000 66 21 13
2001 37 50 13
2002 66 23.4 10.6
2003 37 51 12
2004 20.6 69 10.4
2005 51 42 7
Source: Ministry of Education, 2005
The number of PhDs has slightly diminished over the years and the number of graduates and
post-graduated alternates each year: in one year, most of the civil servants graduate with a
bachelor and in the following year the total number of postgraduate is higher than the total
number of undergraduates. This probably stems from the fact that most students who finished
their bachelors, go on to complete a masters.
Similar to those studying during the sixties, who later became critical of the Government,
young students, mostly men, received their professional education at universities in larger
cities abroad, and this greatly affected their outlook. After their return, they tend to cluster in
the capital Phnom Penh where the division of labor is more complex and the degree of
occupational specialization high. Bureaucratic elites are also more generally concentrated in
these urban centers, which makes living there a precondition for access to higher positions in
the administration of Government and business organizations. Cities enable them to realize
their aspirations, to climb the social ladder, or at least to open the doors for their children’s
potential upward social mobility. Furthermore, the capital is the centre where administrative
agencies as well as large-scale organizations-such as global business firms and international
NGOs- converge and thus, power is concentrated. Highly professionalized experts are
necessary for any international aid package and entrepreneurial skills are expected from
professional managers in Government Agencies and consulting firms that deal with the
conceptualization of a national legal framework for investment practices or state reform
programs.
3.2. Occupational fields: Where they are now
Essentially the three vintages of professionals are dispatched in four different occupational
spheres: : the official sector (Council of Ministers, Minister of Economy and Finance,
Ministry of Commerce etc), the academics (RULE, NUM, CDRI , EIC etc) and those working
for development agencies(World Bank, UN Organizations, AusAid DANIDA, JICA, GTZ,
UNOHCHR etc), the private sector (KPMG, PWHC, DHL, British Tobacco etc) and those
active on the NGO scene (CCHR, Licadho, Ad Hoc etc). These groups are not mutually
exclusive, and sometimes overlap, while others are cross cutting. Thus, professionals working
for the Government also prepare consultations for donor agencies or joint projects with para-
statal think tanks.
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Upon completion of their education, the majority of first- and second-vintage professionals
are employed in higher administrative functions within the state. Professionals, except for
those associated with the NGOs and some donor organizations, lecture at universities and
have strong connections to high party cadres with whom their relationships are structured
along hierarchical lines. Their alliance with other professionals is limited to personal levels
and social gatherings and events such as marriages, Buddhist ceremonies, and similar get-
togethers. Few professionals have started to network on a professional’s basis, such as
CamPro,47 to discuss policy options for the economy. However, political solidarity does not
appear to be an important issue, at least not at the present stage. Government organizations-
specifically the think tanks- are organized on hierarchical lines, whereas NGOs, donor and
business organizations are more often organized in horizontal lines, a feature paradoxically
praised by all professionals including those working within state agencies.
Fig. 3.3. Professionals and their occupational spheres
Government
NGO Donors
Think Tanks
Private
sector
FDI,
DDI
Interestingly, professionals of the Human Right scene-such as Kem Soka and Ou Virak, the
American-Cambodian Secretary General of the Alliance for Freedom of Expression in
Cambodia (AFEC), and current Director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights
(CCHR)- are directly or indirectly affiliated with the former Son San Party. Issues on their
agendas include fierce critiques of nepotism, corruption, illegal practices of the CPP, and
essentially of the Government. They are in favor of a radical ‘modernization’ of the political
system towards a liberal democracy. Professionals in the CCHR introduced in 2002 public
‘open forums’ in each of the Cambodia’s eighty-five districts, and opened one of the few non-
state controlled radio stations. The organization gained the support of volunteers in each of
the 1,621 communes and engaged in broad sensibilization campaigns for people’s rights and
also for Democracy, during which it gathered complaints and organized public gatherings in
almost each commune.
As the campaigns were very successful, the professionals founded the Human Rights Party
(HRP) in 2007 with Kem Sokha at its leader. Ou Virak took over the leadership as president
47 A loose association of professionals working in donor agencies such as the World Bank, Ministries such as the
Ministry of Economy and Finance and of Consultants.
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of the CCHR and in the last elections, in July 2008, the HRP officially gained three seats in
the National Assembly. Kem Sokha, who studied chemical engineering in Prague, was
involved in politics since the departure of the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC). First he was Secretary General of the Buddhist Liberal Democratic
Party, the former Khmer People National Liberation Front (KPNLF) of Son San (see Annex
4).48 In 1995, the party changed its name into the Son San Party. In 1999, when the Son San
Party merged with the FUNCIPEC Party, Prince Rannaridh appointed Sokha as Deputy
Secretary General in the ‘new’ FUNCIPEC Party. Later on he was appointed senator and
chairman for the Commission on Human Rights and Reception of Complaints in the Senate.
As he saw this type of activity as unconstitutional, leaving the Government to form the
Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR) in 2002 with the support funding from
USAID, to focus on human rights education and forums for open dialogues.
Professionals working for NGOs and especially for Human Rights NGOs-such as the
Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR), ADHOC, Khmer Youth Association, Alliance
for Freedom of Expression in Cambodia, Cambodian Defenders Project, and Licadho- are
generally perceived as the de facto opposition. Their rhetoric, funding, and entourage reflect
the structure and feature of classical opposition parties. They generally do not have any ties to
the administrative and political elite as they come from a politically and economically
marginalized strata of the Cambodian society.
3.3. Case studies
Although professionals in Cambodia come from different backgrounds, at one point in their
lives they have made similar decisions that have had an important impact on the formation of
new worldviews and the adoption of similar lifestyles. In the case of state employed
professionals, three different vintages with similar social backgrounds can be identified. In the
donor organizations and non-governmental organizations, professionals with various social
backgrounds exist within their administration. Comparable to state professionals, there are
also three different vintages that studied abroad and were later recruited to work for the aid
industry.
3.3.1. Case studies of professionals working as civil servants
With the exception of the first-vintage, professionals working within the state administration
have a tendency to share specific characteristics with regards to their respective backgrounds.
Indeed, the first-vintage had a situational advantage during the early 1980s. As qualified
individuals were rare in these years, the opportunity to study abroad was generally offered to
48 The tri-party, anti-Vietnamese, coalition was set up in 1982 along the Thai-Cambodian border. It was also
comprised of the royalist FUNCIPEC led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, and Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer
Rouge party headed by Khieu Samphan. This Government -in-exile was officially recognized by the United
Nations and it occupied the Cambodian seat at the United Nations until the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement
in 1991. The party was founded in October 1979 to oppose the Vietnamese occupying forces and Vietnamese
installed Government in Phnom Penh. He joined the negotiation process resulting in the signing of the Paris
Peace Agreements in 1991 that paved the way for the United Nations supervised elections in 1993. Just before
the election, the KPNLF was renamed into the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party.
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individuals who could prove their intellectual performance. In contrast, the second- and third-
vintages differ as a result of social change. Due to an increase in social standing and a more
stable political system, coming from a privileged background increased their chance of
entering elite and private universities. Currently, the Government tends to recruit graduates
from these privileged backgrounds; thereby it fosters the formation of a group of professionals
that share common high social standing.
A prominent figure of the first-vintage, the so-called ‘Russian vintage’ was born in 1965 in
Phnom Penh, during the ‘Golden Era’ under Sihanouk. After Hun Sen’s nomination as Prime
Minister of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea in 1984, he was awarded a scholarship to
study in Moscow/Russia. In Russia, he obtained a Master of Arts (1990) and a Doctoral
Degree (1993) in Philosophy and Political Science from Moscow State University as well as a
Diploma in International Business (1992) from the Moscow School of Business. In 1993 he
returned to Cambodia and directly entered the state administration at a very high position as
the Assistant to the newly elected co-Prime Minister, following the first democratic election.
Shortly after, he moved into a position with the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) as
Advisor to Senior Administrators, one of whom was in charge of the Cambodian
Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB). Later he was employed by the MEF and by
1999 he was elected Secretary of State and appointed Member of the Board of Governors for
the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC). In 2001 he was then nominated as Chairman of the
Supreme National Economic Council (SNEC) with the rank of Minister, and in 2003 he was
nominated as an Alternate Governor for Cambodia on the Council of Governors for the Multi-
lateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). He is regarded as the role model for the
younger professionals, as he represents the idea that as a professional one could be successful
within the bureaucracy on the basis of knowledge and qualification as opposed to ‘sole’
connections.
The current Team Leader of the International Team Project (ITP) of the United Nations War
Crimes Court (UNWCC) and Deputy Secretary General of the Council for Administrative
Reform (CAR) belongs to the second vintage of professionals that studied abroad. Born in
Kirivon/Takeo in 1976, to a relatively wealthy Sino-Khmer family, his father owned an
import-export business trading with rice, petrol, medicine, and other basic consumption
imported from Thailand. His wife, who was raised by relatives in Singapore, comes from a
Sino-Khmer family of diamond traders and jewelers. Until the departure of the Khmer Rouges
in 1979, he and his family lived in a refugee camp near the Thai Border. After the intrusion of
the Thai army into the camp they fled to Siem Reap where they stayed until 1983. Afterwards,
they moved to Phnom Penh where he enrolled in the Primary School of Tuol Sleng and went
to the Svay Prey High School. After high school he received a highly competitive scholarship
from the state to study at the Faculty of Law and Economics, now the Royal University for
Law and Economics (RULE). Hence he went on to study at the Royal School for
Administration (RSA) from 1998 to 2000 where he graduated with a High Diploma in General
administration. Parallel to that, he attended night classes at the National University of
Management (see Annex 18). As a direct result of his high score on an exam taken at the end
of his studies, he was recruited by the COM to work at the Council for Administrative Reform
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(CAR).49 In his function as personal assistant50 to the new Secretary General of the CAR, he
was responsible for preparing the diagnostic report on corruption and to develop the
Government Action Plan (GAP). After the successful approval of the GAP, he was assigned to
work on the coordination of the Governance Project. His mother then introduced him to the
minister in charge of the COM during a Katan ritual51 in 2001. From that time on, he became
a special “protégé” of the Minister. In 2003, he was awarded a German scholarship from
InWent to complete a Masters in Public Management in Potsdam. After his return, he began
his work as Deputy Secretary General and joined one year later Khmer Rouge Tribunal as
Team Leader of the international team of administrators.
Similarly, the Chief Deputy of Office Fourteen of the National Audit Authority (NAA) who
belongs to the third-vintage of professionals, was born to a rather wealthy family. His family
owns a large construction business, and his father is a well know businessman in Phnom
Penh. After graduation from the prestigious Lycee Sisowath (see Annex17), the former school
of the early democrats and intellectuals such as Keng Vannsak and Ieng Sary in the 1940s and
1950s, he went on to complete his Bachelor in Business Administration at the private Norton
University. Following his studies, he worked at the Information Computer School for two
years and in 2002 was assigned to work at the National Audit Authority. In the meantime he
passed the International Certificate of Public Accounting (ICPA) and started his Masters in
Business Administration at the Charleston University. In 2003, he created his own company
dealing with Remote Management Systems.
3.3.2. Case studies of professionals working for donor organizations
In contrast to the professionals working within the state administration, professionals
employed in donor organizations come from various social backgrounds and hence form the
most socially heterogeneous subgroup. Within this subgroup are represented professionals
from the same upper middle class as the state professionals as well as professionals with a
rural background that ‘received’ their social calling during the early phases of the UNTAC
Mission. They also differ from the first-vintage evident among state professionals who were
recruited in the mid to end 1980es, at a time when the Government recruited all trained
professionals as a means to extends its intellectual base. For professionals from the second
and third vintages, donor organizations are highly attractive. Donor agencies offer the
freedom to make decisions, to take initiative regarding the policies that are pursued and are
financially rewarding. However in the short run, the majority engaged in the aid industry
wishes to improve its knowledge, i.e. increase its cultural capital rather than its economic
49 At the end of the studies the students have to pass an exam, from which the scores are ranked. Students with
the highest score of Royal School for Administration go to the Council of Ministers, the second best go to the
Ministry of Interior and the last group goes to the other line Ministries.
50 Together with the Canadian advisor contracted by CIDA.
51 A monthly ritual that aims at collecting donations for the Buddhist temple; here networking alliances are
formed as predominant members of society are expected to attend.
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base. Similarly to the other groups of professionals, financial resources are acquired though
processes of hybridization.
To illustrate, the Economist at the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit of the
World Bank in Phnom Penh, comes from a rather ‘wealthy’ background. His father works at
the Ministry of Mine, Industry & Energy. After the departure of the Khmer Rouge in 1979, his
family moved to Phnom Penh, where he enrolled in the Revolution School. His parents then
enrolled him in the Secondary School at Wat Ko (Island Pagoda) and the prestigious Lycee
Sisowath. After his graduation in 1990, he was admitted to the RULE. There he graduated at
the top of his class in 1995 and, as a result, was recruited by the National Cambodian Banks
Association and was assigned to work at the Pacific Bank. At the bank, he worked in the agro-
credit department as a finance officer. Six months later he was appointed to work at the
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). There he had worked as an economic assistant in
charge of writing the quarterly macroeconomic reports for the Minister. In 1998 he received a
scholarship to complete his Masters in Economics and Trade in Australia, following his
family’s educational pattern of obtaining high-level degrees in economic related fields at
universities abroad. He came back in 2000 and went to work for the Cambodian Development
Research Institute (CDRI) for two years. In 2002, he applied for a job at the World Bank and
was the successful applicant out of 120 others. There, he holds the position of Country
Economist responsible for updating information on trade regulations. He enjoys his current
professional environment and at the moment he does not want to go back to the MEF. His
incentive for working at the World Bank rests on his belief that he can learn a lot as the
position provides numerous training opportunities, which he believes are very important to
improve his knowledge base. He thinks that the World Bank further offers a good salary and a
perfect working atmosphere.
Similarly, the Governance Program Assistant at the Japanese Donor Agency (JICA) whose
father is the Chairman of a state shipping company in Sihanoukville and official at the
Ministry of Mines, Public Work and Transport,52 comes from a privileged background. He
belongs to the third vintage of professionals. Born in 1979 in Phnom Penh after the departure
of the Khmer Rouges, he completed schooling in 1996; in the same year he received a state
scholarship to study at the National University of Management (NUM) where he graduated in
2000. After his graduation in 2000, he worked as a manager in a garment factory where he
was in charge of controlling the quality and the production process. However, he decided to
further his studies and applied and received a scholarship from Japan, where he completed a
Masters in International Trade. After his studies in 2003, he was offered a scholarship from
the International Monetary Fund to study at the prestigious Keo University in Japan but he
refused the offer and applied53 for a position within the Cambodian Development Committee
(CDC), although the position was poorly paid. At the CDC he received some insights into the
drafting process of the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) and had his first
professional encounters with international experts. He also realized that he did not like the
52 He used to be a medical doctor before he worked at the Ministry.
53 The position was low-paying with a very low salary of 35 USD per day, but he did not care about the pay
since he wanted to gain some experience in the public sector (2003-2004).
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public servant style and preferred to be a manager (time management and quality assurance).
After one year, he received an offer from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency
(JICA).54
Similar to the Governance Program Assistant at the Japanese Donor Agency (JICA), the
Research Assistant of the Resident Representative of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
belongs to the third vintage of professionals. His father worked as a Government Official at
the Provincial Department for Commerce. The IMF employee was born in Battambang in
1981 and went to high school in Phnom Penh until 1997. In 1997 he passed the exam to enter
the NUM. He studied there until 2001 and received a scholarship to further his studies at AIT
in Bangkok and at the Ecole Superieure de Commerce in Paris until 2003. Upon his return in
November 2003, he received an offer to work for the IMF in Phnom Penh as Research
Assistant.
In contrast, the Program Manager of the Governance Cluster of UNDP comes from a rather
modest-family background. His father, a driver for a tobacco company, died during the
Khmer Rouge period. He and his siblings hence grew up with their mother who had a hard
time securing their livelihood. During his time in public high school, he took extra courses in
English at the ‘English street’ behind the Royal Palace. In 1991 he was recruited by the
Advanced Mission of the United Nations to Phnom Penhas a communication clerk in charge
of the inventory of the communication centre of the mission. Simultaneously, he was often
demanded by the civil police to translate issues like Khmer complaints. Shortly thereafter, he
was employed as an Administrative Clerk at the civil police of the UN. Afterwards he
received a junior position at USAID and later was promoted to a senior position, finally
ending as a Project Assistant at USAID. From 1996 to 2000, he took classes at the NUM and
graduated with a Bachelor of Administration. From 2002 to 2004, he was granted a Fulbright
Scholarship and went to Pennsylvania University in Philadelphia. While in the USA, he
volunteered for the Cambodian Association for Seniors, which aimed at integrating older
Khmer into American society. When he returned from the States, he approached the UNDP
advisor at the time, who recommended him for the position of the UN Representative for
Cambodia for the Governance unit. He was then invited by the UNDP and passed the regular
assessment to enter into service. He works closely with the professionals in the state
administration.
Similarly, the Program Officer for Human Rights and Democracy of the European Delegation
of the European Commission to Cambodia, who belongs to the second vintage comes as well
from a modest family. He was born in Pret Mey, Kandal Province in 1973 and then moved to
Svay Rieng province until 1979 as his family had to flee the Khmer Rouges. From 1980 to
1987, they stayed in Kandal province and in 1987 he moved to Phnom Penh where he
enrolled in Sankomut High School. In 1990, after his graduation, he decided to flee to
Australia but was held in Indonesia for two years. Upon his return in 1992, he studied English
at the Royal University of Phnom Penh until 1997 and then obtained a job as a translator at
UNESCO. In 1998 he was employed by the European Commission Support Election Process
54 His life motto is a Japanese one: Kaisan, which means keeping improving on an incremental basis for a better
future. The philosophy behind the word was developed in the 1970s by the Japanese automobile industry.
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(ECSP) also as a translator. Then he worked for four months in the Cambodian Association of
Manufacturers as assistant. In 1998 he worked at the UNOHCHR for three years also as an
assistant translator. He then worked as a volunteer for the United Nations Volunteers (UNV)
program and was sent to Eritrea for six months. Upon his return, he took law classes during
the night at the Royal University of Law and Economics (RULE). In 2003 he was awarded a
Humphrey Scholarship but had to wait one year before he could start his studies in the USA.
In the meantime he worked at the UNV office for six months in the human rights department.
From 2004 to 2005, he completed his Masters in International Legal Studies at the
Washington School of Law. Upon his return to Cambodia, he was employed as a Program
Officer for Human Rights and Democracy at the European Delegation of the European
Commission to Cambodia (EDECC). He enjoys his current position because it allows him to
make his own decisions, take initiative, and openly express his ideas. He particularly likes the
management style at the delegation of the European Commission (EC).
3.3.3. Case study of a professional in a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)
NGO professionals differ slightly from those of both the state and donor organizations but
hold more similarities with the latter. They also enjoy the freedom that their organizations
offer, but of greatest importance for these professionals is a sense of morality when it comes
to their careers. Their educational experience generally led them to spend a long time living
abroad, thus gaining further insight into how other societies are administered and organized.
Some NGO professionals come from the first-vintage re-entering Cambodian society, after a
period of exile. Effectively, they remain ‘outside of the system’ with a critical stance on how
Cambodian society should be changed.
The Head of the Monitoring Section of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development
Association (ADHOC) belongs to the second vintage and comes from a rather poor rural
background. He was born in 1970 in Prey Veng Province, where he went to school until 1989,
when he received a scholarship from the former GDR to study in East Berlin, at a time when
scholarships were given in a more fair way as the children of the ‘elites’ were too young to
study overseas. However after a few months after his arrival, the Berlin wall came down and
he fled to West Germany, as he feared that all Cambodian students would be repatriated. In
1990 he fled to Aschaffenburg in Germany where he stayed in the refugee hall for one year.
In 1991 he could get in touch with a former professor from the Humboldt University (HU) in
Berlin. This latter event helped him register for Law and Political Studies at the HU and get a
scholarship from the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). He met his wife who was
studying German Studies at the HU during this time. In 1999, he successfully passed the
‘Staatsexamen’ and applied in March 2000 for a job at a Cambodian Human Rights NGO,
AdHoc. Hence, upon his return to Phnom Penh in 2000 he started as the Coordinator of the
Women’s Rights Section of AdHoc where he prepared teaching material for women in the
villages and the statistics for the annual report of the central office. He didn’t want to work for
the Government as he knew that he could hardly change their ‘mentality’. Since his time in
Germany, he has become used to talking openly and freely and working without strong
hierarchies. Moreover, if he worked within the Government, he would have had to join a party
and the party could silence his opinions. He also believes that it is better to stay ‘clean’ and
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neutral instead of resulting to bribes, so he looked for a position in a organization where he
could avoid corruption. In 2002 he successfully published the first annual report of AdHoc.
As a result, he was promoted to the Chief of the Monitoring Section (dealing with Women,
Land and Human rights). He also created a database system where all the incoming reports on
human rights abuses countrywide are kept and managed.
3.3.4. A comparative case study of a professional employed in the private sector
The life story of the current CEO of MAXIMA, a rural and small business credit bank and
Advisor to the Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce, can be used as a comparative case. This
case study underscores the agency that Cambodian professionals have with regard to choice of
profession.
The entrepreneur comes from a rather wealthy urban business family. He is a neutral example
of the second vintage of professionals. He was born in 1972, and from 1975 to 1979 his
family was displaced to Kampong Cham (eighteen km north of Phnom Penh). He remembers
being in a cooperative separated from his parents carrying rice, fertilizer, and helping with
construction work. However, in 1978, just before the end of the Pol Pot regime, he was able to
rejoin his parents. From 1979 to 1980, he stayed north of the Phnom Penh (suburb) working
as a farmer and repairing bicycles. He graduated from Chatomuk High School in 1989. One
year later, he was awarded a state scholarship to study at the prestigious National University
of Management55 (NUM). There, he graduated with a Masters in Business Management and
Economics in 1995. He then worked at the American Friend Services Committee56 as an
administrative accountant. However, three months later he was appointed by the Government
to work at the Ministry for Fisheries, Agriculture, and Forestry as the Chief of Cabinet until
1998. In 1998 he was transferred to the Ministry of Rural Development as a counterpart to the
World Bank staff and assistant to the Minister. In the same year he started a one-year English
course of the Australian Language Program, funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
After completion of the first course, he undertook another two-year, pre-departure English
course-the English Academic Purpose (EAP)- funded by the Australian Government with the
aim to study in Australia. Upon completion of the second course in 2000, he received a
scholarship in Australia and graduated successfully in 2002 from Victoria University of
Technology in Melbourne with a Masters in Business Management. Before leaving for
Australia, he and five of his closest friends funded their own micro-credit NGO that they
baptized “Maxima”. After he returned from his studies, he was nominated Deputy Chief of
the Asian Coordination Unit within the Ministry of Rural Development. In the same year, his
company applied for a credit at the Rural Development Bank and from two international
NGOs: one from Luxembourg and the other from Italy. By June 2006, he and his colleagues
had gathered a budget of 500,000 USD and became one of the most influential and important
microfinance operators in the country. In the same year, he was nominated Vice President of
the Australian Alumni Association.
To some extent, particularly the professionals with an advantageous background, have the
ability to choose their career paths. However, in spite of their career choices, they all wish to
55 Former Faculty of Business.
56 An NGO that focuses on rural health care, sanitation, water supply, and community development in Prosat.
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improve both their own lives and that of other Cambodians. Thus, modernization of
Cambodian society is a key concern for professionals, a fact that unites them across
professional boundaries.
3.3.5. Analysis
In short, the professionals in these three subgroups-namely those working for the state
administration, those working for donor organizations, and those working in the NGO scene-
constitute as well three groups with distinct educational backgrounds57.
Professionals working for the state generally have studied in elite universities such as the NUM,
the RULE, and the Royal School for Administration (see Annex 18) prior to studying abroad.
Professionals of the NGO scene, on the other hand, did not have the social advantage of
entering elite universities. Thus, many studied at the Royal University of Phnom Penh
focusing on more reflective and critical subjects such as mathematics, linguistics, and
teaching preparation. Finally, the subgroup ‘professionals working for donor organizations’ is
the most heterogeneous group, as it included professionals from privileged and elitist
background as well as professionals from a poorer background that were promoted during the
UNTAC period.
Nevertheless, the similarities between Cambodian professionals go beyond basic common
experiences, such as their year of birth (all were born either shortly before or during the
Khmer Rouge Regime) or their family’s choice to move shortly after their birth to larger cities
such as Phnom Penh. The most substantial linking experience, identified by most as a decisive
moment in their lives, was the choice to study abroad.
Furthermore, largely Sino-Khmer or ethnic Chinese, many either have a grandfather or a
mother that descends from Chinese migrants. This confirms Kiernan’s findings, which
illustrate that in the 1970s Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese were numerically predominant in
Phnom Penh (Kiernan, 1982). Ethnicity is another indirect factor for making it into the ranks
of the professionals as the Sino-Khmer and ethnic Chinese form a sub-community in
Cambodia that has wide-reaching networks in the region and worldwide, and this is often used
for the exchange of resources and information. Professionals without a “family” advantage
must have contact with agencies or organizations in order to access, or at least facilitate the
process of obtaining, scholarships for studying.
These experiences and specifically, the career path they take, creates a dichotomy between
state and donor/NGO professionals in Cambodia. Their educational background and their
chosen occupational spheres lead to the development of specific cognitive structures, that
despite the similarities, lead to a fundamental conflict between the choice of strategies for the
respective groups.
57 Professionals working in the private sector are used as a comparative case as these have the highest agency to
choose their profession.
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3.4. Patterns of self-organization: professional organizations
The professional’s ability to form organizations and political parties gave them prominence in
political life during the anti-colonial struggles. But this does not remain the case in
contemporary Cambodia; the political engagement of current young professionals is rather
limited: 40% of young professionals interviewed were members of professional organizations,
and 20% were committee members of Government bodies that have influence on policy
decisions.
The alumni associations are generally used by young professionals to initiate, maintain, and
influence their relationships with different social institutions. They function further as
platforms or interfaces between alumni, their educational organizations, political actors,
business people, and others. The most important are the Australian Alumni Association (AAA),
L’IDEE Khmer, the Japanese Alumni Association, the National University of Management’s
(NUM) Alumni Association, and the Asian Institute of Technology’s (AIT) Alumni
Association. Scholars that go to AIT for graduate studies generally have done their bachelor at
the NUM.
L’IDEE Khmer, also known as the Russian Alumni Association, was one of the first
associations formed by the first-vintage of young professionals who came back from Russia.
In contrast, the AAA forms along with the Japanese Alumni Association, the most active
associations. The association counts a total membership of 290 alumni and was created by an
incentive of the Australian International Development Program (IDP). Australian universities
established the IDP in 1969 to represent Australian education overseas and to provide a
mechanism for both universities and the Australian Government to channel education and
training aid to developing countries in Southeast Asia. The organization is still owned by
universities in Australia, but is now independent from the Australian Government and
operating internationally.
It has been based in Cambodia since 1992. Since then, it offers English teaching through the
Australian Centre for Education, student counseling to study in Australia and examination
services such as the International English Language testing System (IELTS). It also
implements development projects, organizes event management and public activities, and
offers alumni support for graduates of Australian universities. Thus, this has fostered the
creation of an AAA, which was mainly conceived as a platform to help share ‘development’
expertise, to create a network of experts to advise Australian and Cambodian institutions on
social and economic issues and to share the experiences gained in Australia.
With the increasing number of Cambodians who have studied in Australia in
recent years, we have come together to form this association to help each other
and at the same time to assist the development of Cambodia into an equitable and
prosperous society. As a non-profit and non-political organization, we hope to
contribute to the well-being of society.
Charta of the Australian Alumni Association, 2006
The association sees itself as an organization that is able to assemble the alumni from
Australia to positively implement the association's objectives in a professional and
responsible way, and to represent the Australian alumni inside and outside Cambodia. The
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members of the association meet on a regular basis for ‘dinners’ where Australian and other
experts give specific issues such as strategic planning in Government or perspectives on
changes in Cambodia.
In comparison to the first two associations, L’IDEE Khmer and the AAA, the AIT Alumni
Association is rather young. Its aim is largely to integrate young professionals once they
return from Thailand. The association is trying to become more active since the election of
their new and young president, a professor of Pagnasat University.58 The dynamic president
intends to create a board of trustees (composed of all the ex-presidents and the current
president) in order to secure continuity over time. That trustee committee will act as a
consultative group. Furthermore, the association wants to edit a newsletter and to engage in
research. With a total membership of 319 alumni, it is divided into four committees;
committees for Sport, Business, Environment, and Internal affairs. The members are all
graduates from AIT in Bangkok. But the active core consists of 40 to 50 members. The
scholarships granted to the AIT students are generally given by donors and especially by the
French embassy and the Swedish Technical Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Most of the
graduates who receive a scholarship from a donor agency work for that agency when they
return; few work for the Government. Scholars that go to AIT for graduate studies generally
have completed their bachelors at NUM.
The aim of the association is to build networks and a good reputation, but also to ensure
financial support and old values such as respect for elders. As the president points out:
through respect, they might gain their trust and still fulfill their plans. Thus, ‘playing the
game’ is a feasible solution. Following its president, even though the older generation has a
low education, they are making efforts to integrate the younger generation to fulfill their
technical tasks. In his view, there is a strong divide between the two generations, observed
during the meetings: the older vintage meets to discuss the political issues and the younger, to
discuss the technical issues (on conferences, seminars, etc.). In the realm of the political, they
stand behind the older vintage. The young people, in his words, are committed to change but
remain under the constraints of the older vintage; hence, the former must adapt to, gain the
trust of, and give the demanded respect to the latter in order to achieve their goals.
The Alumni Association of the National University of Management is one of the biggest
associations. It is a rather young and ‘informal’ association, since the initial preparations to
give the association an organizational status only began in 2006 along with their
representation on the World Wide Web. Having a homepage was cited as vital instrument to
share ideas. Alumni of this university maintain the strongest ties after their studies, share
information for job purposes, invite each other to their weddings and other ceremonies, or
meet for leisure activities. In addition, each class creates a mailing list through which they
communicate almost every day.
Finally, the Japanese Alumni of Cambodia (JAC) started with ten people in 2000, and as of
2007 had 70 members. The alumni association defines itself as a private, non-profit and non-
partisan organization acting as a platform for members to further contribute in the spirits of
58 Teaching at the Pagnasat University is in English; most of the documents and materials are also in English;
thus, in his words, the young generations are constantly confronted with Western values.
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intellectual, professional and cultural enrichment and growth. It offers different training to its
members, from vocational to college studies (i.e., graduates). Selection is completed jointly
by the Ministry of Education and Japan’s Ministry of Education. An entry exam is required
mainly in the natural sciences (i.e., mathematics, physics, chemistry and English); after the
high school interview, the candidates must first pass an oral interview. From those admitted,
approximately 70% study economics, 20% IT, and about 10% social sciences ( Ministry of
Education, 2006).
The JAC tries to distance itself from the AIT Network and L’IDEE Khmer, thereby criticizing
them of being unable to sufficiently fight for a radical change; they think that these alumni
association are still very much dominated by seniority principles. On the contrary, JAC
pledges for a radical change that must start with the reform of the education system (in
primary schools, etc.), and for the introduction of basic values for the JAC such as solidarity,
friendship, and brotherhood. The JAC is further connected to international networks through
its membership with Asian Council of Japan Alumni (ASCOJA) and the Japan Alumni
Network from ASEAN countries. The association further cooperates with political and
diplomatic agencies such as the Japanese Embassy in Cambodia, particularly in the promotion
of cultural and educational exchange programs between the two countries. They also
cooperate with Cambodian students still studying in Japan, through the Cambodian Students
Association in Japan (CSAJ), so as to mobilize financial funds for small development
projects.
Beside these alumni association, small and independent professional organizations such as
CamPro emerged in the past few years. These associations meet on an eclectic and sporadic
basis. CamPro can be described as a loose association and is not an alumni association;
however, it gathers key professionals who have generally studied abroad and who work in
important institutions such as the World Bank, UNDP, the Ministry of Health, CDRI, British
Tobacco, etc. They identify themselves as an alternative intellectual circle that focuses on
economic and other important policy issues, regardless of respective political backgrounds,
encouraging the development of alternative policy guidelines not only for the Government but
also for multilateral agencies such as the World Bank.
In spite of their tendencies to organize into professional organizations, most professionals’
political role is determined by their membership or non-participation within major political
parties such as the CPP or FUNCIPEC. Here, their ability to manage lead organizations has
made them attractive to the powerful leadership of these organizations. In other words, it is
less a matter of what they studied that forms bonds, but rather where they studied. This is
quite similar to what previously happened in the early years (after World War II).
3.5. Cognitive structures and lifeworlds: How Cambodian professionals think
Due to their educational socialization in urban centers overseas, Cambodian professionals
consider themselves apolitical technocrats belonging to the most modern section. Their
clients are no longer the common population, but the governmental elites, multinational
corporations, donor agencies and transnational NGOs, and their chosen professions
illustrate this. Hence, young professionals share multiple interfaces with these organizations,
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which they impress with their technical expertise and fluency of language; thereby they act as
facilitators for foreign aid and foreign investments. Has this special role led to an adoption of
distinct political and social attitudes that distinguish them from the local masses and the
political elite?
The following section will discuss the characteristics, attitudes, and cognitive structures of
professionals working in the Government sector that emerged in the case studies illustrated in
Section 3.1. There are few differences and several similarities in the perceptual structures and
embodied dispositions that organize the way professionals view the world and how they act
within it.
Professionals share quite a lot of characteristics, such as an urban middle-class lifestyle and
way of thinking, the means chosen to secure their lifestyles, the integration into the same
networks to exchange vital information, and a shared vision for change. The differences
mainly concern the approach and strategy they employ in order to achieve the change that
they envision. Indeed, in order to get recognized socially it is not sufficient enough to have a
high-level degree from a university abroad or to perform well. Seniority still plays a crucial
role. The tension arising between the older and rather conservative and the young innovative,
dynamic professionals hinders the latter’s ability to mobilize politically, since they fear that
this could jeopardize their position in society. Here, the professionals working within the
NGOs, especially those associated with human rights, demand radical and rapid change while
those that work within the Government system argue that change has to be slow, incremental,
and from within. This dichotomous approach creates a fracture point among the two groups of
professionals who otherwise share very common lifeworlds.
3.5.1. Similarities in lifestyles and cognition
Two clear and common features among professionals are their urban middle-class lifestyle
and their cognition patterns. In essence, all have studied in well-known universities and live in
cities. They define themselves as hard-working, assiduous, respectable, abstinent, and correct,
and are marked by a concern for both material interests and discipline. Interestingly, they
carry conventional and conservative ideas as to how women, married men, or elders ought to
behave. The nuclear family and a solid education are as important as a good job that would
provide enough money, but not too much, so as to live in luxury. Economically, most of them
belong to the better–off sections of society, often owning their own homes or living in the
homes of their wealthy parents, owning a car or two such as a Toyota Camry or Lexus, and
possessing real estate, usually outside Phnom Penh. Several interviewees owned houses that
they rented to international experts and likewise owned land for speculation purposes; indeed,
more and more professionals secure their access to local resources by buying land in rural areas.
Their family networks span across the US, Canada, France, and Australia. They watch CNN,
MTV Asia, BBC, the Japanese channel NHH, Discovery Channel, Channel New Asia, listen
to RFI, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and read the Financial and New York Times, as
well as local opposition and Government papers to ‘stay informed’. If they have children, they
go to international schools, or if they go to public schools, they also visit private schools
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where they learn English. At work, a professional appearance is very important and thus many
of them wear black trousers, a white shirt, and sometimes a tie for work.
The second similarity lies in the means they have chosen to secure their lifestyles, namely
though processes of hybridization. As national politics is not a field where it is easy to legally
earn substantial amounts of money, most of the professionals want to either establish their
own business or marry into business families in order to secure their finances. This is
regarded as a precondition for the successful entry into politics in the future, as participation
in the political sphere requires spending substantial amounts of money. In contrast to, for
example, politicians in Thailand where politics is a means to gain access to funds by using
political position, professionals in Cambodia use the combination of politics and business as
an important means to avoid corruption and to be on the safe side.
A third common feature is their integration into the same networks where they exchange
information on job opportunities, family issues, and world affairs with many other
professionals and actors from other sectors, from other countries. As the Adviser to the
Cabinet of the Prime Minister pointed out, “networking is an expression of good competence,
which for me is different from cronyism or nepotism” (2006).
In these networks professionals distinguish between good friends, generally classmates from
university with whom they develop close relations and with whom they plan their long term
careers (lifelong friends), and acquaintances:
I classify my friends into two categories: First, the brother type of friend, whom I
trust and with whom I share confidence, loyalty, honesty, faithfulness, regular
communication, and whom I can count on in any case; second acquaintances
which I have to be friends with in order to prevent them from being against
me[…]. My strategy is to make friends in various line ministries and universities.
Sometime I can ask friends in higher positions to promote other friends in lower
positions, a common friend generally. The more I know people the easier it is for
me to work.
Deputy Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform, 2006
I have two kinds of friends: close friends generally my former classmates with
whom I share the same ideas and feelings and with whom I have great solidarity.
We are honest and loyal with/to each other and I can expect their help in any
case. The other category of friends includes many people whom I meet for a
drink, to go to Karaoke bars, or with whom I travel on weekends.
Director of the Economics and Finance Institute located at the Ministry of Economy
and Finance, 2006
The young professionals are very careful to ‘save face’ among themselves, especially when
they talk about politics. Interestingly, the size of the network closely correlates to the social
background of the people involved.
When you come from a rural family it is very difficult to get friends in Phnom
Penh; but the higher your education is, the more social prestige you have, and the
more friends you can make in Phnom Penh.
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Advisor to the Prime Minister at the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, 2006
When I meet my friends I do not talk about issues of my work at the Ministry, it
will quickly be known and I might get a lot of problems. […] I follow a different
approach: I am mingling quietly for the time being in the government sector and
when “the time is ripe”, I will get politically active.
Deputy Director general of finance and accounting of the Ministry of Labor and
Vocational Training, 2006
Horizontal networks are used by professionals to share vital information outside the established
communication channels of the civil service and generally overlap the networks of graduates of
the same Cambodian universities, usually from the same class. The majority, except the
professionals in NGOs, has studied in elite universities such as the National University of
Management, the Royal University of Law and Economics, and the Royal School for
Administration, prior to studying abroad. These universities are elitist in nature; in order to
gain entry a potential student has to meet stringent qualifications, including successful
completion of an entrance exam. Furthermore, it is also necessary to have pre-existing social
connections that would provide applicants with an essential advantage. For example, those
who come from a well-situated family are more successful at gaining entrance. Once
admitted, professionals generally study law and economics and graduates are automatically
recruited into civil service. Once in the Government apparatus, they have access to further
opportunities to study in prestigious universities overseas.
Generally, professionals employed by NGOs did not have the social advantage needed to
enter elite universities. Thus, many studied at the Royal University of Phnom Penh, focusing
on more reflective and critical subjects such as mathematics, linguistics, and teaching
preparation. This experience put them in direct contact with the NGO sector and essentially
enabled them to obtain scholarships to study at well-known universities abroad, such as John
Hopkins in the USA. The first and second vintages of graduates from these universities were
selected by the Ministry of Education to work as teachers all over the country.59
For both groups, friendship networks created during their academic career are maintained
throughout, even after they have studied abroad. This shared experience creates bonds and
obligations and determines friendship structures. Upon return to Cambodia, they reintegrate
these networks.
A fourth shared common point is their vision for change. They all aspire to develop the
country to change it into a flourishing modern society on the basis of Buddhist values. They
also share the idea that this change has to come from a new generation, specifically, a new
generation that has the knowledge and the energy to make the change. In other words, change
has to be brought by them. Consider the following remarks:
Cambodia will change soon and people with [technical] knowledge will have a
good life.
Assistant auditor of Audit Office 1 at the National Audit Authority, 2006
59 Interestingly, there is a similarity here to the professionals involved in the struggle for independence who were
also employed by the Ministry of Education.
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I think that democracy comes when the people have a better life, when basic
needs are satisfied, people have a higher salary, a better education, especially the
civil servants who are the “backbone of the society”.
Advisor to the Prime Minister at the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, 2006
The biggest change for all came from the transition from being a student to being a state
professional with responsibility. All the young professionals share a sense of being part of a
new generation, defined as hard working and highly skilled, and distinguishable from the old
generation. In contrast to their seniors, these young professionals prefer to share their ideas,
raise issues openly, and discuss publicly. All have experienced an important change in their
working style since their studies. They consider themselves to be members of a young
generation that works faster, has better communication patterns both horizontally and
vertically, and does a qualitatively better job than their elder colleagues. One professional
mentioned that in the past he used to relax and did not worry about his job. But after being
abroad he observed other professionals working hard to change their country and their
achievements. This motivated him to work in the same way for his country, i.e., in an
effective, innovative, and flexible manner.
You never know actually what your next move will be but you have to be
prepared for everything and every time.
Deputy Director General of the Reform Committee of the Ministry of Economy and
Finance, 2006
I think the concept of change has to be integrated into all sectors, the young
professional outside the government has to make pressure on it, because in a
long-term perspective the technocrats inside the government hope to make
coalitions with the other young professionals.
Deputy Director General of finance and accounting of the Ministry of Labor and
Vocational Training, 2006
3.5.2. Differences resulting from vertical integration
Even though professionals share similar goals, the opinions with regard to which strategies
are the best means to reach these aims differ widely. This causes a divide between the two
groups, despite the similarities that they may share. Three distinct differences emerge: the first
surrounds the pace of change, the second concerns political involvement, and the third centers
on the generational divide and how it affects everyday experiences. These are essential
problems for professionals in the Cambodian context.
We all [professionals in the government and the NGO’s] have the same objective
to meet each other at the political top one day; we will join together because we
share the same objectives and the same vision of a “clean society”. At the moment
we have different approaches. The other [NGO; Private sector] want a fast
change, but you can not push things too much. There is a proverb in Khmer that
says intellectuals are easy to lead but not easy to control, those who have a lower
education are easy to control but hard to lead. You can tell intellectuals to go a
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certain way but you have to explain everything; Sam Rainsy [leader of an
opposition party in Cambodia] takes advantage of his professional background
when he speaks of the “clean” society, with a lot of prosperity and jobs for the
young generation. Even I, a member of the CPP, accept his vision. But I do not
share his approach. He wants to control the intellectuals but this is going to be
very difficult.
Deputy Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform, 2006
In short, as illustrated by the quote above, the first difference rests on the question of fast,
radical change versus adapted, incremental change. Many professionals in leading positions in
NGOs, especially those focusing on Human Rights, share common characteristics that are
typical among other professionals in similar positions. In their view, if modernization is to
occur, then swift, radical change along technical pragmatic lines is needed immediately. In
contrast, the non-NGO professionals seek to satisfy their personal needs first. Once they are in
a secure position they might consider changing society. They view their studies as an
investment in their own person and expect a good rate of return from it. They are eager to
apply their newly acquired knowledge in their jobs and to be able to live entirely from it
without being financially dependent on their parents. They want to make their own decisions
and obtain powerful positions within society. This is an important aim, which may take ten to
fifteen years to reach. In addition, reaching this powerful position implies not only the
successful practice of their skills but also the willingness to learn and play within the
prevalent political rules.
Furthermore, Government professionals believe that their technical skills alone would not
allow them to push their ideas through. Their time as professionals in their specific job
position is a probation time, a kind of training period; if they perform well they might get
further opportunities to work in higher positions within their respective organizations. In order
to move forward it is important to obtain more credit in the social environment, such as honor,
respect, a good reputation resulting from hard work and quiet attitudes, and to be known as a
person that never gets into trouble, one whom you can rely on; in short, to become a role
model in the Cambodian context. In this light, they feel that their contribution to society will
be different from that of their parents’ generation.
In contrast, professionals working for donor agencies or think tanks are somewhere in
between, depending on their social background. Those coming from wealthy and well-situated
families tend to follow the strategy of professionals in the civil service, whereas those who
‘have nothing to lose’ share the ideas of NGO professionals.
The second difference surrounds the need to get actively engaged in day-to-day politics. For
NGO professionals it is important to be politically engaged now, not in the future, and to
mobilize the population at large in support of their own political causes. Indeed, the President
of the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR) views himself as a ‘glimmer of hope’.
He sees himself and his organization as “the fearless, passionate, and uncompromising voice
of those who can’t speak for themselves in a country where criticism of the Government
makes one an enemy of the state and a target for defamation crimes” (2006).
Similarly the President of the Khmer Youth Association (KYA), a Cambodian NGO, is a
fervent defender of women rights and political participation. He engages in advocacy projects,
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drug prevention, and conflict resolution since he thinks that the Government is not doing
enough, but instead chooses to “remain focused on cronyism and corruption”. Before working
for the KYA, he wanted to be a businessman, but then felt compelled to engage in social
work. This decision was very influenced by an Australian social worker who worked with him
at the Initiative for change. He thinks that he is in a position to help society, especially the
youth; as the leader of an NGO he is free to discuss issues he thinks are relevant. Moreover he
has this position because of his ability, because of his capacity to do the work, and not
because of connections.
The other professionals working in donor agencies, think tanks, or state organizations
however, have more or less withdrawn, voluntarily or involuntarily, from active politics. Those
who want to engage directly in the business sector have rejected the idea completely, whereas
others, such as professionals in civil service, have just postponed the move to politics until
sometime in the future. The President of Maxima60 believes that engaging in politics does not
provide him as many opportunities as engaging in that business would. His aim is to build a
business ‘empire’, and thus he does not want to engage in politics, although he is currently the
advisor to Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce. He wants to contribute, once he is rich, to his
society by building orphanages and child facilities. He wishes to positively influence the next
generation by writing books about his own experiences in which he can share his ideas and
concepts. He learns everyday and tries to apply the newly obtained knowledge to his everyday
practices at work. He also aspires to continue his research in order to find innovative ideas on
how to improve the financial mechanisms in order to control the long-term cash flow of
people in the rural areas. In the future he plans to set up a business in Australia, and once his
children have finished their high school education, he will send them to Australia. He has
relatives in Melbourne, Las Vegas, Washington DC, and Paris.
In the same vein, the Secretary General of the Royal School for Judicial Profession thinks that
he has to wait to enter politics, but in five to ten years wants to begin actively engaging in
politics. To be successful in the political field, he is following a pattern: first he needs to build
a strong network; second, he must engage in party politics, including participating in
campaigns for Cambodian People Party (CPP) elections; third, he has to run his own business
(for example, a clinic); fourth, he must find a good wife; fifth, he must acquire good social
skills (i.e. to be respected and asked by people on the grassroots level what they need for their
schools, their irrigation systems, their hospitals, or their cooperatives); sixth, he must
distribute the money; and finally, he must build confidence. He thinks he needs more
experience in the real world; currently, many high-ranking politicians in high positions do not
have managerial skills and are floating in the air. Thus, step by step, he needs to acquire more
technical knowledge, which he has the opportunity to do in his current position.
The third and the most problematic difference exists in the valuation of seniority and
performance. Although all professionals feel that they belong to a new generation,
professionals working for NGOs, such as the Cambodian Centre for Human Rights (CCHR),
Licadho, and ADHOC, have a different view on how to deal with this generational divide than
60 a well known micro credit bank.
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those professionals who work within the bureaucracy. Therefore, they share a common
criticism of the older generation, which, to the young professionals, is a visible representation
of the previous system. The young professionals accuse their senior counterparts of having a
strong hierarchy based attitude, and also of thinking that the younger professionals can not
compete in the political arena. Furthermore, the older generation hinders day-to-day routines,
with their emphasis on formality and stiff ritualized interactions. Essentially, they can hardly
be reached to discuss important issues during working hours, they demand unnecessary
protocol, and they blame younger colleagues of employees of being hasty and disrespectful.
This stands in full contrast to the international professionals who are open to discussing
matters at any given time. They can be contacted directly via email and can be counted on to
give a direct and quick response.
There are some tensions between the old generation and the younger, and it is
very difficult to change their attitudes [OG bureaucrats]; we [the young
professionals] have to please them very much, which I think is very difficult; even
when you work hard and have high knowledge they don’t accept you. When you
stand in a line for example for a while, when they enter the room you have to give
them your place (ask them of course if they don’t mind coming forward in the
line, they expect it); people are not treated as equals like in Western countries; I
appreciate very much the Western style and dislike always asking the permission
for everything at the top levels and the complicated bureaucracy.
Information and Public Relation officer at the SEILA task force Secretariat, 2006
This is not to say that non-NGO professionals, particularly those working within the
bureaucracy, are not aware of the tensions resulting from the generational divide. They realize
that the older generation is instrumental as a source of advice and also that bureaucrats and
especially their patrons and patron brokers from the older generation still have a lot of power
to appoint, transfer, and promote officials; they will only be promoted when these latter
decide to do so. Young civil servants who can not get along well with their superiors are still
urged to respect them. As a result, they avoid direct competition, which means that they do
not challenge or provoke their superiors, which they are demanded to consider as their
‘uncles’. Even though they make decisions on what to do, members of the younger generation
still ask their senior colleagues for their opinions, if only to give them a feeling of being
consulted and valued, and most importantly, they do not mingle in the older generation’s
(OG) political affairs.
I do not want to have a better position in two years, this is too short. I think I
already have a very high position for my age. Some other people from the older
generation of the CPP wouldn’t accept it anyway, and they would just start to
hinder me in my plans and my career. I think I need more experience in the
professional, business, and political world; currently there are many high-
ranking politicians in high positions who do not have managerial skills and are
floating in the air. Step by step I need to acquire more technical knowledge and
social skills. I have the opportunity to do so in my current position. In Potsdam I
have learned a lot of theories; the challenge is to put these theories into practice,
to use the concepts at work. In ten years I will consider being minister or
Secretary of State.
Secretary General of the Royal School for Judicial Professions, 2006
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Especially as a young person it is important to acknowledge and understand the
senior politicians and senior social authorities (coined the “older generation”).
The older generation has achieved a lot and have more reasons than the young
professionals to be proud in terms of life sacrifices for their country. They have
invested far more in the society than the younger generation to get into the
positions they are now. If there wasn’t the war, they would have had studied as
well, because nobody wants to have a lower level of education.
Deputy Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform, 2006
Additionally, a Secretary of State mentioned, “the older generation knows that they need to
change and to adapt. But they have a practical knowledge which we still need to acquire.
They are familiar with a kind of day-to-day knowledge that we still do not master” (2006).
Young professionals in the bureaucracy think that older bureaucrats including their patrons
have achieved a lot in terms of social change, prestige, pacification, work, and in internal
ministerial organization, even if they did so very slowly, over a long period of time. In their
view, without the achievements of the senior ‘uneducated’ bureaucrats, the young
professionals would have no basis to start with. One of their competencies (the older
generation) is to link the past with the future. Even if this is not efficient, they are able to
identify problems very well and know how to resolve them with the people. They are
perceived as calm, serious, and as doing things carefully, and it is because of these social
skills that they have been promoted into their current positions. In whatever situation, as
explained by a young professional from the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR), to
obtain a responsible, high position you first need the vocation, second the experience, and
third a good social network of many people, educated or uneducated, who are connected to
each other and who can be mobilized easily.
We generally know the problems, but we do not have the social skills to deal with
the people around those problems, and thus do not have solutions to those
problems in the eyes of the people. The OG has the ability to negotiate, has good
communication skills, discuss a lot the social issues of the people, about religion in
the pagodas, about day-to-day problems. This way is very different from the
more anonymous, complicated, and technical expertise of the young
professionals. The old generation talks in simple words that everybody
understands.
TWG Coordinator at the Ministry of Health, 2006
Young professionals in the Cambodian administration think that modernization reform has to
start from within the system, within the established networks.
The people of the old generation (OG) think they have a lot experience, they do
not listen to the younger generation, they do not let them decide even if they have
the knowledge. The OG thinks that we have no experience. I think it is a
personality conflict the OG likes to walk, we like to run. The OG doesn’t like
changes, they keep the day-to-day things as usual and simple. They think that if
there is no problem why change the status quo. We like change. We have the
knowledge and thus indirectly the power. We are quick but sometimes make
mistakes; however with patience we can fix it and learn from it. I have a lot of
conflicts with the OG, however I try to cope with it by listening and by waiting.
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However the OG tries more and more to avoid conflicts as well. They are used to
facing a lot of problems since they were young. In five to ten years I think there
will be a change in the leadership towards a more professional setting. Cambodia
has a fast growing economic sector; the economic sector will push for
professionalism. I think Cambodia is still at the beginning; We are a small group
of very qualified intellectuals who are convinced that the “foreigners are not
better than us!”
Assistant Auditor of Audit Office at the National Audit Authority, 2006
Indeed, most young professionals in very high positions within the bureaucracy do not feel
that they are competing with the older generation. They (the professionals) are both different
and important.
You know, they want us to respect them. They want to ask for our advice,
pretend to be in control and to read the papers and books but they do not
actually understand the ideas they entail, they just simulate, but they are better
informed concerning the everyday practical issues since they have the experience.
Only few are very closed and fear to loose their position. They know that the
more they run away from us the more they will encounter new problems which
they do not understand, since they do not know how to manage the issues, lacking
the adequate technical tools. They are actually looking for a symbiosis with us,
where they can combine their experience and everyday knowledge of social issues
and our technical skills. They expect us to speak frankly to them about those
issues. We may be good managers, but we need as well to understand the feelings
and needs of our teammates, listen to them and provide solutions to their
problems. We need to be good listeners first. The young people have small
families and have small needs and problems, the older bureaucrats and
politicians have greater families and greater needs and thus need more. A good
manager or businessman is not automatically a good leader, especially if he
doesn’t care about the needs and feelings of the people around him but just tries
to maximize his profits and only pushes the people to reach his objectives.
Deputy Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform, 2006
Seniority, along with its collective responsibilities, is an important issue for young
professionals in key positions within the administration. Playing by the rules is the first step to
realizing their agendas and is a means to succeed professionally. Thereby, they constantly
face challenges by their senior colleagues and superiors within the bureaucracy.
Simultaneously, they are exposed to criticism from outside the administration, namely
criticism from professionals working for big business, donor organizations, or NGOs.
3.6. Behavior and practices within the Cambodian bureaucracy
This generational divide directly affects the development of behavioral patterns within the
Cambodian bureaucracy. Unlike professionals from NGOs, the career of Government
professionals is highly determined by the generational divide. Similar to the Thai bureaucracy
described by Dhiravegin (1978), the administrative system in Cambodia can be qualified as a
time-honored system. In other words, it is a system in which the institutional matrix is built
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along established distinctive norms, values, and patterns of behavior; the expectation for
behavior directly affects Government professional’s actions.
These protocols are a great part of their daily lives. Interpersonal relations within the
administration, such as the use of different pronouns to address one’s superior/patron, are
highly codified. Entering the administrative field involves learning its rules and behavioral
codes, such as how to stand, listen, sit, respond, and how treat superiors/patrons and
colleagues in the right way. However, to get in the good favor of the patron to be considered
for promotion it is not enough to know how to ‘deal with him’; it is also important to know
how to approach other actors in his network, such as the patrons wife and his own patron61.
Becoming a close ally with a patron’s wife is as effective as getting his favors directly. Young
professionals who want to be successful in the administrative game must be willing to act
against their individual principles sometimes.
This does not mean that they remain passive, waiting to get promoted whenever their
superiors or patrons make the decision; on the contrary, young professionals have to stay
alert, study their environment constantly, play the right roles in the right situation, plan their
intervention for an adequate amount of time. In other words they must gain local and practical
knowledge in the administrative field. Other behavior patterns that enable a quicker rise in the
administrative system include: being attentive, preparing and organizing para-professional
activities for their patrons (such as going to the markets and choosing the best fight cocks for
their bosses private hobby), attending marriages, offering expensive gifts as souvenirs (such
as golden cocks for the Chinese New Year), accompanying their patron to political meetings,
and most importantly helping them physically, ideologically, and financially strengthen their
power base. In other words, their loyalty implies defending and supporting their patron’s
interests in the political struggles for power. For the majority of the professionals interviewed
it is crucial to be part of the support base of powerful bureaucrats or politicians in order to
promote their own base. Similarly, as in the Thai bureaucracy described by Dhiravegin
(1978), success in the competitive Cambodian administration depends on the ability to follow
diverse strategies, handle different people, and learn specific codes of behavior, in order to be
pulled by powerful patrons, pushed by many clients, and supported by diverse friends.
Currently, young professionals are within promoted the higher civil service on the basis of
their qualifications and their social backgrounds. Until recently, it was necessary to have good
connections to the political elite; currently, however, holding a high academic degree or a
degree from a foreign institution has become one of the main requirements to enter higher
positions in the administration. In other words, possessing a high degree from a university
overseas has become the qualifying status symbol for membership in the administrative elite.
Generally, ambitious professionals who want to make a career in civil service or politics,
graduate with a Bachelors from an elite Cambodian university (NUM, RULE, or RSA),
complete their Masters in the USA, United Kingdom, or Australia, reintegrate into their
position in the bureaucracy and/or integrate into elite universities as lecturers. Being a lecturer
at a university is viewed as an intermediate and necessary stepping stone on the road to top
61 See the case of the National Police Commissioner Hok Lundy his relationship to the Prime Ministers wife Bun
Rany.
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administrative and political positions. These academic activities allow them to integrate the
networks of more powerful patrons. Social mobility and functional efficiency within the
Cambodian administration is thus achieved through the combination of educational
achievement and performance and the integration into competitive and powerful patron-client
networks, the result of which is a mixture of favoritism and merit.
The Ministry of Education, until very recently, controlled the distribution of highly
competitive scholarships, with priority being given to the candidates already working in civil
service and children of Government employees. The resource education and its valorization as
a prerequisite to enter the higher positions in the bureaucracy have been institutionalized
within the administrative practices. Until 2004 members of the bureaucratic elite mainly
monopolized this resource. In effect, this change in 2004 presented the possibility to enter the
bureaucratic elite while increasing the chances of persons with different backgrounds to
advance into the higher positions within the Cambodian administration. Modern and global
knowledge has become a decisive qualification in the competitive cooptation of young
professionals.
The young professionals have to stay professional when they go back into the
bureaucracy and have to take care of the procedures to benefit the future. They
do not ask for gift and presents but they receive them anyway and the OG
pressures them to accept these gifts. So they make some arrangement, knowing
that they can not completely accept the gifts if they follow the laws. So they
change some procedures. Then take 60% for the road construction and put 40%
in other channels. The quality of the road is then of course not of the best quality.
Deputy Director General of Finance and Accounting of the Ministry of Labor and
Vocational Training, 2006
Once employed within the apparatus, the young professionals are not accountable to extra
political institutions, but rather are accountable to their respective patrons who are generally
bureaucrats/technocrats in higher positions or politicians from the Cambodian People Party
(CPP). Different high cadres within the bureaucracy and within political parties, such as the
CPP, the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), and the Human Rights Party (HRP), have been competing
to attract young professionals into their networks since the early 1990s. The administrative
system’s symbolic and material resources, such as prestige, promotions, titles, and financial
benefits, have been played out to co-opt the professionals.
The rationale behind these tactics is to encourage loyal clients and to satisfy their demands so
that they do not leave. This culture of promotion has been well played by the CPP in
protecting their heads and their base. Similar to Riggs’ bureaucratic polity in Thailand(1966),
the bureaucratic system in Cambodia controls itself and defines its own tasks, policies, and
time frames. Only those issues perceived as important by the Office of the Council of
Ministers (OCOM) and hence the CPP are added to the political agenda. Their strategies aim
at modernizing state institutions to guarantee welfare and security, while adhering to criteria
that are efficient and effective for economic growth.
Thus, as the majority of young professionals have explained, it is necessary for them to get
involved in economic activities, to get promoted, and to secure their lifestyles. Being involved
in a powerful network allows them to improve their own power base vis à vis potential friends
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and clients. Interestingly, they have the flexibility to choose their patrons and the networks
they want to belong to. In one case, a professional asked his patron to employ a family
member, who had the qualifications required for the position. However, after he was
employed, the direct superior (another client of the patron) of the relative in question decided
to pay the person only 50% of his wage. The patron then intervened and nominated the
protégé’s distant cousin as Deputy Director General at the National Information
Communications Technology Development Authority of the Council of Ministers, which has
the function of monitoring and auditing all Information Technology (IT) systems related to
running projects. However despite the better offer, the protégé’s relative preferred to take a
leave for two years and work for an even better paid job at the UNDP.
Due to the high status that professionals enjoy, their views are easily accepted. However the older
bureaucrats are usually better known by the people, generally in rural areas, in the communes, and
districts. The OG is familiar with the local development problems in the communities.
Interestingly, the young professionals, especially those working within the administration, are
increasingly trying to monopolize these capabilities through their vertical networks.
Thus, it is not enough to have a title and a high degree and to successfully pass university, but one
must hone the social skills required for a leader during their apprenticeship with their political
patron. Young professionals hence act as technical advisors to the high cadres of the CPP and, in
return, learn from them adequate political rules and behavior codes. These skills are then used
when they come in contact with the local communities and ordinary individuals, whom they have
to advise and serve in the name of their patrons. In turn, the patrons use the modernizing skills of
the young professionals as a means to legitimize their political agendas and ideologies. Many
professionals working in the bureaucracy are integrated into communal life beyond their actual
assigned work tasks; generally, they are assigned to an area where they have kinship ties and
wider acquaintances, most likely from their parents. There they meet regularly with the monks of
village temples,62 hold meetings to determine needs and develop a vision, and construct schools,
football fields, and other collective goods. Hence, the young professionals know the needs and
problems of people in their assigned commune or village and articulate these to the higher cadres
of the party.
But the professionals themselves use these opportunities where they have to be involved and
participate in community affairs and institutional spheres to build their own reputation and thus
improve their own image. In other words, the time they spent within communities is used to build
their own networks. Once consolidated, these pre-political networks can be mobilized for political
purposes. Once professionals are well-integrated into the different networks and prove their
technical and social skills, they usually get promoted.
In their view, the movement towards more efficiency and effectiveness in administration and
the strengthening of the rule of law is seen as a means to increase the credibility of the
Government and to build a professional environment conducive to long-term private sector
development. The question of human rights is not raised at all. They think that rights and
62 They regularly visit the head monk of the village and listen to his opinion on diverse issues, thus getting involved in
the local decision making networks.
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obligations are rather closely connected to culture, and thus outside their profession as such.
Businesses, in their perception, are an essential part of civil society.
They think that the development of technical plans greatly helps to clarify their organization's
tasks and functions, and ensures that key superiors are all ‘on the same script’. However, they
also know that, far more important than the strategic planning documents, is the strategic
planning process itself, which in Cambodia is a political process of negotiation. Thus, they try
to combine goal-based planning with issue-based planning in their official work, without the
direct articulation and reflection on their organizations underlying vision and values. Thus,
sometimes a gap emerges between the actions plans demanded by the cooperating partners
and the strategies of their political superiors.
Indeed, their main function is to provide technical knowledge and information on possible
options for policy decisions, and thus suggest various normative views to the elite. The SNEC
is a prominent example in this case. Bright, younger professionals such as the Deputy
Director General of the Reform Committee of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)
are regularly recruited to work for that organization.
Furthermore, as the bureaucracy is the key holder of political power, they are the ones who,
under the given political circumstances, are best positioned to initiate reform. They face the
problem to reform the administrative system within an established structure. As the Director
of the reform committee of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) puts it:
The best way to change a system would be to ‘build a new house’; but this under
the given conditions is very difficult; so what you do is restore the old house. The
old dweller of the house are already there, so what you can do is prove them that
the new system is good. The political system is increasingly giving its support and
commitment to the new management system; a lot of support is given by the
political leadership. The Priority Mission Group is a good example of the new
system according to the new principle: it rewards people who behave according
to the principle. Often the ambitious come back from their studies with very high
expectations, but the system doesn’t allow them to fulfill their ideas; they then
accept the status quo of the system and prefer to change in the long run, i.e. to
adopt a ‘sustainable” strategy of change.
Director of the Reform Committee of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, 2006
3.7. Lack of common strategy?
The professional’s objectives, goals, and ideas concerning the political system, state-
formation and the role that the administration should play, are similar. Differences emerge
concerning the strategies that should be used to achieve them. The differing nature of the roles
that professionals play within their respective organizations lead to a division along the lines
of different preconceptions of how to conceive the modernization of Cambodian society. The
common objective of all focuses is to make the state structure less rigid and to reform it along
lines of technical-pragmatic rationality rather than solely on value-oriented rationality. In
other words, they share the vision of a society from a value-oriented to an achievement-
oriented structure. Therefore, those professionals who experience and face these tensions the
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strongest are the professionals working in the bureaucracy. They have to follow routines
established by the old generation, even though these are in contrast and contrary to their own
understanding of pragmatism.
Some, like the current Director of the Reform Committee of the Ministry of Economy and
Finance who studied in the United States, see a potential for social change in the adoption of
old principles into a new system. The Director illustrates his argument with the driving
attitudes of people in different countries. For example, people in Cambodia drive without
respecting the conduct of others and without respecting any traffic rules. Whereas in the USA,
where the traffic system is more organized, people adhere to the rules and stop at the red
lights. If people want to bring about change, he says they have to change the mind of the
people. Only then can they introduce a new system, based on checks and balances, a system
that would support local process and that is not based on penalty or conditions. You need two
elements, he says, if you want to bring about any change; without the principle and with just
the system people will not follow the system. In his view people are more important than
institutions; the real challenge lies in training people, in learning to stand up, to raise voices,
and to give presentations. Hence it is crucial to identify the status quo of a society and to
understand it. In his opinion, Buddhist principles may help to change the ‘old attitudes’. If
these principles are adopted through education, for example, then things can become more
efficient and effective.
Likewise, the Advisor to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet thinks that although it is not the case in
Cambodia, politics should not have an influence on the exercise of their professions. He
thinks that it is vital to reform civil service, to review its competence, to enhance the living
standards of civil servants, and to modernize the bureaucracy, In fact, all bureaucrats should
care about their performance and work like employees in the private sector, or at the Ministry
of Economy and Finance (MEF), where civil servants complete a high quality of work. As a
result, they are well paid. This leads to less corruption, more political stability and economic
growth. Every qualified person could just work for the Government on the basis of his/her
qualifications.
Similarly, the Deputy Secretary of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) thinks that if
all professionals would sit together and “talk the same language”, then they might solve the
issues of poverty and corruption, etc. In his view, just the fact that they would agree to sit
together and talk would already clear their differences by 50%.
In contrast, the Director of the Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR) thinks that the
current state uses its power to repress real democracy and freedom, thereby undermining the
rights of the majority of its population.63 Professionals who support the state by working
within the bureaucracy maintain the authoritarian structures. In order to realize a Cambodian
civil society where human rights and democracy are fully respected, corrupt practices and
nepotism ought to be eliminated and an independent judiciary should be established.
Professionals working within the private sector prefer to remain apolitical altogether. Their
concerns lie in self-betterment and modernization initiative by individual motivation. In this
63 His view is widely shared with many representatives of donor organizations.
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sense, professionals who chose to work in this sector are more concerned with the economy
and leave politics to the state administration.
3.8. Professionals: A Cambodian strategic group?
In sum, Cambodian professionals do not yet form a strategic group in a strict sense. However,
they are neither a quasi group (Evers, 1983a) as they are beyond the first stages of group
formation and share a common identity. After the social transformation, confusion and
conflict over the last twenty years, group cohesion and a certain degree of solidarity has
emerged among professionals. This solidarity is manifested in a distinct lifestyle and the
formation of professional organizations such as the various alumni associations. Yet,
professionals do not challenge the societal normative and political structures by articulating
and promoting their own economic and political goals. Nor have they become, to use Evers’
words, “a recruiting field for political leadership” and a political pressure group at the same
time (Evers 1973:114). Whereas bureaucrats and the business sector have ready-made
instruments of power in the form of large-scale organizations, professionals tend to work alone
or in small groups. Because they have no command over others, they do not yet qualify for
inclusion in the political elite.
Indeed the mechanisms for horizontal alliances are challenged by vertical integration into
competing systems of bureaucratic patronage that secure the disbursement of Government
funds and positions. Professionals are co-opted into bureaucratic patronage networks as soon
as they start to study at the elite universities. The development of independent professionals
that provide political leadership is rather slow.
Thus, young professionals in Cambodia find themselves in an ambiguous situation. First, their
pursuit of personal interests on one hand and their beliefs in professional ethics on the other,
are pushing them to combine politics and business as independent spheres64. Second, to solve
their paradoxical situation in which they have to start a political career but prefer to remain
apolitical, they have chosen to create a “modern” life for themselves, and a process we have
decided to coin the secularization of professionalism. In addition, because of their peculiar
position, they have adopted political and social attitudes, which distinguish them from the
local masses and push them to consolidate their own social status and power rather than to work
for the “common good” of society. Paradoxically, even though young professionals act as
spearhead groups of modernization, they also tend to consolidate and push their vision of the
“urban good life” and thus to foster the continuous process of social differentiation and
inequality between the urban and rural space by translating global inequalities into national
ones and vice versa (Evers, 1978c).
Hence, professionals in Cambodia have “some” influence but no political power. Indeed, for
the time being they remain, in Evers’ words, ‘servants of power’ (1973). Their main function
is to legitimize the strategies and visions of their respective organizations/networks. This
is reached through economic success of development efforts and by maintaining the ideology
of technical and economic pragmatism.
64 However, these spheres are not independent yet, as politics and economics are still embedded.
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3.9 Professionals: a global strategic group?
Over the last two decades, during the transition toward a market economy, a quasi-strategic
group consisting of international professionals working for aid agencies has been legally and
strategically influencing the shaping of state institutions in Cambodia.65 However, Cambodian
professionals have not joined their counterparts in donor organizations to articulate and
conceptualize national development strategies and policies, as their self-reproduction is
dependent on their loyalty to their organization/vertical networks. Hence Evers (2001, 2006)
finding according to which development experts in general form a globally operating strategic
group,66does not fully apply for the Cambodian case. On the contrary, professionals or experts
from donor organizations have found it quite difficult to form alliances with Cambodian
professionals, despite their similar educational background and lifestyles. One reason for this
certainly lies in the different rationales of their respective organizations.
On one hand professionals from aid agencies have argued that if Cambodia is to sustain social
and economic development, then improvement of governance according to Good Governance
principles is necessary. Hence technical and financial assistance on the basis of various
conditionalities as to how to implement the reform and how to spend the development funds
has been provided by various international agencies to help the Government.
On the other, Cambodian state professionals have argued that a strong intervention into the
Cambodian state affairs negates their sovereignty and national integrity, as it is precisely the
function of bureaucracies to decide and implement political agendas and to control the
allocation of state resources. Hence for the professionals in Cambodia the question whether a
sovereign state can decide for itself what style of administration it wants to establish, or if this
should this be done by external forces like donor organizations, became a crucial point of
contention.
This tension, which basically resulted from the question of who should control the
administration, has its background in the recent history of Cambodia. When UNTAC revealed
its mandate in 1991, it was assumed that the state in Cambodia was nearly non-existent as the
Vietnamese advisors and troops had withdrawn end of 1989. At the time, it was the
‘international community’, led by the United Nations (UN) Agencies that argued that
intervention was required as Cambodia faced depleted human capital, devastated physical
infrastructures and a fragmented political system (Hourn, 1998).
Therefore, the evidence of failed/fragile states or incompetent states implied the need for
external intervention into state functions by donor organizations. A failed state does not own
sovereignty; it can neither supervise nor control and does not have any authoritative
resources. These are then provided by the donor organizations, who assume that, as the
65 See the study from Evers and Gerke on the emergence of experts as a global strategic group (2006) and Evers
article on Macht und Einfluß in der Entwicklungspolitik (2001).
66 Thereby they define what ‘right’ development is and turn themselves into the appropriate and indispensable
specialists who can implement ‘development’. As a result, they can impose the payment of high salaries and
other revenues as legitimate actions.
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resources come from them, they should control them. Therefore, UNTAC had to impose
elections and take over stately responsibilities like, policing (internal pacification), control of
the bureaucracy, etc. Even though an administration did exist, it was assumed that it was in
need of far-reaching rebuilding. The State of Cambodia could not fulfill its stately tasks,
which UNTAC had to take over.
Hughes (2007) argued that it was precisely this intervention by donor organizations into
Cambodian politics and conflicts by incorporating elections or popular referenda into the UN
peacekeeping activities that offered a means to wipe off criticism about interventionary
policies as violations of sovereignty.
International sponsorship of elections could be and was portrayed as a
restoration of sovereignty rather than a violation of it, as sovereignty was
regarded as appropriately located in the “will of people” rather than in the will of
its leaders. This view of sovereignty reversed previous conceptions of the
relationship between sovereignty and democracy. Whereas democratic
arrangements had previously been viewed as matter for sovereign states, in the
1990s, international respect for sovereignty rather became dependent upon the
ability of government to demonstrate that they had been constituted by
appropriate democratic procedures.
Hughes, 2007:45
Furthermore Roberts (2001) maintained that although the official purpose of the United
Nations was to settle the political conflict in Cambodia by implementing the ‘liberal project’,
intervention by UNTAC served the non Cambodian political interests, namely those of the
Sino-US, anti-Moscow axis who consequently rejected a Cambodian solution to the conflict.67
Their goal was to settle their own conflict and that meant first bringing back the Khmer
Rouges into the arena of Cambodian politics and second to marginalize the established
political power, namely the State of Cambodia (Roberts, 2001).
[…] the great powers, particularly China and the United States, played a spoiling
role, maximizing their influence with and support of their Cambodian protégés to
outflank the regional diplomacy. Negotiations at great power level, in Paris and
especially in the UN Security Council, displaced the regional ones, returning the
Khmer Rouges to the diplomatic forefront. Such a UN settlement […] could now
be imposed on Cambodia.
Kiernan, 1993:191
67 Roberts argues that “the United States [State Department] played a key role in the collapse of the Hun Sen-
Sihanouk alliance by not offering Sihanouk support if he cut ties with the Khmer Rouge and its sponsor,
China[…] The Hun Sen alliance offered an opportunity to achieve what UNTAC later could not. Hun Sen would
not have been challenged; Sihanouk would have presidential power immediately” (Roberts 2001:21). Similarly,
Kiernan (1993) argued that the intervention by the UN was seen as a means by which the United States and
Chinese administrations of the time could undermine regional, particularly Southeast Asian diplomacy that
aimed at excluding the Khmer Rouges from political power
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Indeed, the deployment of UNTAC was seen by the State of Cambodia as an imposed
settlement and a threat to its further existence. A threat that would marginalize the vast system
of bureaucratic patronage it had established, hence leading to the socio-economic and political
marginalization of its supporters.
[…] the intended separation of the bureaucracy from the incumbent party of the
State of Cambodia [CPP], led by Hun Sen, aggravated this problem by having the
effect of separating mutually interdependent patrons and clients. Whilst this
could be argued to be deft planning and deliberate policy to overcome a cultural
and economic platform of resistance to democratization […] the organizers of the
Paris Peace Accord miss several crucial issues in their attempts to democratize
Cambodia.
Roberts, 2001:34
Then, after having taken control of some central state functions, the ‘donor community’
assumed that to achieve their objectives of internal pacification it was necessary that they had
to control and re-structure the state apparatus. Hence the bureaucrats (CPP) under the pressure
of the imposed Paris Peace Accord (PPA) were expected to pass over their control of the state
organs68(Roberts, 2001). However, before UNTAC’s late deployment, the People’s Republic
Party of Kampuchea renamed itself the Cambodian’s People’s Party (CPP) and kept control
of functions over all aspects of state activity from the military, to the police and secret
services, to the foreign office and civil and political organizations in the communes.69.
The various organs of the state of Cambodia had been transformed such that real
power lay elsewhere [namely in the Office of the Council of Ministers and not in
the ministries], denying UNTAC the capacity to neutralize the political
environment. It was naïve to assume that a party as entrenched in political power
as the CPP would relinquish that control when its political future depended
largely on securing support for itself through the labyrinthine networks that were
characteristic of the communist model of bureaucracy […].
Roberts, 2001:39
Consequently UNTAC’s intervention marked the beginning of a contested and ambivalent era
of ‘development cooperation’. This ambivalence was maintained even after the withdrawal of
UNTAC during the following policy negotiations between donor organizations and the
Cambodian Government. Thereby the state professionals were still reluctant in welcoming
68 UNTAC’s civil administration component that aimed at separating the CPP from the organs of the state
oversaw the operation of five core areas including the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Public
Security and Information. A further ‘specialized control’ group oversaw the Ministries of Health, Education,
Agriculture and Transport.
69 Furthermore most of the civil administrators employed by UNTAC were from Phnom Penh and members of
the CPP (Roberts 2001:76).
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any plans from various donor organizations to reform the civil administration.70 A reluctance
that was rooted in unsolved questions of trusteeship and legitimacy, and hence reluctance to
accept ‘imposed aid’.
This reluctance was best observed in the negotiation on Administrative Reform. There the
question of how to institutionalize the control of development resources and their use became
a point of contention. On one hand, donor agencies found it crucial to control the funding
mechanism of the reform processes; while on the other, the Government insists on its right of
ownership. Development experts argued that the Royal Government could not be granted full
control over development funds, since corruption practices through channels of patronage
would abuse their use. Conflicts hence emerged between on one side functionality of
administration, i.e., formal, generalized structures based on functions and on the other side
personalized/patronage relations as the functioning principle of the bureaucracy. In the first
case, money is used as an incentive to enhance functionality through professionals; in the
second case, remuneration is used inter alias to strengthen patronage networks.
Thus in a historical sense, donor organizations initially existed as a strategic group. They
pressured the Cambodian Government to accept their terms, when it came to foreign aid. The
professionals working for these organizations believed that regardless of sovereignty,
Cambodia’s administration needed to be reformed, in order for modernization of society to
become realized. Once international pressure forced donor organizations to recognize national
sovereignty, the Cambodian state was further able to withstand, or at least slow down, donor
professional’s modernization plans.
3.10 Conclusion
Professionals of donor organizations could be relevant for Cambodian professionals for two
reasons. First, as indicated by the case studies in chapter 3.3, many Cambodian professionals
work for donor organizations in high positions; thus they provide attractive career
opportunities for Cambodian professionals. Second, professionals in donor organizations
basically follow strategies that should fit the interest of the Cambodian professionals.
Cambodian professionals are at the interface and even part of quasi-strategic groups. Hence, a
strategy for Cambodian professionals could be to use the donor organizations as they are
integrated into global networks, have access to information and other relevant resources (e.g.,
finances, knowledge, support), common ties, and the same experiences to make alliances with
the international experts to push through their national agendas. Indeed, a strategy to play a
political role on the national level could be to unite at the regional and even supranational
level. This in fact increases agency in forwarding interests, as a large collective has more
power than various fragmented groups.
70 As Roberts puts it, the CPP was clearly taking measure in the interest of the bureacurcy to undermine the
‘neutral’ democratic education programme of UNTAC (Roberts, 2001).
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However, even though professionals in donor organizations have a strong impact on state-
formation, state professionals find it difficult to interface with them as their integration into
different organizations and political networks determines their allegiances. Particularly, their
recruitment into the state apparatus determines that they have to be respectful of the political
agendas of their organization. For these professionals, there is a very thin line between
pushing for modernization and disrespecting the political traditions of the state.
Thus this historically rooted divide leads to a political deadlock. Professionals, in general, are
not able to move beyond the level of quasi-strategic group, as they cannot find the means to
unite their vision while at the same time, respecting the occupational spheres. The following
case study of administrative reform is an illustration of the inability of state professionals and
professionals within donor organizations to form a global strategic group. In contrast, both
groups follow distinct strategies, which is an indication of their vertical integration into
organizations. This in turn limits the possibilities for the Cambodian professionals to rise as a
single, unified strategic group.
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4. Administrative reform in post-1993 Cambodia: Implications and
institutional setting
The administrative reform is at the heart of the Royal Government strategy to
implement the NSDP and it is urgent to radically transform the Civil Service into
an effective provider of services and a trusted development partner.
Hun Sen, Prime Minister of Cambodia, 2004
The administration as such is certainly the result of and, at the same time, the main driving
force for state-formation; on one hand, it is the core entity with regard to state-formation,
explaining why the bureaucrats are often defined as a strategic group; on the other hand it is
an outcome of processes of socio-cultural and political change. Under the condition of a
bureaucratic polity, the administration can be seen as a strategic means for bureaucrats to gain
and maintain political domination. In Cambodia the administration is more a result of the
strategies of various strategic groups like aid agencies and businesses. Due to its central role
for the state, attempts towards administrative reformation are indicators of the figuration of
these strategic groups. In the bureaucracy, professionals, such as technocrats, have gained
important positions without however gaining control over its regulation. Indeed, through
patron-clients networks their strategies are closer to the interests of their patrons and
organizations than to other professionals. In the following, administrative reform will be
discussed as a case study of the figuration of development organizations, professionals, and
the bureaucracy.
The policy negotiations for administrative reform in Cambodia have been institutionalized
into three distinct ‘interfaces’ (Long, 2001), namely the Cambodia Development Cooperation
Forum (CDCF), the Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC), and the Technical
Working Group (TWG). For the donor organizations, the reform of the administrative system
was viewed as a purely technical exercise along the lines of New Public Management
theories, whereas for the Cambodian Government, the reform of the administration entailed
modernizing its procedures for political stability and consensus. Similarly as to the early
1990s, the Government continued to question the donors capacity, power, and legitimacy to
claim trusteeship71 for reforming its state apparatus.
4.1. Institutional setting of development cooperation for administrative reforms and its
actors
Since the early 1990s, bilateral and multilateral negotiations between the national and
international aid agencies and the Cambodian Government occur at three interfaces/levels: the
political (1), the semi-political/semi-technical (2), and the technical (3) level.
71Thomas (2000) using Cowen and Shenton’s categories defines trusteeship as “the intend which is expressed,
by one source of agency (the actions of individuals or groups, and their capacities to influence events), to
develop the capacities of another. It is what binds the process of development to the intent of development”,
Thomas 2000:41
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1. The political level consists of the Consultative Group Meeting (CG) that was renamed in
2007 the Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF). The CDCF is an overarching,
high-profile, and media-attracting event attended by officials from capitals and headquarters
of bilateral and multilateral development partners and agencies. It is also a mechanism for
stock-taking and the evaluation of Cambodia's overall progress and challenges in a broader
context and with a long-term perspective.
2. At the semi-political/semi-technical level, the Government Donor Consultative Committee
(GDCC) monitors and discusses the progress of the CDCF policies.
3. At the technical level, Technical Working Groups composed of professionals,
operationalize the policies defined by the first two levels through further discussions and
consensus finding.
At all these interfaces, the reform of the administration has centered questions about the
effective political control over the ‘development budget’, out of which the major bulk of the
civil servants’ additional income is paid. Indeed a central theme for discussion and
negotiation between professionals, politicians, diplomats, and representatives of donor
organizations was the Remuneration and Employment Policy. Even though professionals
agreed during these negotiations on the necessity of introducing performance-based salary
allowances, they have failed to find a consensus on how to operationalize the civil service
remuneration procedures.
Fig. 4.5. The three interfaces for policy negotiations
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4.1.1. The political negotiation level: CDCF (until 2007 CG)
The Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF)72 is the highest political forum for
high-ranking Diplomats, high-level Representatives of aid agencies and Government Officials
such as the Prime Minister and his Deputy Prime Minister. The discussions and bargaining
within this interface are made on the background of documents prepared by the Government
and thematic papers prepared by development agencies.73 Thereby they center around key
areas for reform. These key areas for reform are then endorsed as Joint Monitoring Indicators
(JMI).
Looking at the history of meetings between the Government and the donor agencies, a shift in
power-differentials between the respective actors took place. Initially, the donors could define
objectives in consultations with the Government. Then the Government took over the
leadership, with the donors still playing an important political role. In other words, in the
CDCF the Government becomes dominant, not the least by adding further actors into the
forum besides the donor agencies.
Essentially, the CDCF meetings are no longer prepared and organized by the World Bank,
which has traditionally been its organizer and chair. The task to organize the meetings,
provide documentation, etc. is now given to a Cambodian body -the Cambodian
Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB). In general, this board has the task to
formulate and implement the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). As such, it has
access to all relevant data and documents that are used as background information in the
Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) meetings. The donors are represented
in the preparation of the meetings through a Lead Donor Facilitator. This role is held by the
World Bank. Consequently, even though the position of the World Bank has certainly been
weakened, it still plays the main role as consultant to the Royal Government of Cambodia and
as Representative of the donors.
Shifts in power relations within the meetings are well–shown in how projects are now
promulgated. Formerly, donor organizations more or less supervised the Government; now,
after the Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) Declaration, the Government increasingly
coordinates the donor organizations.
[…] the RGC [Royal Government of Cambodia] believes that, by moving to
assume greater responsibility for the consultative process, this will lead to a
further strengthening of RGC's ownership and leadership, while retaining the
fundamental characteristics of partnership that underpin RGC's relations with
its development partners.
Unofficial translation of the document, approved by the Prime Minister on 28
September 2006
72 Formerly the Consultative Group (CG).
73 Such as on the macro-economic performance by the World Bank.
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As to 2008, the Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) prepares and
circulates so-called pledge sheets. In these, the donor agencies individually indicate what
programs mentioned in the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP)74 they are willing to
fund and to what amount.
For the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), the National Strategic Development Plan
(NSDP) was defined as the basis for negotiation with all donor agencies. The acceptance of
the plan by the donors was enhanced by the Rome/Paris Declarations, as these demanded
harmonization and alignment of the various development agencies. Thus, the RGC fulfilled
demands formulated in the global development discourse, and applied it as a means to gain a
level of independence from the donors. To account for these changes, the Consultative Group
was renamed the Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF). The semiotics of the
name already indicates a higher level of independence, and the move from consultation
towards an open forum for cooperation in development organized by the Cambodian
Government.
With these changes, more flexible and political mechanism to focus on key strategic policy
issues or on broad areas were introduced. Thereby, it was expected that quicker progress and
critical evaluation of policies would be enabled. For the future, the Government plans for
further changes in order to enhance its positions in the meetings with the donors. The
Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) shall be changed into the Cambodia
Development Forum (CDF). Removing cooperation from the name for these meetings
illustrates that ‘development’ interventions in Cambodia are decided by the Cambodian
Government.
Nevertheless, the Forum should still serve as a consultation mechanism for Royal
Government of Cambodia and development agencies. However, the scope is widely extended
as well, as the CDF will include a broader range of participants like businessmen, investors,
etc. to facilitate dialogue and consultation on diverse issues that relate to both public and
private sector development.
4.1.2. The semi-political, technical level: Government Donor Cooperation Committee
(GDCC)
The Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC) is mainly a political forum.
However, it is structurally below the highest political level the Cambodian Development
Cooperation Forum (CDCF) and above the operational/technical levels. Its task is to translate
the action plans from the lower operational levels into policy indicators for the highest
political level and adjust these same action plans to the policy guidelines. At the same time, it
74 Part of the process by which the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) gained a stronger position in the
negotiation processes was the promulgation of the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) in 2006. This
plan brought together the Poverty Reduction Strategy from the World Bank, the Socio Economic Plan of the
ADB, and the Millennium Development Goals for Cambodia from the UN-agencies.
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has the task of resolving the technical problems that remain unresolved at the operational
level. This ambiguous character has made it very difficult to function effectively.
The GDCC deliberates and agrees upon the set of Joint Monitoring Indicators (JMIs). Once
the set of JMIs, which is derived from the action plans of the lowest levels the Technical
Working Groups (TWG), is deliberated and agreed upon by the GDCC, they are submitted for
endorsement to the higher political level the Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum
(CDCF).
Structurally, the GDCC is co-chaired by the Minister of the Ministry for Economy and
Finance and the First Deputy Secretary General of the Council for the Development of
Cambodia (CDC). It is further attended by Ministers, Heads of Government Agencies,
Ambassadors or Heads of Diplomatic missions, and Country Representatives of Multilateral
Institutions.
This semi-political, semi-technical level oversees and monitors the work of seventeen75
Technical Working Groups (TWG). It sets priorities and is supposed to resolve the problems
and issues raised by the TWGs.76
4.1.3. The technical level: Technical Working Group (TWG)
The Technical Working Groups are the ‘playing fields’ of the professionals. Each of the
seventeen Technical Working Groups (see Annex 12) are co-chaired by a Senior Royal
Government Official and a Lead Donor Coordinator/Facilitator.
Essentially they were introduced at ministerial levels to share information and pursue action-
oriented targets at the sector level between donor and Government Agencies. Thus, they are
‘technical’ and operational forums used to discuss, agree upon, and pursue clearly defined
action plans and measurable targets. The respective terms of references of each TWG are
defined through the Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation.
Due to its nature and its focus on the role of professionals in the transformation of the
administration, this study focuses on the Technical Working Group (TWG) working on Public
Administrative Reform (PAR).
The Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR), created in
2004, is located at the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) and consists of professionals
in the CAR’s Secretariat and the World Bank, UNDP, JICA, DANIDA, AusAid, the EC
delegation CIDA, GTZ, and the IMF.
75Since 2006, the number has been reduced from eighteen to seventeen TWGs.
76 For the first time, in 2006, the preparation and the formulation of JMIs that were to be submitted to the
Cambodian Development and Cooperation Forum (CDCF) meeting (political level), was led by the Royal
Government of Cambodia in a discussion that had representatives from the respective development agencies in
attendance through the Technical working Groups (TWG), and the semi-political, semi-technical level of the
Government Donor Cooperation Committee. Consequently, the decision of the Royal Government of Cambodia
to head and lead the CDCF in the future emerged from this experience.
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The CAR Secretariat’s mission is to put reform in practice in accordance with the Minister of
the Office of the Council of Ministers. Its tasks is to develop, implement, and follow-up on
short-, medium-, and long-term projects with regard to Administrative Reform, and to report
to the Government on approved projects. It also has the task to review and ensure the
coherence of further reform programs in other Ministries and Institutions. This last task has
been specifically by-passed several times by donor agencies that have so far preferred to
directly negotiate and cooperate with the Ministries or Institutions without consulting the
CAR Secretariat.
Fig.4.6. The Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)
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As mentioned, the work of the Council for Administrative Reform’s Secretariat is completed
in accordance with the Minister in charge of the Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM), a
key political figure in Cambodian politics.
4.2. The Council of Ministers and its Office
The Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM) is the administrative centre of the
Government and thus of the Council of Ministers. It is the political and institutional centre for
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policy making in each sector of the Cambodian society. Interestingly almost each Ministry
has its counter-part agency within the OCOM (see Annex 14).
The Council of Ministers is the top executive organ of the Royal Government of Cambodia
and comprises twenty-six Ministers and two Secretariat s and is headed by the Prime Minister
and two Deputy Prime Ministers. After the 2003 elections, and the following twelve month
deadlock, the twenty-four Ministries were divided to seventeen Ministers from the CPP,
eleven from FUNCINPEC and four co-Ministers77 with two Ministers from each party. After
the last election in July 2008, the CPP retained the coalition structure although it had ordered
the leader of its coalition partner, the royalist FUNCINPEC Party, to stand down.78.The
Council itself is officially appointed by the King through a royal decree after the National
Assembly has given it a vote of confidence, for a five-year term.
Essentially, it is collectively responsible to the Assembly, and reviews and coordinates the
work of Government agencies at all levels on specifically defined issues, such as the approval
of the state budget. Interestingly, these policy institutions have been inherited almost one-to-
one from the People Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in the 1980s. The COM officially
convenes twice a month, but in practice meets weekly for restricted sessions, the Inter-
Ministerial or Executive Meetings, under supervision of the Minister in charge of the Office of
the Council of Ministers (OCOM), the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Ministers. The
Deputy Prime Minister is not just the Minister in charge of the Council of Ministers (see
Annex 8). He is also known among the Cambodians as the ‘brain’ of the Prime Minister, as he
oversees the daily work of the OCOM, which consists of preparing, facilitating, coordinating,
unifying, and guiding all activities of the individual ministries and localities. He also oversees
and chairs the Council of Administrative Reform, the Fonction Publique, the Civil Aviation,
the Anti-Corruption Unit, the APSARA Authority, the Council on Food Security, the Council
on Mine Clearing, the Tourism Unit, NIDA, the UNESCO Working Group, the Working
Group on Board and Land Issues, the National Land Dispute Authority, the Cambodian
National Petroleum Authority, the Council of Jurists, the Council for Judicial Reform, the
Working Group on Small and Medium Enterprises, the Khmer Rouge Task Force, the
Cambodia Training Board, the Royal Academy, and the State Investment Board on Rubber
Enterprise. In sum, he is the nexus for all important state programs, the private sector and
international politics. To understand this strategic position, let us consider the chains of
command within the Government.
All Ministries send their policy drafts and budget proposals to the Office of the Council of
Ministers (OCOM), where they are evaluated in specialized committees and councils. For all-
77 At the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior.
78 “The CPP retains that coalition to avoid instability, and because it says it is incompatible with the opposition
SRP, which snared at least 26 seats at Sunday's polls and is the second most popular party in the country.
Funcinpec was expected to comply […]Funcinpec plummeted from 26 seats to just two on latest preliminary
estimates, but despite the CPP dominance, axing a coalition which has existed since the first democratic
elections in 1993 would potentially cause deep political instability [..] Bhun Chhay[ who played a major role in
the ousting of former FUNCIPEC president prince Ranaridd], an army general with the reputation of being a
military bulldog, a love of former king Norodom Sihanouk but no royal blood, will be the first non-royal leader
of Funcinpec” (Cambodian Information Center, 2008).
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important Ministries, a Council or Committee is established within the OCOM. The task of
these Councils is to evaluate the drafts from the Ministries and prepare recommendations for
the OCOM. If the council supports the draft, it returns it to the Minister of the OCOM. If the
proposal is approved by the OCOM, it is sent to the respective Ministry. Then, the Ministry
sends the draft to the National Assembly where specialized committee discusses the proposal
with a Representative of the Ministry. If an agreement is reached, the proposal is forwarded to
the plenary of the National Assembly for improvement. If no agreement is found, the proposal
is returned to the Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM) for amendments, following
which, the OCOM returns the amended proposal to the Ministry, where it is reformulated as a
draft and the procedure starts again.
Hence the OCOM is not only the nexus of all policy programs but, it is also the most
dominant body in Cambodian politics. At the same time, it is the most contested body in the
Cambodian state. Clearly, the OCOM tends to be more relevant than the National Assembly.
The majority of important bargaining which seeks to find a compromise and consensus,
occurs within its structures. The OCOM has tremendous influence on policy formulation in
other Line Ministries and Institutions. In fact, the professionals of the OCOM define policies
and procedures of the Ministries, and thereby hold the most dominant political role in
Cambodia.
The central position of the OCOM does not only imply that it is the most politically powerful
apparatus. Due to its exalted position, it provides, next to the Ministry of Economy and
Finance, the best possibilities for careers and is most attractive for aspiring young
professionals. The professionals are integrated into powerful networks of high Cambodian
People’s Party (CPP) Officials of the OCOM; access to these networks is granted through
personal connection or through ‘investments’ practices. These career possibilities are strongly
connected to competence and qualification on the one hand, and to loyalty and performance
on the other.
Indeed, since 1991, competition for civil service offices is more difficult, and higher civil
servants are increasingly recruited on the basis of their qualifications. Professionals that are
well connected to the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) have increasingly moved into the
highest positions traditionally reserved for members of the political elite and the royal family.
Thereby they have played a crucial role in reforming the Public Administration.
4.3. Historic contextualization of Public Administrative Reform
The Public Administration Reform (PAR) has centered around the daily experiences made in
the Ministries and on different discursive levels produced by the donor agencies frameworks
for Governance Reform. The recurrent and key theme has been the Remuneration of the Civil
Service. Indeed, during the whole negotiation process, remuneration of, transparency and
control over the bureaucracy remained the main issues of disagreement between the Royal
Government of Cambodia (RGC) and the donor agencies.
Although both sides ‘spoke the same language’ and both followed the same goals,
meconnaissance was generated with regard to the interpretations and implementations of the
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shared concepts. On one hand, the RGC engaged in a political, multi-faceted approach where
different issues were simultaneously dealt with, while on the other hand, the different donor
organizations focused on technical issues, according to their specific areas of expertise,
generally defined by the headquarters outside Cambodia. Different meanings and logics were
constructed from the respective experience made through different arrays of representation,
images, and cognitive understandings.
The first attempts to reform the administration were made in 1993, after the promulgation of
the new constitution and Cambodia’s entrance into the global world of ‘liberal democracy’.
However, the reformists did not foresee the drastic consequences of the dissolution of
established power structures and the introduction of new political forces into the political
arena. From 1993 until 1997, political parties began competing for power within the newly
created framework and sought to reorganize and re-legitimize their own ideologies and
agendas. Indeed, after the breakdown and expulsion of Democratic Kampuchea in 1979, the
Cambodian administration was rebuilt based on the Vietnamese model, which was rested on
socialist concepts.
During the 1980s, a specific Cambodian structure of bureaucracy emerged around the
Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP). After 1984, this administrative formation
was reopening the country to global regimes until in 1991, where international donors became
influential in defining national policies, pushing for the replacement of the Vietnamese
administration.
The re-entrance of new actors on the Cambodian political stage such as the Khmer Rouges,
prince Ranaridd and his father, King Sihanouk, and the introduction of multi party politics
during the early 1990s, provoked internal conflicts between competing patron-clients
networks, making party affiliation and loyalty key criteria for joining the newly founded
parties79 and for entering the state apparatus. The struggles for loyalties and networking
among the various parties on different levels marked the race for political power and
legitimacy of Cambodian elites from 1993 to 1997. The ‘competition’ more or less ended in
1997, when the military and political bodies of the CPP dismantled the FUNCINPEC and
several key figures of the party were integrated into the Cambodian People’s Party; other
former FUNCINPEC members such as Sam Rainsy did not see any advantage in joining the
CPP and formed their own parties. As a result, the royalist party remained without resources
and turned into a one-man party surrounding Ranaridd. In 2007, the Royalist Party was
completely dismantled after its head Prince Ranaridd was accused of corruption in the 2006
sale of the front’s Phnom Penh headquarters by general Niek Bun Chhay.80 Basically, the
competition between the different clientelistic networks were an innovative mechanism for
political participation and public communication. As maintained by Neubert (1999a, 1999b,
2004), because they are based on a voluntaristic model (Neubert, 2004), these patron-client
networks break rigid bureaucracies, allowing for a dynamic contextualization to the new
situations since 1993 and greater flexibility to access new resources.
79 Such as the FUNCINPECC and the Son San Party, or the up to then, the powerful and established
Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, later renamed the CPP.
80 Just before the corruption scandal General Chhay had made efforts of rapprochement with the CPP.
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In the logic of the former Kampuchean People’s Revolution Party (KPRP), having a position
within the state mainly guarantied the access to a range of a multitude of other resources.
However, this political aspect was more or less ignored by the various donor organizations
that saw the reform of the state apparatus as a technical matter. In their approach, key policies
sought to integrate the different and various administrative units and agencies into one
structure. This was to be done through the assessment of the composition of the bureaucracy,
the selection of a core group of civil servants according to their qualifications, and the
formulation of a legal and management framework. But for the CPP, ‘reform’ meant
dissolving its constituency, which was busy redefining its affiliations and relation to new and
old patrons. Consequently, no real negotiations for reform could take place between the donor
organizations and the Royal Government until the first dismantlement of the FUNCINPEC
and the cooptation of key Khmer Rouge figures into the CPP could be fully realized.
The official Reform Process of the Administration could hence only start in 1998 with the
formulation of the National Public Administration Reform (NPAR)81. The NPAR presented
both the overall goals for Civil Service Reform and the agenda for its undertakings. It was
followed, in 2000, by the Governance Action Plan I, in short GAP I and in 2001, by the
Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS).82
A central issue of the National Public Administration Reform (NPAR) and the Strategy to
Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS) was, and continues to be, the remuneration of civil
servants.83
Fig. 4.8. Chronology of key documents for Public Administrative Reform (PAR)
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81 From 1999 on, the RGC engaged in the rationalizing and downsizing of the public sector, stabilizing the
number of civil servants to around 160,000 in 2007.
82 The NPAR and the GAP were revised in 2004 and 2006, into the NPA II and GAP II (DANIDA, 2004).
83 Transforming the administration into a more operational, productive and responsible one, with an acceptable
level of remuneration of civil servants.
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The National Public Administration Reform (NPAR) I strategy first focused on the
documentation and control of the composition and distribution of the workforce; second, on
the development of instruments to manage and motivate personnel; third, on assessing the
needs of each Ministry in relation to corporate services; fourth, on completing of the
preparations for the de-concentration process; and finally, on strengthening its own capacity
to plan and manage the reform.
Phase one of the NPAR was terminated in 2001. At that time a Civil Service Census had been
completed under the aegis of the World Bank; personal ID cards were distributed to the civil
servants; approximately 9000 ‘ghost workers’ had been removed from the civilian payroll,
12,900 ghost soldiers and 105,000 ghost children had been removed from the military
payroll;84 and finally a legal framework for the civil service as well as an automated payroll
application had been introduced (Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and
Financial Policies, 2000).
The NPAR was followed then by the Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS) also
known as the Civil Service Reform and the Pay and Employment Reform. Essentially, the
Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS), can be divided into two components: first,
the Employment and Management Reform; and second, the Pay Reform.
Fig.4.9. Key components of the Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS)
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In order to investigate options for accelerating employment and pay reforms the Royal
Government of Cambodia (RGC) gave a mandate to the Council for Administrative Reforms
(CAR) to carry out six studies. These studies aimed at collecting factual information and
preparing an analysis upon which decisions could be made to accelerate the Pay and
Employment Reform. The six studies were on:
1. Improving public services delivery;
2. Benchmarking the labor market;
84 This is in line with the program for demobilization.
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3. Reviewing operations;
4. Enhancing remuneration to support performance;
5. Enhancing employment to support service delivery;
6. Strengthening the management of the civil service work force.
In April 2002, the World Bank agreed to finance the first five studies. The Terms of Reference
for these studies were agreed in March 2003, and funding from the World Bank was secured
in May 2003 (CDC-CRDB, 2002). For the donor organizations, these studies were seen as an
important source of information for the formulation of a comprehensive reform of the
Remuneration System for the Civil Work Force. The study on Improving Public Services
Delivery (1) was completed in September 2003. The last study on Strengthening the
Management of the Civil Service Work Force was supported with the technical and financial
assistance of Brunei and the European Commission (EC).85
The second component of the Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS), namely the
Pay Reform Policy (PRP) or Remuneration Policy, was to become the ‘stumble stone’ of the
Technical Working Group on Public Administrative Reform, thus leading to its dissolution in
early 2007. The Remuneration Policy basically dealt to optimize the Base Salary and
Allowances Framework (BSAF) -a mix of a basic salary and a mix of allowances, according to
performance and merit based principles.86
85 The Operations or Operational Review (3) that aimed at documenting and complementing the work underway
in line Ministries (Ministry of Education, Health, Agriculture, Justice), stock taking of progress and developing a
replicable methodology and framework to carry out such reviews was not never fully carried out as to 2008. Nor
were the Labor Market Study or the Remuneration Policy Study (that was piggy-backed on the Operational
Review and the Study on Employment Policy, that aimed at strengthening the existing information base on
employment needs and to design mechanisms to effect necessary adjustments in the configuration of the Civil
Service ( CDC-CRDB, 2002))85, ever finished. Concurrently, these three studies were continuously postponed,
since it was clear that such an analysis would lead to the removal of politically needed partners. For the donors,
this second step was, and still remains, an important prerequisite for reorganizing and restructuring the Ministries
based on the assumed qualifications, skills and competence of the civil servants.
86 The different forms of allowances:
1. PMG (Priority Mission Group, around 100 USD) allowances and MBPI (Merit paid payment
incentives, around 800 USD)
2. Functional allowances (to those who perform their duties). They are paid according to their position and
length of service or work experience
3. Risk allowance: monthly extra pay for exposure to hazards, accidents, diseases, etc.
4. Mobility allowances
5. Official expense allowance (from the Undersecretary of the state upwards), representation allowance
(advisors to the cabinet)
6. Education allowance (for foreign services, for example when they are sent to the provinces)
7. Travel expenses (pocket money, food, accommodation)
8. Salary Supplement.
9.
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The BSAF was launched as a policy guideline for a new remuneration system for civil
servants.87 However, the Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM) made it clear from the
beginning, that the actions of the Royal Government would be based on two basic principles.
First, any changes had to respect the principle of relativity among the various categories of
Government employees (political, civil servants, military, and security). Second, they had to
be financially sustainable over time within the fiscal framework. Accordingly, increases in
remuneration had to remain dependant upon available funds and thus on Government
revenues (CDC, 2004). It further stated that the Government’s commitment to increasing
remuneration would be by ten to twenty percent annually. The available resources would then
be targeted on priority-needs through instruments like the Priority Mission Group (PMG)88
program and a system of allowances that would complement base pay.
Consequently, a new classification system with four categories was introduced for the
calculation of base salaries. Entrance into and promotion within this system was to no longer
to be based on seniority but rather on education and competitive examination. Here, a shift
became evident from bureaucrats influencing the administrative regulation to professionals
using their credentials as means to accede position within state organizations. Hence,
promotions through seniority were interchanged with promotions through selection, according
to the provisions provided by the particular statutes of each body (DPADM, 2004). Usually,
the minimum period of time required to obtain a promotion was two years. However, since
2002, in cases where a civil servant was recognized for the exceptional quality of his work,
promotions were automatically granted on the basis of performance. Moreover, in the case of
a change from one civil service body to another higher-ranked body, the civil servant had to
take a competitive entry examination. In that case, the salary level was to be the same as or
immediately above the civil servant's last salary level.
In addition, a New Career Path System (classification system) was introduced in 2002. This
system aimed at facilitating better management and the progression of careers within the
administration. Here again, the number of diplomas and years in school determined the entry
points within the classification. The new classification system was complemented by special
initiatives89 such as the Priority Mission Group (PMG), targeting specific units of key civil
servants.
The PMG was initially introduced by the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR), to target
key workers -such as teachers, senior doctors, managers and advisors -and to counter the
salary supplementation practice of the donor community.90 However, the donor organizations
87 Currently only functional and pedagogical allowances are paid, but the idea is to introduce risk allowances, as
well as mobility allowances and family allowances.
88 See ch. 4.3.2.
89 In total three: the ‘AA’ scheme, the Performance Incentive Scheme under the Priority Action Programme
(PAP) and the establishment of the Priority Mission Group (PMG), which proved to be the most prominent and
challenging initiative.
90 However, donors are expected to fund a large part of the PMG /MBPI initiative.
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involved in the Reform of the Administration remained unsatisfied with the initiative and with
the way the reform was handled by the Cambodian Government. They criticized the reform
process’ lack of a proper pay policy and concept, as they did not adequately tackle the issue of
low salaries of the civil servants.
Although the Government has taken an important initial step toward reform by
laying out a multi-year framework and providing moderate pay raises to civil
servants, there remains a concern as to whether the current scenario would go
far enough to address the low pay problem, a fundamental issue for Cambodia’s
civil service reform. It is widely recognized that the most serious obstacle to
improving civil service performance is the lack of adequate incentives to motivate
and retain talented, capable staff within Cambodia’s public administration.
Extremely low remuneration across grade levels saps morale throughout the civil
service and leads to high absenteeism, corruption and, particularly for skilled
professionals, brain drain.
World Bank at the Cambodia Consultative Group (CG) meeting, June 19-21, 2002
Hence they suggested drafting a policy concept that would allow a higher pay-raise and a
stronger vertical-decompression in order to retain and motivate senior-level officials and
young professionals to implement their assigned work.91
The World Bank and DANIDA suggested two measures to tackle the pay issue: first, self-
financing through the cutting of employment over a few years; and second the pooling of
donor resources ‘traditionally’ applied to salary supplements for civil servants working in
their projects into a Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) scheme instead of establishing Priority
Mission Groups (PMG).
The Council of Administrative Reform interpreted the donors attitude as follows:
The PMGs were in development for about two years. They are flexible
instruments to marshal resources where they are needed most- priority missions.
Bank staff discounted the sheme from the start and refused to collaborate. It did
not fir a paradigm that would have revolutionized the Administration and
severed its roots. Only when they were confronted with the PFM [Public
Financial Management Programm at the Ministry of Economy and Finance] did
the staff turn to the PMG mechanism.
Letter from the CAR to the World Bank, Phnom Penh, 14th November 2005
Indeed the donor organizations and the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) ended up
considering the PMG scheme but just to enable the implementation of their Merit Based Pay
Incentive (MBPI) scheme. This root causes of the divergent choices led to continuous tensions
within the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR). But
before we turn a detailed analysis of these tensions, let us have a look at these two models.
91 However, this raises the question of incentives and motivation for young professionals in the Cambodian
society. What motivates young professionals to work within the Cambodian civil service? Is it linked to higher
remunerations?
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4.3.1 The Priority Mission Group (PMG)
The Priority Mission Group (PMG) aims at promoting results-based management and
capacity development within a systematic and transparent setup. In theory, this is achieved by
providing financial incentives to teams of Government officials based on their performance in
predefined key sectors of reform such as Education and Health. The idea behind the concept
is to help ministries and councils accelerate their reform agenda through the mobilization of a
highly motivated core group of civil servants to implement key development programs with
“greater energy, skill, and dedication”(CAR, 2006).
Thus the PMG, legally defined in Sub decree 9892, targets officials working on identified
‘priority missions’. As such it is designed as a flexible interface to accommodate the needs of
individual ministries and potential external partners.
The allowances paid by the Government range from 150 USD for grade A, 100 USD for
grade B, and 50 USD for grade C in a period of one, to one and a half years. Donor agencies
interested in supporting the scheme can pool their salary supplementation resources into a
special fund administered by the Secretariat of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR).
The PMG [Priority Mission Group] program could be a useful stimulus to civil
service performance if it is well designed and tightly focused. The primary
objective assigned to PMGs should be to catalyze change rather than to become
mechanisms for modest pay reform. PMGs need to act primarily as change
catalysts, working as small teams from within individual ministries to trigger
better management practices and more effective approaches to service delivery.
CAR, 2005
The program is monitored by three Committees: the selection Committee,93 the Monitoring
Committee94, and the Audit Committee.95
One of the six Deputy Secretary Generals of the CAR explained in 2006 that the procedure to
get the temporal incentive goes as follows.
Key ministries interested in the Priority Mission Group (PMG) scheme send their project
proposal to the CAR Secretariat, where professionals of a PMG team review the technical
issues and make sure that the documents are in line with the Rectangular Strategy and the
92 The Sub Decree 98 enacted in August 2005 provides policy guidance on how Ministries are to negotiate on
salary supplementation issues. It is the tool for conducting sector level negotiation with development partners on
Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP).
93 Chaired by the Undersecretary of State of the Fonction Publique.
94 Chaired by one of the Secretaries of State of the Ministry of Economy and Finance H. E. Ouk Rabun. Ook
Rabun is said to be a close friend from Prime Minister Hun Sen since the early 1980s. The rivalry between H.E
Rabun and the professionals around H.E. Dr. Aun Porn Moniroth and Dr Han Chuon Naron is an open secret at
the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). The World Bank and DANIDA, however, mainly work with these
professionals in the context of the Public Financial Management Program (PFM). As to 2007 the professionals
of the MEF were hence not really involved in the working procedures of the Council for Administrative Reform.
95 Chaired by Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) H.E. Ngo Hongly H.E Hongly
is also the Vice Secretary General of the Anticorruption Unit.
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National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). After an agreement is reached, the Secretariat
sends the proposal back to the Ministries where public announcement calls are made. Then
the applicants from the Ministries send their CVs to the responsible focal points within the
ministries (black board, meetings). Once they receive the applications, the ministries start
with the selection and send their result to the Secretary General of the CAR. Next, the
Secretariat sends the list of potential candidates to the Selection Committee.
In a second step, the selection committee forwards its decision to the Secretary General of the
CAR, who sends the second list of candidates to the Monitoring Committee. The Monitoring
Committee sends its comments back to the CAR.
In a third step, the results are sent to the Auditing Committee. After their commenting, the
Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) makes his final decision
and submits the list to the Minister of the Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM) for
approval. Following the approval by the OCOM, the CAR informs the Ministries about the
selected projects and personnel. Finally, the Ministries then sign a performance contract with
selected persons and pay the Priority Mission Group (PMG) allowances from their own
budget. At the same time, the pay roll division of the Ministry of Economy and Finance
registers the professionals on the national payroll, sends a copy of the print-out to the
Ministries and the Ministries claim their budget by the Treasury. The Treasury then confirms
the list with the Secretariat of the CAR, and pays the salaries directly to the ministries.
Although very bureaucratic, the Priority Mission Group model appears to be convincing at
first glance as it takes into consideration the existing constraints and challenges of the
Cambodian administration while introducing a performance and incentive based management
system.
4.3.2 The Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) scheme
In contrast to the Priority Mission Group (PMG), the Merit-Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) was
not developed by Cambodian professionals, but by the Incentives and Organizational Change
Consultancy (IOCC) that was contracted by the World Bank and DANIDA. The aim of this
incentive scheme is to improve the incentive structure in which civil servants operate and
introduce higher pay coupled with meritocratic selection and performance management into
the civil service. First introduced in 2005 as a pilot initiative at the Ministry of Economy and
Finance, it was designed as an accelerated and selective pay reform scheme on the basis of
international best practices to push forward Civil Service Reform at the Line Ministries.
During the pilot phase, the Government agreed to pay an increasing share over time and
eventually to assume the full cost in the future. In Phase I (lasting six months), donor
organizations finance the scheme completely. In Phase II (lasting fourteen months), the donor
organizations pay 80% of the allowances and the Government assumes the remaining 20%.
The participation rates are planned to be three hundred USD per month during stage I and 270
USD per month in stage II, in contrast to the average one hundred USD per month of the
Priority Mission Group (PMG) program. Hence, the control over the resources allocated was
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directly tied, not to the CAR, but to the MEF and the actors96 involved in its Public Financial
Management Program (PFM).
This high difference in the monthly pay-rate was highly contested by the Council for
Administrative Reform who feared that its scheme would loose its appeal. They fear that as a
result, civil servants would then prefer to work on projects promoted by donor organizations
rather than on projects implemented by the Government. Another contested point is the fact
that the MBPI is based on a manual developed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance
(MEF) and not by the Council for Administrative Reform. The MBPI would hence be
supervised by the Ministry of Economy and Finance’s Reform Committee97 and not by the
Council for Administrative Reform (CAR). Hence these two points, the higher rates of the
MBPI and the control over the allocation of resources by the MEF, led to a strong reluctance
from the CAR to consider the MBPI as feasible option.
To conclude, two distinct, although similar in nature, pay-incentive schemes were proposed
by professionals of the CAR on one hand, and by professionals from donor organizations on
the other. These hinged on the concept of merit but conflicted on the basis of their
operationalization, resulting in an open conflict between the CAR and the donor organizations
working with the Ministry of Economy and Finance, particularly the World Bank and
DANIDA. Although the donor organizations included the PMG as new semiotics into the new
name of their performance and merit based model98, they did not remove the root causes of
the tensions. As the conflicts were not resolved, direct cooperation between the donor
organization and the Council for Administrative Reform was resumed in early 2007, when the
Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administration dissolved and the World Bank’s
Representative resigned from the working group.
4.4. Political tensions
The political nature of the conflict became highly visible once it became clear that a
resolution could not be determined at the operational level. Hence, the tensions were
forwarded to the semi-political level where, as illustrated by the ninth meeting of the
Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC), a solution could not be easily found.
Thus, the conflict was forwarded further to the political interface, the Cambodian
Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF), held the 19th of June 2007. There leaders
negotiated a new resolution that would consolidate both the Priority Mission Group (PMG)
and the Merit-Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) schemes.
To illustrate the nature of the conflict, an analysis of the speeches of both parties at both
events has been done. Although the speeches are veiled by the use of idioms of objectivity,
96 Donor organizations such as the World Bank and DANIDA as well as Cambodian professionals.
97 More precisely by its Incentives and Recruitment Subcommittee.
98 Now, PMG/MBPI.
93
neutrality and rationality, they address issues which are political in nature. These ‘political
problems’ are removed from the realm of political discourse, and reshaped into a neutral
technical language. The narratives are respectively backed and legitimized by symbolic
references that suggest an understanding that ‘sounds right’. Each side defines ‘valid
knowledge’ by overlapping their perceptions with their experiences. Thereby, they illustrate
the dynamic interactions and struggles over meaning and representations and, more
importantly, over the control of strategic resources.
The discursive contention between the Royal Government and the ‘donor community’
defining how the reform of the bureaucracy should be implemented, reflects the relations of
forces supporting, and supported by, different types of knowledge. In fact, both sides struggle
for the codification of Administrative Reform, for the power to define what practices are valid
and which are not. Both sides use distinct verbal means to justify their basic assumptions of
how Administrative Reform should be implemented. These assumptions are framed within
different discourses. Donor organizations regard it as a mainly technical exercise, whereas
Government officials define it as a political one. The speakers presented below are either
high-ranking Diplomats or leading politicians in the Government. Similarly to confrontations
between political parties, the speeches manifest both critics to the ‘other’s side’ understanding
and implementation of the reform and respective political agendas to transform certain ideas
into concrete social action. Thereby, the ‘donor community’ takes features of an ‘opposition
party’ by using distinct linguistic structures with specific strategic functions that denote
resistance, opposition, protest, delegitimization of the Government’s agency, and
interestingly, coercion.99 In the same vein, the Representatives of the Government paint the
donor organizations as naïve, irresponsible, impatient, and unwilling to respect the
sovereignty of their organizations.
4.4.1 Political confrontation at the Government-Donor Coordination Committee
(GDCC) level
At the ninth Meeting of the Government-Donor Coordination Committee (GDCC), the
Australian Ambassador harshly criticized the pace of the Reform of the Public
Administration. In her opinion, the resources the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC)
devoted to the Reform of Public Administration did not appear to take into account the
seriousness of the problems within the Cambodian administration.
The poor state of the civil service is one of the key binding constraints on public
sector performance, growth, and poverty reduction in Cambodia. Given the
seriousness of the problems afflicting the civil service - low pay, low skills, poor
management, and thus low capacity - more reform is needed, and it is needed at a
faster pace. Unfortunately, the pace of public administration reform -and the
resources that the Royal Government has devoted to it - do not appear to match
the seriousness of the problems caused by Cambodia’s weak civil service
99 Through various conditions for further ODA.
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H.E Lisa Filipetto, Joint Development Partner statement at the 9th GDCC meeting,
February12, 2007
In her view, effective Civil Service Reform first needed to improve Civil Service Pay; second,
it required to rationalize Civil Service Employment; and third it demanded to strengthen Civil
Service Management. However, two of the most important Joint Monitoring Indicators (JMI)
were off track. The JMI on improving Pay and Employment Conditions did not receive
serious attention. The current policy of 10-15% annual increases on the base civil service
salary did not constitute a realistic strategy to significantly improve pay for Cambodia’s civil
servants. In this scenario, a civil servant earning thirty-five USD per month in 2007 and
receiving a 12% annual increase would have a salary of just one hundred USD per month in
2016. That was clearly too long to wait for Civil Service Reform. She further argued that the
resources resulting from higher economic growth rates, rising tax collections, and oil revenues
should be made available to increase civil service salaries in a fiscally sustainable manner.
What is perhaps most disappointing is that CAR does not appear to be showing
much interest in developing policy options to address these important issues, in
spite of the support provided by donors. For example, in spite of agreements on
their Terms of Reference, consultants have still not been provided with data on
the numbers of civil servants by category and Ministry, and their average pay
levels. This is merely aggregate data that is publicly available in almost every
other country. Providing it would in no way compromise requirements for
confidentiality about the particulars of individual civil servants. And yet the
failure to provide this data has stalled this important policy development work.
H.E Lisa Filipetto, Joint Development Partner statement at the 9th GDCC meeting, 12
February 2007
In addition, she felt that it was unfortunate that the establishment of Priority Mission Groups
(PMGs), and PMG/Merit-Based Pay Initiatives (PMG/MBPIs) in the Ministry of Health was
off track.
Development partners have repeatedly expressed their concerns about
weaknesses in the design and implementation of the PMG model to CAR – but
there has been little evidence of interest in improving the model. Until the PMG
model is improved, few donors are likely to support it financially.
H.E Lisa Filipetto, Joint Development Partner statement at the 9th GDCC meeting,
February12, 2007
With this speech, the donor agencies represented by the Australian ambassador stated their
disappointment with the work pace of the Government and demanded for reinvigoration of the
Joint Monitoring indicators.
In his reply, the Secretary General of the Council of Administrative Reform (CAR) thought
that on the contrary the CAR had being doing well in the Reform of Public Administration. In
his view, many targets of the Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS) had been met
between 2002 and 2006. To illustrate, he went on to give some figures: average salaries had
95
increased by 130% since 2002, over two and a half times the Gross Domestic Product rate of
growth during the period, to reach forty-five USD per month. The size and composition of the
civil service had been stabilized. The legal framework was in place. The Human Resources
Information Management System (HRMIS) and the payroll were effective. The Priority
Mission Group (PMG) scheme covered over one thousand civil servants in fifty-two projects.
And more importantly, all this had been achieved with little assistance from donor
organizations.
On the contrary, he thought that the steps taken by the CAR were vital to modernize the
Public Service in ways that were best suited to the Cambodian conditions. If donor
organizations wanted to support the CAR, it was important that they deploy significant,
predictable and timely assistance in a way that would best suit the existing conditions. But
most importantly they would have to support the principles of national ownership, leadership,
and Cambodianization. These principles were vital for overall sustainability on one hand, and
the reduction of the Civil Service dependence on external assistance in the long term on the
other hand.
The quality and timeliness of resources deployed, including assistance to
strengthen internal capacity, will largely determine success. We just heard that
the resources devoted to the reform by the Government do not match the
seriousness of the situation. I might add that the resources devoted by our
partners on the PAR TWG fall well short of their rhetoric. Only one of the
members has targeted the reform as a priority. The PAR TWG agreed on the
JMIs over a year ago. Resources and assistance necessary for their realization
became available during the summer and we are still awaiting resources
necessary to implement the strategy to phase out salary supplementation. (H.E.
Ngo Hongly, speaking notes at the 9th GDCC meeting, February12, 2007)
He then argued that the course set out by the CAR had been clear for some time. However,
some of the donor agencies continued to ignore their work. Instead, they narrowly focused
their attention on a few elements of reform that met their own agendas. In his view they
continued to push forward unsustainable and impractical reform options.
[The donor organizations] are trapped in unrealistic technical approaches that do
not correspond to Cambodia’s needs and reality. It is clear also that the PAR
TWG has been dysfunctional for some time. It has not been able to mobilize the
necessary resources in support of the Government agenda and the joint
indicators. It is more of a hindrance than a supporter and facilitator contrary to
the principles behind their establishment.
H.E. Ngo Hongly, speaking notes at the 9th GDCC meeting, February 12, 2007
Concerning the phasing out of Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP), the donor
organizations were not able to provide the requested means to capture and analyze the data
generated from the questionnaires, this despite numerous requests. As a result, any further
work to implement the approved strategy had to wait for the completion of this initial step.
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With regard to the Priority Mission Group (PMG)/Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) for the
Ministry of Health, the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) had to make sure that the
MBPI scheme met the interests of the national Government and those of Departments in the
provinces. The Government was looking forward to primarily paying allowances to civil
servants working in the rural areas and not only to civil servants working in the capital.
I should add that it shall follow sub-decree 98 which specifies that the
establishment of a PMG is a first step which could be enriched through a special
salary allowance funded by donors if they so desire […].To conclude, please allow
me to quote front a letter H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary
General of the Council for Administrative Reform sent to Mr. Porter in response
to a letter he had sent making essentially the same points made by the Australian
Ambassador. “Continuing misunderstanding between Bank staff and the Council
for Administrative Reform is becoming increasingly counter productive. The
Council for Administrative Reform is proud of the progress made to reform the
civil service. The targets set by the Strategy to Rationalize the Civil Service,
2002–2006, adopted by the Royal Government in October 2001 have been met.”
[…].Reforming the civil service is a political exercise NOT a technical one. It is
the art of the possible. It is about marshaling resources and people towards a
common goal. […] One cannot strengthen the Civil Service by focusing narrowly
on salary. It is a strategic error and an illusion.
H.E. Ngo Hongly, speaking notes at the 9th GDCC meeting, February12, 2007
In his view the CAR team did not need any further instructions or ‘assistance of substitution’.
What they needed was assistance to complement and develop their own capacity. He then
finished his speech by reminding the Representatives of the various donor organizations that
in 2003, they had agreed to listen to the Government, to align their strategies, and to have
realistic expectations. For the future, the CAR looked forward to working in real, constructive
partnerships.
However, despite these two meetings no constructive dialogue could be established as both
sides were unable and unwilling to cede to the other’s view causing the tensions to escalate
further.
As the tensions escalated, the conflicting issues were forwarded to the annual Cambodian
Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) that was held the 19th of June, 2007 chaired by the
Prime Minister and the head of delegation and the Ambassadors of the various donor
organizations.
4.4.2 Political confrontation at the CDCF level
This time the American ambassador spoke in the name of all donor agencies, reiterating the
comments that had been made by the Australian ambassador. He emphasized the seriousness
of the low pay, low skills, low representation of women, and the poor management problems
of the civil service. Above all, he insisted that reform was needed more quickly.
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Unfortunately, the pace of public administration reform and the resources that
the Royal Government has devoted to it do not appear to match the seriousness of
the problems caused by Cambodia’s weak civil service […] The development
partners are concerned about the lack of progress and respectfully request a
meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Sok An to discuss how we can work
together to support civil service reform.
Development Partners' Consensus Statement on Governance for The Cambodian
Development Cooperation Forum, Delivered by U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia,
Joseph A. Mussomeli, June 19, 2007
He repeated many issues raised by the Australian ambassador at the Government Donor
Cooperation Committee and re-emphasized that it was urgent to improve the civil service pay,
to strengthen civil service management, to ensure that wage expenditures were subject to full
budget control and to rationalize civil service employment, so that human resources were
deployed in priority sectors and functions.
He reiterated that donor agencies were still disappointed with the Public Administration
Reform process at the TWG PAR.
Development partners feel that there has been no meaningful dialogue on how to
address these important issues. Engagement on the government side has been
limited to the Council of Administrative Reform Secretariat. There is a need to
revisit the TWG composition to include other key ministries such as the Ministry
of Planning, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the State Secretariat for Civil
Service, and other ministries that are actively engaged in a range of public
administration reform measures. Unfortunately, development partner support
has been waning over the past year, due to the inability of CAR to engage
partners in a meaningful dialogue. Resources in the form of grants and projects
have been provided over the past several years, but there is a sense that they have
not been used effectively: outputs have been minimal and of questionable quality.
Development Partners' Consensus Statement on Governance for The Cambodian
Development Cooperation Forum, Delivered by U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia,
Joseph A. Mussomeli, June 19, 2007
He further criticized that little progress was made to developed new MBPIs in other
ministries.
The other JMI that is off track is the establishment of Merit Based Pay Initiatives
(MBPIs) in other ministries […].Development partners stand ready to support
implementation of the MBPI. Resources are available, but it is important that the
Government bear an increasing share of the costs over time, or sustainability will
be at risk. In the case of the PFM MBPI,100 the Government is currently bearing
11% of the costs of the MBPI, but its share will increase annually, arriving at
35% by 2011. If the Government were to adopt the same approach in other line
ministries, the overall quality of the civil service could be improved greatly at
reasonable cost. The current policy of dedicating an annual sum to small but
across the board pay increases could be modified to dedicate increasing funds to
100 The MBPI pilot project at the Ministry of Economy and Finance.
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rolling out MBPI while also preserving an across the board raise necessary to
meet or slightly exceed inflation. This would guarantee an annual pay increase
for all civil servants while allowing the Royal Government to use higher targeted
increases through the MBPI to actually improve civil service performance and
thereby provide better services to Cambodian citizens.
Development Partners' Consensus Statement on Governance for The Cambodian
Development Cooperation Forum, Delivered by U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia,
Joseph A. Mussomeli, June 19, 2007
He emphasized that until the PMG model was improved, few organizations would be willing
to support it financially.
In his reply to the American ambassador, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister in Charge
of the Council of Ministers, recurred to the findings of the 2007 World Bank report. In his
view, the report showed that no clear consensus could be reached on how best to allocate the
resources between investments in infrastructures and current expenditures. For him, the
reason was simple: allocating resources was a political exercise emerging from the local
realities of a certain society.
Allocating resources is a political decision that can only be anchored in a
country’s reality. As reforming is essentially a political venture, it is imperative
that government leads and owns the reforms.
H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in Charges of the Council of Ministers,
chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform, talk points at the CDCF meeting,
June 19, 2007
The different perspectives on how to realize the Administrative Reform between the donor
organizations and the RGC stemmed from a different interpretation, a different perception of
Cambodia’s reality and what to do about reforms in general.
We see the glass half full; our friends see it half empty. Our approach to reform
is a participative one involving all ministries and partners wishing to be involved;
it is based on consensus and step-by-step implementation. […] Government is
progressing well with the implementation of GAP II. Progress may seems slow
for those with unrealistic expectations or with too simplistic solutions.
H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in Charges of the Council of Ministers,
chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform, talk points at the CDCF meeting,
June 19, 2007
Similarly, to the Secretary General of the CAR, he cited the latest statistics and pointed out
that the achievements realized were an average salary increase of 163% since 2002.
Furthermore, a legal framework for the integration of civil servants into the new regime had
been completed, and a new policy on Public Service was under implementation. The RGC
was committed to further engage in a multi-faceted approach within the National Program on
Administrative Reform.
Remuneration is foremost a revenue issue. Salaries must be sustainable and fiscal
balance must be maintained. We all know the difficulties in raising revenues. As
we say, we cannot sell the bear skin until the bear is killed. Coherence among
state institutions is imperative. Our approach to remuneration targets all civil
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servants and particularly those on the front line. […] We had set out, at the
beginning of the mandate, to increase basic salaries by 10 to 15% a year. We have
done much better, as we have seen. Now the Prime Minister has already clearly
announced a core element of the medium-term policy. Base salary will increase
by 20% a year. Yet, this is not all that is being done. The allowance system will
continue to complement base salary to improve support to priority operational
requirements. The pension system is also being reformed.
H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in Charges of the Council of Ministers,
chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform, talk points at the CDCF meeting,
June 19, 2007
In fact, he thought that the Government was confident that revenues would sufficiently
increase to provide sufficient room for increasing remuneration in a fiscally prudent manner
that would respect coherence among institutions. Despite differences, the Government was
looking forward to complement increases of the base salary through targeted allowances such
as PMGs and MBPIs.
This morning, the Prime Minister has asked that we find ways for MBPI to
complement the PMG program of the Government and for the two programs to
work together. I think this is a very important issue. The government approach
to reforms will continue to be prudent covering a wide front of mutually
reinforcing initiatives – step by step focusing on what CAN be done, not what
SHOULD be done and setting realistic and sustainable targets. Pacing is foremost
a matter of capacity and available resources.
H.E. Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister in Charges of the Council of Ministers,
chairman of the Council for Administrative Reform, talk points at the CDCF meeting,
June 19, 2007
However, if MBPIs were to be considered, he further argued, a constructive dialogue and
partnership based on mutual respect and accountability would be required. Constructive inter-
ministerial dialogues had already been reached.
Finally after both speeches, the Prime Minister endorsed the speech of his Deputy Prime
Minister and urged all parties to look for a consensus on the use of MBPI scheme as a
complement to the PMG.
I am aware that MBPI has some additional special features comparing to the
concept of Priority Mission Group (PMG) that the Royal Government is
implementing at the same time in a number of ministries and agencies of the
RGC. Therefore, to ensure the clarity of concept and policy as well as
effectiveness and continuity in implementation, I would like to request relevant
ministries/institutions of the RGC and our development partners to organize a
national workshop as soon as possible to discuss and to find consensus on a
political and conceptual framework, as well as evaluate the progress and the
needs to take some accommodations aimed at speeding up and accelerating this
important reform agenda.
Prime Minister’s address at the First Cambodia Development Cooperation Forum
(CDCF), Phnom Penh, 19 June 2007
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The donor agencies and the CAR thus agreed to organize a national workshop in October
2007, to lay down core principles of PMGs and MBPIs with the goal to find a consensus on
how to use targeted allowances. The workshop was followed by follow-ups on the generic
principles of a unified PMG/MBPI scheme. As a result of the workshop, Sub-Decree 98 was
revised to incorporate a unified and sustainable incentives system for all strategic reform
programs, incorporating merit based principles. In addition a Sub-Decree 29 on the
Implementation of Merit Based Performance Incentive (MBPI) was passed in 2008. The new
Sub-Decree specified that under the procedures for approval of MBPI schemes, Ministries and
Institutions would have to submit their proposals to the Council of Ministers and the Ministry
of Economy and Finance. The CAR Secretariat would then be responsible for approving,
coordinating, and monitoring the implementation of the MPBI schemes. However, each
Ministry and each institution that initiates a MBPI scheme has to ensure that donor
organizations “transfer their salary supplements funds to support the implementation of the
MBPI scheme” (Royal Government, 2008). These supplements are then paid into the personal
account of the targeted civil servants using the banking system.
Despite the political will to consider the integration of the MBPI scheme, the Government has
excluded the experts of the donor organization in the operationalization of further policies,
i.e., in its internal working process. The Technical Working Group on Public Administrative
Reform was not revived and the CAR Secretariat continued selected cooperation on a bilateral
basis with “partners” from France,101 CIDA, and the EC. Beside bilateral cooperation, the
CAR has started to work more closely with other ministries such as the MEF and line
ministries such as the Ministries of Health, Land, Interior and Commerce to expand the
coverage of the MBPIs.
In the last counter, as to March 2008, the CAR planned to focus on a third instrument to
enhance performance in the delivery of public services, the Special Operating Agencies
(SOA)102. The goal was to apply the scheme to a future employment agency. In the meantime,
the scheme was piloted at Health Centers in the provinces, without however the ‘advise’ of
most donor organizations.
In a comment in August 2008, Representatives from DANIDA wrote: “although a Sub Decree
29 on Merit Based Performance Incentives was adopted on 02 April 2008, there is still a lack
of clarity from the Council for Administrative Reform on the differences between ‘strategic’
MBPI reforms, ‘operational’ PMGs and ‘service-delivery’-oriented Special Operating
Agencies” (DANIDA, 2008).
101 The French Cooperation finances the development of one Special Operating Agency pilot for Health Centers
and the preparation of a compendium of core information on public services.
102 The SOA concept is a Canadian concept. Interestingly, the Secretary General of the CAR is advised on a
daily basis by a French Canadian CIDA cooperant since 2003. The Canadian advisor has a office at the CAR and
appears during policy negotiations with donor organizations as member of the Royal Government of Cambodia
and not as CIDA expert. In the past he used to be a senior executive of the Canadian Federal Service in the
Natural Resource Department.. Since the 1990s he has however been a full-time consultant working as a Senior
Advisor to the Royal Government.
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4.5. Conclusion
Looking at the history of the meetings between the Government and the donor agencies, a
shift in the power-differentials between the respective actors took place. Initially the donors
could define objectives in consultations with the Government. The RGC then took over the
leading position in 2006, with donors still playing an important political role. In the political
negotiations, the Government becomes dominant, not the least by adding further actors into
the forum besides the donor agencies. In other words, the RGC gained a stronger position in
the negotiation processes by fulfilling demands formulated in the global development
discourse, and applying it as a means to gain a level of independence from the donors.
The actual interface of political struggle and negotiation within the RGC is situated at the
Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM). The OCOM is no only the nexus of all policy
programs but as well the most dominant body in Cambodian politics. As the Council for
Administrative Reform (CAR) is a sub committee of the OCOM, negotiations at CAR can be
discussed at negotiation of the OCOM. However, the OCOM is also the most contested body
in the Cambodian state. It has a tremendous influence on policy formulation in the other
ministries and institutions. Next to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, it offers the best
possibilities for careers and is most attractive for aspiring young professionals. However, the
career possibilities within higher bureaucracy position are strongly connected to competence
and qualification on one hand, and to loyalty and performance on the other. This is important
to keep in mind when looking at the Administrative Reform process starting in the 1990s.
For the donor agencies who are involved in the reform of the administration, but remain
outside the negotiation processes within the OCOM, the completion of the Operational
Review, the Remuneration Study and the Labor Market Study were regarded as a vital
prerequisite for the conceptualization of any policy on remuneration and employment. The
Government’s strategy, on the other hand, is to work on a broader agenda in which the
priorities and sequencing of policies are others than those of donor agencies. Priority is first
given to the Strategy to Phase out the Salary Supplementation Practices of the donor agencies
and a policy for better Service Delivery in the rural areas though the introduction of PMGs.
The Remuneration Policy has to be completed as well but as a last step. In the same vein,
donor agencies push for the implementation of the Merit Based Pay Incentive model.
The political éclat between the donor organizations and their diplomatic Representatives and
the high Officials of the RGC that culminated in 2007, shows how different agendas came
together with distinct claims in the administrative reform. Claims that derive from different
understandings on how to control the allocation and appropriation of national resources, the
incompatibility between the instrumental technical claims of the donor organizations and the
political claims of the RGC. Indeed, topics that were avoided had to be addressed at one point
of the negotiations. As the donor organizations were unable to address the political aspects of
their interventions, tensions emerged.
The tensions raised at the political level were primarily the product of failed communication
patterns and the continuous construction and maintenance of meconnaissance within the
Technical Working Group on Public Administrative Reform. Even though professionals from
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both the donor organizations and the state bureaucracy were very close in terms of
knowledge, practice, and education among others, the integration into different organizational
settings limited their possibilities for horizontal alliances. They could reach a consensus with
regard to the ends, or the vision of how Cambodia should develop, but not on the means and
strategies to achieve them.
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5. Professionals and administrative reform: a contested
negotiation process
Reforming the Civil Service is a political exercise NOT a technical one. It is the
art of the possible. It is about marshaling resources and people towards a
common goal. We all agree to deepen and widen the reform as it is essential to the
success of the Rectangular Strategy, the NSDP and GAPII. It is essential to
realize the government’s objectives of sustainable development, social justice and
poverty reduction […] One cannot strengthen the civil service by focusing
narrowly on salary. It is a strategic error and an illusion.
H.E.Ngo Hongly, Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform.
Speaking notes at the 9th GDCC meeting, February12, 2007
For the records, administrative structures are rarely developed on the basis of
efficiency alone. In Cambodia as in other countries they are the results of difficult
balancing to accommodate a variety of factors. These include the absolute need to
secure peace and political stability. The resolution of the situation following the
last general elections is a very small price to ensure the formation of an effective
government
Letter from the CAR to the World Bank, Phnom Penh, 14th November 2005
The inability of the members of the Technical Working Group on Public Administrative
reform to find a common consensus can be traced back to their integration into different
organizational and thus vertical structures. On one hand, professionals in the Cambodian
bureaucracy followed requirements posed by politics based on, for example, the necessity of
being a member of the CPP and thus of established bureaucratic patronage networks. In
contrast, professionals of donor organizations follow technical requirements from their
headquarters outside Cambodia. This crucial differentiation along divergent rationalities is
based on the necessity of the self-reproduction of the respective organizations/networks to
which they belong.
5.1. The political tensions and their basis within the Technical Working Group on Public
Administration
Tensions that were made visible on the political level in the speeches of the Minister in charge
of the Council of Ministers had their basis in the failure of the professionals to develop a
common strategy within the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative
Reform (PAR). As a result, as illustrated in section four, the TWG PAR was dissolved in early
2007.
The dismissal of the TWG illustrates the ambivalent position of its participants. Professionals
negotiating at the Technical Working Group were indeed in a dichotomous situation as they
represented the discourse and rhetoric of their own organizations, but had to meet the
expectations of those with whom they had negotiated. As a result, different ‘knowledges’
linked to specific interactions and practices remained.
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The data presented in this section, represent the results of ten TWG PAR meetings, seven
speeches by Representatives from both sides and extensive ethnographic data from participant
observation during a four-month internship at the Council for Administrative Reform.
Throughout the course of the negotiations, different logics and expectations were presented.
On one hand, professionals representing donor organizations regarded the completion of the
operational review, remuneration and labor market studies as a vital prerequisite for the
conceptualization of any further reform that could result in the introduction of a coherent
Policy on Remuneration and Employment. Alternatively, state professionals believed that it
was crucial to work on a broader agenda in which: first, transparency on the amount on
resources spent by external actors within the state agencies was created, and second, the
attainment of concrete Service Delivery was realized as soon as possible in the provinces and
districts. Following this logic, the implementation of an Operational Review and a
Remuneration Study would have been counterproductive, as it would have destabilized the
fragile political consensus within the state apparatus.
Basically, on one hand donor agencies pushed for the implementation of a Merit Based Pay
Incentive model, whereas on the other hand the Council for Administrative Reform wanted to
see the Priority Mission Group model realized. Donors pushed for shorter-term measures, i.e.
greater increases in payments within a shorter period of time whereas the professionals of the
Council for Administrative Reform worked on introducing long term policies that were
congruent to Government’s and thus the CPP’s ‘development’ agenda. This included a
gradual raise in salary for a broad range of civil servants and inter alias the establishment of
Health Centers in the provinces. Donor professionals argued that immediate measure would
be more effective if they targeted few highly-qualified civil servants in key positions within
the Ministries on the national level, whereas the Government thought that civil servants
willing to work in rural areas should be financially promoted.
In addition, professionals at the Council for Administrative Reform opposed the construction
of an Administrative Reform as a purely technical endeavor to improve the ‘corrupt’,
‘inefficient’ and ‘ineffective’ bureaucracy pervaded by ‘unfavorable’ networks of patronage.
In their view the aim of Administrative Reform was not primarily to enhance efficiency to
rationalize the bureaucracy but to increase efficiency in satisfying the demands of the middle
bureaucrats while still exerting political control103 over them. Ideas on prospective methods to
achieve this were strongly influenced by national political developments such as party politics
and global economic processes.
Although professionals of both sides pursued the same goal of modernizing the bureaucracy
by introducing performance and merit based incentive schemes, meconnaissance was
generated and tensions evolved. Different ideological paradigms and practices led to different
interpretations of the reform practices within the administrative system. This was not a
fundamental flaw, but once the different performance based management concepts had to be
operationalized, tensions emerged, including:
103 Indeed, as formulated by Evers (1987), the combination of redistribution and control within the bureaucracy
constitutes the power base for dominant strategic groups.
105
1. Tensions between the concept of the program for administrative reform as a technical
endeavor and as a provider of funds for the Government to implement its own political
agenda.
2. Tensions between professionalism and its ethics on one hand, and the massive lack of
resources on the other.
3. Tensions between ownership, leadership and sustainability, and alternatively the need
for salary supplementation to fulfill these principles.
4. Tensions resulting from the inclusion and exclusion of different suggestions about
issues to be included in policy documents.
5. Tensions rising from the integration of suggestions made by the donor agencies and
omission of RGC’s opinions in international policy papers and conversely, the
exclusion of donor suggestions in the favor of inclusion of young professionals
concepts in the policies of the RGC.
6. Tensions emerging from organizational constraints and guidelines.
5.2. The contested issues: Joint Monitoring Indicators and their implications
During the 2004 negotiations of the TWG on Public Administrative Reform, topics reflected
the political guidelines and frameworks of the political and the semi–political/semi-technical
levels. These policies were summarized into four Joint Monitoring Indicators (JMIs). These
JMIs are not just indicators but also, in fact, policy guidelines; under the guise of ‘indicators’,
policy priorities are defined. As a result, policies follow the indicators, not the other way
around. This has important implications for their operationalization. Even so-called neutral
‘indicators’ are highly contested among the involved actors. They have far-reaching policy
implications with regard to the power differentials that exist between the Government and
donors.
The following indicators were the subjects of negotiations:
 Joint Monitoring Indicator 1: Implement the approved Joint Government-Donor
Strategy for Phasing out Salary Supplementation Practices in Cambodia.
 Joint Monitoring Indicator 2: Improve Pay and Employment Conditions in the civil
service.
 Joint Monitoring Indicator 3: Design and implement a Human Resource Management
policy and action plan to improve merit and performance management.
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 Joint Monitoring Indicator 4: Enhance Service Delivery through developing a One
Window Offices (OWOs)104 policy, a consistent legal framework and implementation
plan.
A distinguishing feature emerged from the identification and definition of these indicators;
both groups of professionals align with very specific indicators, arguing fervently for their
conceptualization of change. In sum, the Royal Government was predominantly interested in
Joint Monitoring Indicator 1. The issue was important for the Government as far as it had
established the Council for Administrative Reform to oversee all institutional changes and
financial transactions within Cambodian State Agencies. Conversely, donor organizations
such as the World Bank and DANIDA105 focused on Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 2. For
them, JMI 2 had to be operationalized into the Remuneration/Operational Review; thereby
JMI 2 represented a tool to get an overview over the functioning and structure of the
bureaucracy. As no consensus could be reached as to the operationalization of JMI 1 and 2,
tensions emerged. Consequently, the professionals of the Council for Administrative Reform
(CAR) shifted the negotiations from JMI 1 and 2 to JMI 3 and 4 as these were politically more
neutral.
5.3. The Joint Monitoring Indicator’s relationship and their dynamics over time
The primary reasons tensions appeared is that Joint Monitoring Indicator 1 and Joint
Monitoring 2 were competitive and not additive. These indicators had far-reaching
implications as they were connected to specific, competing interests of the donors and the
Royal Government. The objective of Joint Monitoring Indicator 1 was to obtain transparency
and control over funds distributed by donors to civil servants involved in their respective
projects. In contrast, Joint Monitoring Indicator 2 aimed at identifying the functions,
backgrounds and levels of professionalism of the civil servants working in the public sector.
In this context, the implementation of base line studies would have need to form the
foundation from which decisions could have been made regarding whether specific incentives
should or even could have further improved administrative efficiency.
While Joint Monitoring Indicator 1 requests transparency from the donors it does not provide
a clause that stipulates the same for the Royal Government. Therefore, Joint Monitoring
Indicator 2 embodies the donor’s desire for transparency from the Government, without
demanding the same from the donors. In both cases, vested interests play a role. The donor
organizations want to maintain the possibilities of working together with ‘efficient and loyal’
104 The One Window Service Office is divided into a Front Office, where all the transactions with the citizens are
handled, and a Back office where competent experts in the different areas of activity work. On a board in the
One Window Office, the citizens can read which fee they have to pay for which service.
105 In this context, the World Bank and DANIDA were supported by UNDP, AUSAID, and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Other donors namely from the French Embassy, the European Delegation of the
European Commission and CIDA were more or less neutral concerning Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 1 and
Joint Monitoring Indicator(JMI) 2 and rather focused on Joint Monitoring Indicator(JMI) 3 and Joint
Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 4, which were generally less problematic and therefore, essentially uncontested.
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civil servants, whereas the Government wants to maintain patronage networks within the
administration without interference from donors.
From a neutral and external viewpoint, both positions make sense and are reasonable.
Understandably, the Government is well-aware that, at present, patronage networks are
crucial for the functioning of the bureaucracy, even though efficiency might be reduced.
Furthermore, these networks establish the loyalty needed by the Government to maintain, at
least, pacification. Conversely, the donor’s desire for a system where they are in control is
also understandable. They fear that if the Government can control the funds it would lead
towards corruption and reduced efficiency.106 Even though both understand the position of the
others, it is difficult to find a consensus.
Essentially, Joint Monitoring Indicators 1 and 2 were the main topics for discussion within
the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administration Reform (PAR) during 2005
and early 2006. This shifted in May 2006 with the discontent of the Council for
Administrative Reform’s team over the reluctance of the donor organizations to support their
work in an ‘effective’ way. From this point on, the discussion within the TWG focused
mainly on Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 3 and Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 4.
However, the tensions generated by Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI)1 and Joint Monitoring
Indicator (JMI) 2 could not be ignored and thus the Technical Working Group (TWG) on
Public Administration Reform (PAR) was dissolved in early 2007. After the dissolution of the
TWG, negotiations to reform the administration were postponed by the Government Donor
Cooperation Committee (GDCC). As these were ineffective, they were relocated to the
highest political forum, namely the Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF).
To get a good overview of the dynamic development of the meetings, each meeting is
summarized in the table below.
106 In the CPIA report 2005 the World Bank writes: “ Civil service regulations are meritocratic but are not
implemented. Instead, patronage based practices prevail in nearly all government[…] Rent seeking, including
the sale of positions, is entrenched and regarded as normal”( CAR; 2005). In response to that point in the CPIA
report the CAR responded by stating that: “This statement is evidently false and malicious […] Existing rules
and regulations are routinely implemented. There may be instance of patronage practices but they do not
prevail. Cambodia is a career civil service that is based essentially on seniority once one has joined the service
though examination. While the system corresponds to Cambodia’s culture and tradition and was very useful to
create a unified civil service.(CAR; 2005)
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Table 5.2.: Chronology of the meetings of the Technical Working Group on Public
Administrative Reform
Issues
discussed
7.9.2005 29.9.2
005
11.5.2005 6.12.2005 5.4.2006 26.5.2006 31.5.2006
Joint
Monitoring
Indicator 1
X X X X X Letter of
discontent
from the
Secretary
General of
CAR to
members of
TWG PAR
X
Joint
Monitoring
Indicator 2
X X X X X X
Conflict over
Resources
Joint
Monitoring
Indicator 3
X X
Joint
Monitoring
Indicator 1
4
X
Conflict over
the CPIA
report World
Bank
Issues
discussed
14.6.2006
GDCC
20.9.
2006
18.10.200
6
01.2007 12.2.2007
GDCC
19.6.2007
CDCF
4.3.2008
GDCC
Joint
Monitoring
Indicator 1
Speech
disappoint
ment by
the donor
“Commu-
nity”
Resignation
of co leader
of the TWG
PAR (World
Bank)
Political
confrontation
between the
Australian
Ambassador
and the
Secretary
General of the
Council for
Administrative
Reform
Political
confronta-
tion
between
the
Ambassa-
dor of the
USA and
Minister of
the Office
of the
Council of
Ministers
Interventio
n by the
Prime
Minister
Consensus to
use
PMG/MBPI
in line
ministries
TWG PAR is
not revived
Administra-
tive Reform:
bilateral
cooperation
France,
Canada, EC
Joint
Monitoring
Indicator 2
X X
Conflict over
Resources
Joint
Monitoring
Indicator 3
X
Joint
Monitoring
Indicator 4
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5.4. Analysis of the meetings of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public
Administrative Reform (PAR)
The meanings of different knowledge/truth constructs such as ‘salary supplementation’,
‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’, ‘transparency‘, ‘performance’, ‘sustainability’, ‘ownership’, and
‘service delivery’ are not as fixed in negotiations as they appear to be. Instead they are
communicatively negotiated between the different parties involved. During 2005 and 2006
asymmetrical relations were first maintained, reinforced, and then reversed. Although a
common vision for a potential joint action plan was conceived, donor agencies on the basis of
their economic power base dominated the discursive space giving the professionals of the
Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) no other option than the exit strategy. After the
emergence of the first tensions within the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public
Administration Reform (PAR), the distribution of discursive power shifted in favor of the
CAR professionals.
Basically, the emergence of different realities resulted from different cognitive, emotional,
and organizational experiences and interpretations. Problematic situations and their solutions
were experienced differently. The cultural repertoire of the young professionals entailed
elements of both: discursive practices from the leading donor agencies and from their political
superiors. Moreover, power tactics were exercised during the discussion on the disbursement
and use of funds and while defining the agenda and the content of the meetings; thereby the
use of languages such as English or Khmer shifted.
In addition, several processes of inclusion and exclusions were officially and unofficially
distorted and reconstructed over time. Within the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR)
Secretariat, tensions emerged between the senior professionals and few young professionals
regarding the transparent use of allowances and funds for the CAR Secretariat staff itself.107
In the same manner, differences emerged between the Cambodian professionals and the
expatriate professionals within donor agencies. Simultaneously, differences based on how to
proceed with negotiations with the CAR Secretariat materialized between the World Bank and
DANIDA on one side, and the French Cooperation108 and CIDA on the other. Many donor
Representatives were not convinced that their interests were sufficiently represented by the
lead co-facilitator for the TWG PAR. Thus, a situation of multiple asymmetric divisions of
tasks and decisions emerged as well. However, more importantly, the professionals working
for Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) had to take into consideration national politics,
whereas the professionals of the aid organizations systematically excluded politics from their
systems of reference. For them, the political processes were defined as technical.
To illustrate this problem, the analysis will focus on the meetings of the Technical Working
Group (TWG) on Public Administration Reform (PAR), before the éclat between the Council
for Administrative Reform (CAR) and donor organizations. As illustrated in the preceding
section, Joint Monitoring Indicator 1, aiming at the phasing out of Salary Supplementation
107 Tensions that had to be resolved by their patron in the Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM).
108 French Embassy.
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Practices (SSP), and especially Joint Monitoring Indicator 2, aiming at the reform of the Pay
and Employment Practices, were the most contentious as they were connected to specific
interests of the donors or the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC).
5.4.1 Joint Monitoring Indicator 1: Implement the approved "Joint Government-Donor
Strategy” for Phasing Out Salary Supplementation Practices in Cambodia
Negotiations on Joint Monitoring Indicator 1 ended in a deadlock. In fact, Joint Monitoring
Indicator 1 basically represented a policy request by the Cambodian Government for more
transparency and control over the allocation of resources from donor organizations within the
bureaucracy. The Cambodian Government’s demands were supported by the Monterrey
Consensus and the Rome/Paris Declarations on Aid Effectiveness, which placed donor
agencies under increasing pressure to find new ways of working with the recipient countries.
In Cambodia, before a common mechanism on how to structure practical cooperation at the
interface between the aid agencies and the state was found, old structures, which had so far
favored nontransparent and bilateral cooperation, had to be phased out. However, the process
of making disbursements ‘transparent’ appeared to be a sensitive issue for several donor
organizations.
At the meeting on the 7th of September 2005, the Secretary General of the Council for
Administrative Reform (CAR) emphasized that the Royal Government of Cambodia wished to
formulate a policy that would bring consistency over time in the Salary Supplementation
Practice (SSP) of all donor organizations. The Government expressed the wish to ‘optimize’
the SSP and Representatives of the donor organizations did not oppose the demand. In fact, an
agreement was made to create a working party with Representatives from both sides.
At the following meeting on September 29th, the Secretary General of the CAR informed the
participants that during the preceding Inter-Ministerial Meeting of the Council of Ministers,
the Ministers had indicated that they were not aware of persons receiving salary
supplementations from donor organizations in their Ministries. As a consequence, the Office
of the Council of Ministers (OCOM) had sent a letter to all Ministries asking them to report on
any known Salary Supplementation Practice (SSP) within their establishments.
Following this, the Draft Policy on Phasing out Salary Supplementations109 prepared by the
CAR was presented to the audience for comments. Once the issue was opened up, divergent
opinions were expressed by both sides.
For the professionals of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR), the strategy should
have enabled the different Line Ministries to reach an agreement on phasing out the SSP in
their action plans. They thought that the matter was complicated and inconsistent throughout
the Ministries. In the Ministry of Health, for example, larger amounts of money were spent on
per diems rather than on the salaries themselves.
109 Prepared by selected members of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administration Reform
(PAR).
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The Assistant Secretary of the European Commission Delegation raised the issue of how a
definite target date for this process could be agreed upon. The World Bank’s Representative
replied that it would be difficult to set that target that very day, but that further studies would
facilitate this matter. The Resident Representative of the International Monetary Fund asked
what the purpose was of gathering information about Salary Supplementation Practices and,
also, how would the sustainability of pay change be established.
The CAR Secretary General reiterated that the Ministries did not know what salary
supplements were given and that it was important to know the total volume of resources
allocated and then to look at whether the supplementation was being used in the best possible
way. The strategy that had received recent endorsement by the Prime Minister would enable
the Government to direct the development priorities through setting up Priority Mission
Groups (PMG) staffed with qualified personal. Although it was not possible to set a firm date
for phasing out Salary Supplementations Practices (SSP), the immediate objective of the
Government was not to replace SSP, but to clarify how they were being spent. Cambodia
would eventually get to the point where any kind of SSPs would not be needed. Thus, for the
time being, Cambodia would need SSPs to continue.
The minutes of this meeting indicate the importance and the priority of the Council of
Ministers to get a clear picture about the volume of resources that are paid to civil servants.
However, both the donor organizations and the Council for Administrative Reform agree that
at the present stage no clear date to phase out the Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP)can
be set. The disclosure of information pertaining to SSPs is not that much a problem between
the donor organizations and the Cambodian Government, but rather a sensitive issue among
the different donor organizations themselves. Here it is important to mention that although
many steps had been taken under the direction of the United Nations Organizations, the
World Bank and DFID to harmonize and align the ‘donor community’s practices’, differences
and disagreement on certain issues prevailed among them.
A sensitive issue that exists between different aid agencies is indeed the reform implications
of the Rome (2003) and Paris (2005) Declarations, which aim to increase aid effectiveness.
Thus, by laying down a practical action-oriented road map for all organizations to improve the
quality of aid and its impact, room to set own priorities at agency level and possibilities has
been reduced. This has led to an atmosphere of competition between various aid agencies on
the “development market”. Another reaction has been to follow exit strategies vis a vis
powerful multilateral organizations and their ‘selected’ partners. For example, not all
decisions made by the World Bank and DANIDA, which occupy a leadership position on
Governance Reform and have a strong influence on the choices and policies of other aid
agencies, are based on a full consensus between all donor organizations. However, because of
the alignment dictum, donor agencies have to speak with one voice.
One way some aid agencies have used to counter this dictum was to delay handing over the
questionnaire that stressed the Government’s desire to know more about Salary
Supplementation Practices (SSP). It had been sent to all donors for comments to help
facilitate the process of reform. Thus, when the Secretary General asked for feedback from
the questionnaires at the following meeting in November 2005 some failed to report their
findings, as an indirect means to prevent JMI 1 from being fully realized. Following
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DANIDA (2004), disagreement prevailed already in 2004 between donor organizations on the
kind of information they would have to disclose. Some organizations only saw the necessity
to share their guidelines for salary supplement rates; whereas others wanted to go a step
further and track salary supplement payments made to individuals.110 Moreover, disagreement
prevailed on the how to re-channel these supplements. Some donors argued that they simply
did not have the mandate for direct support for pay reform, others perceived re-channeling as
a stop-gap measure with limited benefits or negative effects in the sense that it might delay
the reform process; a last group of seven donor organizations considered re-channeling of
Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP) funds as a means to secure “their commitments in
Cambodia as their irregular SSP were jeopardizing the future of their program” (DANIDA,
2004: 10).
At the same meeting in November 2005, just before DANIDA’s Representative urged all
donors organizations to fill in the questionnaire as soon as possible, the World Bank
Representative reported on the Donor Lunch that was held on 27 October 2005 to discuss the
draft strategy prepared by the CAR to phase out the donor’s salary supplementation. The
rough minutes had been circulated to donors for comment and the Council for Administrative
Reform was informed that it would have the final minutes in the near future. In general, donor
organizations thought that the strategy needed firmer language and time-bounded benchmarks
on the work to would be undertaken. It also covered the related international work on
harmonization issues (e.g., the Rome/Paris Declaration). Although the Sectoral Approach111
was welcomed by some, potential difficulties were raised in some sectors where Technical
Working Groups (TWG) were less effective or there were perceived capacity difficulties.
Thereby, the root causes of the difficulties to rationalize the Salary Supplementation Practices
(SSP) were not primarily located in the different rationales of the donor organizations, but in
the technical shortages of the Draft Strategy prepared by the Council for Administrative
Reform (CAR). At the end of the meeting the Secretary General of the CAR announced to
dissolve the Technical Working Group(TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR) as no
constructive dialogue could be reached. This seemingly sudden announcement was actually
based on the strong dissatisfaction with the recently published Country Policy and
Institutional Assessment of the World Bank.
Here we see that although all parties agreed on the need to create transparency, cautious
reservations were expressed by the donor organizations, which were reluctant to make
information about their Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP) public. In fact, they threw the
ball to the Khmer side by arguing that a strategy to phase out the SSP could only be approved
once certain technical requirements were fulfilled. This discussion followed a tactic of
conditionality and postponement. The behavior pattern of the donor agencies was one reason
110 Ranging from the tracking of all payments made to the listing of names and recipients.
111 In Line Ministries such as Ministry of Education, Health, Agriculture and Justice.
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and the CPIA report prompted the Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform
to threaten to suspend the forum in its current form.112
In a letter to the World Bank the CAR wrote on the 14th of November 2005:
The CPIA is a flawed instrument that seeks to score a country based on
subjective and arbitrary criteria and it is a questionable process that gives too
much weight to the view of the Bank’s staff and little weight, if at tall, to the
views of duly elected and sovereign governments. Justifications given are
misleading and, at times, evidently wrong. One is left to wonder about intentions.
Is the CPIA a mechanism to justify political choices and give them the
appearance of objectivity?[…]The evaluation of Bank staff is based on subjective
criteria opened to arbitrariness and widely differing interpretation […] It
provides subjective snapshots of the situation as perceive by staff that does not
make justice to progress being made in the reforms. The rating is based on
preconceived notions of an ideal state of affairs and reflects a poor understanding
of Cambodia […] Bank staff shoul not comment on the nature of the Cambodian
government and imply that it could explain what it judges to be weak
coordination mechanisms. Internal mechanism for policy coordination function
effectively. Various councils and interministerial committees are in place to
facilitate dialogue among ministries, to facilitate the emergence of a consensus
and to ensure coordination. It is hard to understand how Bank staff here to assist
he country does not full appreciate the extend and effectiveness of governmental
coordination mechanisms with the Council of Ministers at the elms. One can only
presume, it is because of lack of time, if not of a lack of interest and
professionalism […] Policy coordination issues lie much more with development
partner among themselves and between them and government. Their practices
are often anarchic and dysfunctional. Rather than listen to government and base
their interventions on government policies, too many continue to seek results that
are more in line with their national interests, their perception of issues and their
ready made solutions.
Letter of the Secretariat General of the Council for Administrative Reform, Phnom
Penh 14 November 2005
At the following meeting on the 6th of December, the Country Manager of the World Bank
attended the discussion to mediate and smooth the ruffled feathers. The resource person113
outlined the progress to date, namely the development of the Draft Strategy on Phasing out
SSP, the collection of the information questionnaire and their circulation to Ministries and
donors for comment. The regular Representative of the World Bank in the Technical Working
Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR) reiterated the comments that had been
112 Another important reason was the reluctance of donor organizations to fund the activities of the CAR and the
inability to find a consensus on the performance based merit scheme.
113 The resource person was hired by UNDP to coordinate the activities of the Technical Working Group (TWG)
on Public Administrative Reform (PAR). However his function remained symbolic as he was increasingly
excluded from the actual activities of the Council.
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made by donors at the Donor Lunch in October 2005, where they had discussed the draft
strategy. He said the donors’ views had been taken into account in producing a revised draft
strategy for the Council of Administrative Reform (CAR) to consider and it was going to be
presented to the CAR in the near future. Some of the particular suggestions that were
incorporated into the new draft involved: first, closely linking the Supplementation Strategy
with the new Remuneration Policy; second, tightening timelines; third, allowing for the
completion of the information questionnaire until the end of January 2006; and fourth, the
need for the production of a concise guide about the operation of the Priority Mission Groups
(PMG). He suggested that, if possible, the strategy should be tabled at the semi–political,
semi-technical level, the Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC), the following
week.
The Secretary General agreed that a process guide on Priority Mission Group (PMG) would
be developed and the timelines reviewed for the questionnaire. The CAR Secretariat’s
objective was to complete all policy work by mid-2006 so that stronger focus could be placed
on Reform Implementation.
Despite the éclat of the previous meeting, both parties agreed to continue working within the
frame of the TWG without specifying how they would do it. Interestingly, the Representatives
of the donor organizations used the opportunity to emphasize the link between Joint
Monitoring Indicator 1 on Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP) with the successful
implementation of Joint Monitoring Indicator 2114 on the Pay and Employment Policy.
At the April 5th meeting in 2006, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Representative informed the meeting about her group’s work on SSP, including the
establishment of a data base, the review of supplementation arrangements, and the efforts to
harmonize practices across UN Agencies. She then, however, asked when the Operational
Review/Remuneration Study would be completed and was told that it would be done by the
end of June.
After congratulating the Secretariat of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) on their
work progress, the Representative of the World Bank emphasized the importance of following
up the implementation of the Strategy on Phasing out Salary Supplementation (SPSS),
including the questionnaire sent to the donor organizations to fill in information on their
Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP). He suggested that the CAR write to donors to
outline the necessary action and that this should be followed up by making this matter an item
for discussion at the next meeting of the Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC)
in June 2006.
114 The Renumeration Policy and the Studies accompanying it, are a recurring theme throughout all JMI
negotiations. The donors recognize that the implementation of JMI 2 is a sensitive issue as it is a political
process. By making the full disclosure of information on their Salary Supplementation Practcies (SSP)
dependent on the realization of studies on the Functional Analysis/ Operational Review, including the
Remuneration Study, of the state bureaucracy, and the formulation of clear Guidelines for the Priority Mission
Group. In doing so, they exert pressure on the Council for Administrtaive Reform to fulfill their agenda. For
further discussion on Joint Monitoring Indicator 2 see chapter 5.4.2.
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Yet again the link between phasing out the Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP) and the
Pay and Employment Reform was made. Thus, pressure was exerted by the Representatives of
the donor organizations on the staff of the Council for Administrative Reform CAR to provide
information and transparency over the processes and posts within the bureaucracy. It was
made clear again that the donor organizations are not willing to disclose information as long
as they had no clear picture i.e., transparency over the processes and structures within the
administration. Interestingly, the suggestion was made for the second time by the donor
organizations, to transfer the negotiation to the higher semi-political, semi-technical level of
the Government Donor Cooperation Committee (GDCC). However, the professionals of the
CAR did not cede to the pressure and opted for a strategy of confrontation by writing the
following letter to the members of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public
Administrative Reform (PAR), on May 26, 2006:
Now it seems that the Technical Working Group has a fundamental systemic
problem. This is that, by comparison with the large amounts that it has been
possible to find in other areas of governance, it does not seem to be possible for
our development partners to generate the relatively modest level of funds needed
to support our common agenda on a timely basis. Instead, the Council for
Administrative Reform is expected to scrape by largely through relatively small
contributions generated from a range of sources. This is not a satisfactory way to
support a fundamental and far reaching program of public administration
reform that requires adequate and sustained support.
Letter of the Secretary General of the CAR to the members of the TWG PAR, 2006
At the following meeting on the 31st of May 2006, all parties met again and the professionals
of the donor organizations made some new suggestion to support the strategy to phase out the
Salary Supplementation Practice (SSP); in this vein, DANIDA proposed to provide 38,000
USD for data entry work and for the planned review of the Strategy for the Phase out SSPs.
The World Bank’s Representative explained that the remaining funds required could be
provided through the already running Economic and Public Sector Capacity Building115
(EPSCB) program. The professionals of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) replied
that this would not be possible, as the budget for the EPSCB has already been planned for
other activities.
In sum, the meeting could not end with a consensus on how to proceed with the phasing out of
the Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP) of the donor organizations as no essential funding
could be mobilized. In addition no agreement could be reached on the institutional framework
and responsibilities for its implementation. Hence, the implementation of Joint Monitoring
Indicator 1 failed as no consensus could be reached on the institutional anchoring for
information/data sharing and administration. Moreover, donor organizations thought that
reallocating or re-channeling resources from Salary Supplementation Practices (SSP) to
115According to the World Bank, the project aims to bridge the Government's reform efforts toward a second
generation of reforms. While the project is a small operation, it aims to play a catalytic role by focusing on
capacity building on the ground with an emphasis on training, knowledge transfer, and assumption of
responsibilities by Cambodians in the place of or complementary to, the provision of foreign advisors, including
introducing a Global Development Learning Network (GDLN) facility. The fund was also used to finance the
Remuneration and Employment Studies.
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support for the wage bill was not straightforward in operational terms as it raised questions of
fiduciary risks.
5.4.2 Joint Monitoring Indicator 2: Improve pay and employment conditions in the civil
service.
In a similar manner, the negotiation on Joint Monitoring Indicator 2, on the Remuneration
Policy, ended in a deadlock. At the beginning, the professionals of both the donor
organizations and the CAR favored increasing the salaries of civil servants, based on both the
current performance and an incentive for improved future performance. However, frictions
and tensions emerged over selecting the model to be applied. The Representatives of the
donor agencies were in favor of a Merit Based Performance Incentive (MBPI), while the CAR
pushed to establish the Priority Mission Group (PMG) model. Although discussed mainly as
technical issues, in fact, both models had far-reaching political implications with regard to
who has control over resources to finance the administration. In the PMG model, Cambodian
politicians and high-ranking civil servants decided the allocation of funds, while, conversely,
the MBPI model left this decision making power mainly to the donors. In addition, the MBPI
model allowed the donors to choose their counterparts.
In the meeting minutes of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative
Reform (PAR), technical issues dominated the discussion. However, because these technical
issues were directly connected to political issues implicit in the models, no consensus could
be reached and increasingly, the political positions became more explicit.
At the September 7th meeting in 2005, open issues concerning Sub decree 98 were discussed.
As the CAR Secretary General explained, the decree demanded that the old pattern of bilateral
Salary Supplementation Practices shall be phased out and substituted by a merit and
performance based system of salary increases. As many ministries were not ‘ready’116, the
donors offered alternatively to the Priority Mission Group (PMG), the Merit-Based Pay
Incentive (MBPI) scheme, but only if the salary supplements were agreed upon jointly by the
donors and the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR).
In addition, the donor organizations informed the CAR that a PMG/MBPI pilot was started at
the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) covering three hundred staff members, with the
Government paying PMG allowances for 80 staff and the donors the remainder of the
allowance cost plus an extra, enhanced, performance incentive allowance on top of the PMG
rate. However, although they welcomed the idea of re-channeling the SSP resources, the CAR
professionals thought that a pilot approach was not appropriate as these were not evaluated.
Furthermore, they were concerned that the MPBI model would necessitate increased
Government accountability.
116 ‘Ready’ is defined as: having a credible reform program jointly agreed by government and donors, and having
agreement on: phasing out salary supplementation in that sector, the pooling approach (including the % to be
funded by donors and government alike), and the details of the pay and employment reform pilot.” (DANIDA,
2005).
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Then the discussion went on to cover the Priority Mission Groups (PMG). The UNDP
Representative raised the issue that guidelines were needed for the implementation of the
PMG in their organizations. However UNDP and the Representatives of the World Bank,
AusAid, and DANIDA were ready to assist in formulating potential guidelines. As a result, it
was agreed to set up a working party for the formulation of a draft directive. This working
party comprised one young professional from the Council for Administrative Reform, the
CAR’ Secretariat’s Principal Advisor contracted through CIDA, the Resource Person of the
Technical Working Group (TWG) financed by UNDP, and respectively a Representatives
from the World Bank, AusAid, DANIDA, GTZ, and UNDP.
The Representative of the World Bank then suggested that the CAR Secretariat would be
better off engaging in a ‘two-track proposal’117 instead of a ‘one-track reform’, since only a
small number of ministries were ready to proceed to the PMG model. Other Ministries needed
to first to focus on harmonization of tasks, functions, budgets, etc. The Representative of
AusAid noted that, indeed, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) was fortunate
enough to have clear priorities and thus harmonized structures. However, the Ministry for
Agriculture, in contrast, was less advanced in this regard.
The Secretary General of the Council of Administrative Reform (CAR) rejected the two-track
approach, stating that this method could encourage some Ministries to delay reform. Instead
he saw a need for a one-track approach, namely the full implementation of Sub decree 98, at
varying paces, sector to sector. Even if some sectors would take longer, each sector should be
expected to come up with a firm action plan for achieving, step-by-step, the necessary change,
with most applying PMG rates and some applying the MBPI rates. The expert from GTZ and
the Representative from DANIDA demanded that the guidelines specifically explain exactly
what was intended by phasing out, as well as demanding a clarification of what was regarded
“merit-based”.
The Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) reiterated that the Sub
Decree 98 was a starting point for a step-by-step negotiation. The purpose was to reach a
consensus rather than to impose one. First, he needed the feedback from the ministries on Sub
Decree 98 before any further discussion could take place. An important target of the Priority
Mission Group (PMG) was to get competent people to work in the countryside, for example,
in the Health Sector.118 But an immediate concern for the Government was to develop a better
understanding of what was happening in all sectors.
During the meeting, the focus lay on setting of guidelines; it was not a discussion of what
model should be adopted. Certain tensions emerged among the different groups and the most
obvious, resulted from the debate over the use of either a two- or one-track approach. A
second underlying tension that came to the forefront was whether the whole process should be
based on consensus reached by negotiations with the Ministries, or whether the guidelines
117 Track 1= Phase out salary supplementation; ‘pool’ and fund merit based pay reform pilots in
ministries/sectors that are “ready”. Track 2= Rationalize salary supplementation in sectors that are not ready for
track 1. This means: first gaining greater clarity on the current situation at the sectoral level by collecting
information on rates and practices by donors through selected Technical Working Groups; second agree on a
Strategy for Alignment and Harmonization of Rates and Practices.
118 Not just the Ministry of Health.
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should be imposed. Thirdly, although seemingly as a side remark, tensions emerged between
bringing competent personnel into the Ministries in Phnom Penh or/and to the provinces and
districts with explicit reference to the Health Sector, another recurring theme from the Khmer
side. Fourthly, the need for understanding what was going on in the ministries prior to
defining guidelines was also mentioned.
In the follow-up meeting on the 29th of September 2005, a young professional on the Council
for Administrative Reform (CAR) outlined the progress to date on studies of the Strategy to
Rationalize the Civil Service (SRCS). The Operational Review of the Ministries was underway
for low and high positions within the Ministries. Staff from twelve Ministries was trained to
use the review methodology developed by the contracted consultant. The World Bank
Representative asked how the line ministries reacted to the Operational Review, and whether
the CAR should have provided mentoring for Ministries. In response, the CAR stated that it
was a sensitive issue as additional management capacity and financial assistance was needed.
The Secretary General of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) provided a similar
response when the AusAid Representative inquired whether the Operational Review was
linked to the Decentralization and Deconcentration (D&D) Policy. The Secretary General
insisted that in the context of the Operational Review it was vital first to understand the
situation in context and then to work on possible solutions such as the One Window
Approach, the Decentralization and Deconcentration possibilities, or privatization. Once the
Operational Review had assessed the current situation, each Ministry’s use of resources could
then be examined. But, above all, it was important for more civil servants to work in the
provinces. It would then be necessary, for example, to draw private doctors to work in new
Health Centers. In addition, more training was needed for civil servants in the provinces.
The Representative of the World Bank asked whether there was a concern in the line
Ministries about the possible loss of employment, as this particular issue had already come up
during the implementing of the Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) reform at the Ministry of
Economy and Finance (MEF). The Secretary General explained that there were other Human
Ressource policies that could help to address the issue. For example, if a person lost his
position he would just not receive the Priority Mission Group (PMG) allowance. He said that
only competent and engaged civil servants would be selected to work in PMGs.
He then returned to the subject of Health Centres in the provinces and districts by informing
the donor organizations about the creation of a PMG for Health Centers in Kampot province.
The resident Representative of the IMF insisted that it would be helpful if it was explained
how the PMG process might be wound up over time and would become part of the normal
pay system. Similarly, the Representative of AusAid raised the need to remove uncertainty
about how these PMGs are intended to operate. After discussion, it was agreed that the
Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) would provide further guidance for donor agencies
on using the PMG mechanism. Then, the Resident Representative of the IMF asked if the
PMG was project-based, in the sense that the allowance ceased when the project ceased, or if
it was function-based. The Secretary General explained that the problem was less about the
function of the Ministry than it was about getting the particular Ministry to accept
responsibility where a work problem arose. The World Bank Representative reiterated that he
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was looking at Terms of References for further studies that were needed as part of meeting the
Remuneration Policy benchmark.
In close, the Secretary General argued that any Human Resource change had to take into
account the reality of the country. The evaluation of merit would continually need to be based
on an exam, but there was a need to strengthen its quality without making the standard
unreasonably high. The Representative of AusAid outlined the Australian Public Service’s
approach to test merit through job criteria, interview, and provisions to avoid discrimination.
CIDA’s Head of Aid informed that the Canadian experience was based on an exam, interview,
and a reference check. However, he felt that relying solely on exams did not provide a good
enough indication of abilities.
Following the theme that is evident in the minutes of this meeting, the Operational Review is
a ‘sensitive issue’. It seems though, that the donors are not aware or less aware of this
sensitivity. Nevertheless, the Representative of the World Bank interprets the problem as fear
of loss of employment and remuneration, especially for the older personnel who are less
competent. Interestingly, the issue raised by the Khmer side was to use incentives to bring
more qualified personnel to the provinces especially for Health Centers was raised again.
Even more, although the guidelines for the Priority Mission Group (PMG) were not yet
defined, the PMG had already been applied in Health Centers in the countryside. This rather
rapid implementation of PMG was taken by the donors with surprise and cautious critique. A
problem of mutual understanding was expressed with the question, whether the salary
supplement (PMG) should be implemented project based (only while the project lasts) or
function based.
In November 2005, the young professional in charge explained that an Operational Review
was being completed in the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Land and should be
finished by the end of November 2005. A large amount of material had been produced and
needed to be translated into English -a compendium on the methodology would be made
available to all Ministries. Terms of references for two other studies had recently been agreed
upon and recruitment was underway. The World Bank Representative reiterated the
importance of the involvement of the respective Ministries within these studies. The
launching of the Establishment and Control Study was however made dependent on the
completion of a Human Resource Management guide.
With regard to other potential Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) pilots for the Ministries of
Health, Lands and Commerce, an extra meeting would need to take place to assess and
discuss the progress made. He emphasized the importance of fully involving the Ministries in
the preparation of the MBPIs.
The Secretary General informed the meetings’ participants about the current situation of the
Priority Mission Group (PMG). A budget had been established to cover employing 305 civil
servants. Agencies considered for PMGs included the Council of Ministers (COM), the
Secretariat of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR), the Ministry for Women’s Affairs,
the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Health and ‘One Window’ Services in
Battambang and Siem Reap. The Ministry for Economy and Finance (MEF) also had the
PMG/MBPI and would receive the results of its selection of 263 staff.
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However, the Representatives of the donor organizations expressed once again their
reservations about the PMG model. While some were concerned about understanding the
model, more substantive problems were also raised by others about the PMG being overly
bureaucratic; they argued that the proposals to create PMG took much time to gain approval
and to implement; advantages were rather seen in the implementation of the PMG/MBPI
model. Moreover, they were disappointed that the Secretary-General was not able to attend
the last Donor Lunch.
In response to these comments, the Secretary General said the PMG process was clear and
that the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) had made considerable effort over a
number of years to explain it to Ministries and donors. However, if the current donors still
needed to have an explanation, he would be happy to arrange a presentation for donors. The
meeting welcomed the suggestion.
The World Bank Representative again reiterated that the donor agencies felt that it was
difficult to support the PMG scheme. First, they were implemented on a project basis and
were therefore relatively short term. They were wondering what would happen to the work
and staff involved at the end of the project and would it be sustainable. He recommended that
the Council for Administrative Reform look at how the model could be revised and
streamlined. Similarly, the Representative of DANIDA added that his organization supported
the PMG concept and had tried to work with the PMG model but had however experienced
major difficulties. He felt that the selection process for the PMG was too complex. Unless
improvements were made to the PMG model, some donors including DANIDA would
continue to resist using it.
As a response, a professional of the CAR Secretariat stressed the fact that the Priority Mission
Group (PMG) concept was not new and that it was not the organization’s fault if it was not
understood. However, the Government needed donor support to increase the number of PMG
members. The processes of the PMG that were interpreted as bureaucratic by the donor
agencies were conceptualized to minimize risks of inappropriate selections. He argued that it
is essential that the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) sets proper standards for the
operation of PMGs.
The Representative of UNDP added that the mission of the PMG scheme needed to be derived
from the Operational Review, since Ministries ownership of the mission was needed to be
stressed.
During this meeting, interesting tensions were mentioned only in passing. The Khmer side
was already implementing PMG on a larger scale, without waiting for the studies to be
completed. The remarks from the World Bank can be interpreted as astonishment or as a
moderate critique of this practice. Nevertheless, it seems that a highly sensitive spot had been
pitched, as the response by the secretary shows. Still, open conflict was avoided, as the
Secretary General pointed out that not only the donors had difficulties with PMG, but several
Ministries had experienced similar problems. A reason, for this, might be that the
implementation of the PMG by the Government was based on funding by the donors.
But the meeting did not end on such a consensual tone. In fact, an éclat followed when the
Secretary General finally announced that the CAR was not willing to continue with the
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Technical Working Group (TWG) in its present form, and that the meetings should be
terminated. He pointed out that, at the moment, the CAR believed that it was not effective or
useful. The current action plan was largely the donors’ priorities and did not deal with issues
of greater concern to the Council of Administrative Reform (CAR). As there was little
financial assistance from the TWG or donors for the CAR’s project, it was considering
returning to bilateral arrangements. A greater sense of joint partnership was needed in the
TWG, with an action plan that was jointly owned and not determined by the donors. The
original idea of creating TWGs was to mobilize resources for shared ownership, constructive
partnership, joint action and alignment, following the September 2003 donor retreat.
Unfortunately, the expectations that the CAR had for development cooperation had not been
realized. The CAR Secretariat did not want to waste time in a TWG process that was not
closely linked to achieving key reform priorities.
The CAR professional in charge of Employment and Remunerations Studies added that the
Joint Monitoring Indicators did not include the resources to do the work. He mentioned the
difficulties that the CAR Secretariat had advancing its own important work priorities, like its
Service Delivery Policy and the Human Resource Development Master Plan, which were
under Joint Monitoring Indicator 3 and Joint Monitoring Indicators 4; until the present, the
CAR had not receive substantial project support from donor organizations. So far, the CAR
had only received a Priority Mission Group (PAR) allowance from the Royal Government.
The Representative of DANIDA welcomed the frankness of the discussion. She agreed the
sense of partnership was important. However, donors did not have a good understanding of
what the CAR was doing. Moreover, the members of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on
Public Administrative Reform (PAR) had continuous difficulty marketing the importance of its
work to other donor agencies because of the ‘image problems’ of the CAR. Donor agencies
had to see a mutual benefit in project work. Their pre-occupation was Poverty Alleviation.
The linkages between the work of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public
Administrative Reform (PAR) and Poverty Alleviation were not always clear to them. Hence
their concern rested on the impact that would be met by supporting particular project work. In
other words, they wanted to see results.
The Secretary General explained that he realized that the donors did not understand that the
Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) often played a vital role as a coordinator and
initiating policy making for change, as with the one window initiative (JMI 4 for service
delivery). He said that the CAR Secretariat had achieved many results. It was involved in
Poverty Reduction, although indirectly. Of course did the reform to reach salary increases, to
regulate the Civil Service, to introduce One Window Offices in Battambang and Siem Reap,
and create a PMG for the Health Centre in Kampot indirectly contribute to Poverty
Alleviation in Cambodia.
The Representative of DANIDA agreed that it might be more of an issue of marketing than
actually making the link to Poverty Alleviation. She said that donors would support the CAR
in playing a more facilitative role in reform beyond the policy development work. She said
that if the Council could better explain its policies it would have a more beneficial impact.
She said the frankness of the discussion would help all parties to address how to improve the
Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR) work.
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The Secretary General then answered that he would work on the 2006 Work Program of the
Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR) and hoped to send
it on to TWG members as a basis for further discussion on possible benchmarks and project
work.
The Representative of DANIDA noted that donors would want to make an assessment for
themselves of the benefit of involvement in particular project proposals. There had to be a
shared interest. However, she agreed that there needed to be stronger linkages to the CAR
Secretariat’s work program. She had some funds that DANIDA could use to support the
TWG’s work program. She added that the strong trend in development cooperation was away
from bilateral approaches. Similarly, the UNDP’s Representative indicated that she wanted to
develop a better understanding of the CAR’s work on capacity development, including the
project’s possibilities.
However, the Secretary General reiterated that ultimately, the CAR Secretariat did not need to
continue with the TWG as it was, because up to now it did not receive any assistance through
the TWG. He couldn’t see until now how the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public
Administrative Reform (PAR) would help the CAR to mobilize resources. Hence, more mutual
support was needed for the reform agenda to advance its work. He would share the work plan
with donors in the near future.
The Representative of DANIDA welcomed further discussions on possible benchmarks for
2006. It was important that there were in fact shared priorities for the future work.
The tension at the end of the meeting illustrates several of the implicit misunderstandings that
occurred between the participants of the Technical Working group (TWG) and the implicit
dissatisfaction with the CPIA report of the World Bank. Obviously, the Khmer side expected
financial support for their work in a double sense: support of their policy priorities (Joint
Monitoring Indicator 3 and Joint Monitoring Indicator 4), and, in terms of Salary
Supplements as recognition for their performance and as an incentive. Following the priorities
of the CAR, the discussions of TWG did not translate into support, and thus were irrelevant.
The donors pointed out that even though the hard work of the CAR is recognized,
unfortunately, the priorities that direct its work were not in line with the priorities of the
donors, and their general organizational and development frameworks. Thus, the task of the
Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) would be to show that the priorities that they were
working on were closely connected to those of the donor organizations.
Following this, another meeting took place on the 6th of December. The World Bank’s
Country Manager emphasized the importance of making progress on the creation of Merit-
Based Pay Incentives (MBPI) by mid-2006. The young professional in charge of the PMG
scheme informed the meeting about the CAR’s recent work on Priority Mission Groups
(PMG). He had recent discussions on MBPIs with the Ministries of Health and Education,
and had also received a report from the Ministry of Commerce. Good progress was being
made in all cases. He also outlined the progress that had been made so far in setting up PMGs
in eight Ministries (Justice, Women’s Affairs, Finance, Health, Industry, COM, the CAR
Secretariat; one window facilities in two provinces). In 2006, the approval level set by the
Government for PMG membership would reach 1270 civil servants.
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The Secretary General reiterated the need for donor support in setting up Health Centers in
the provinces. In particular, the Government wanted to pursue the National Expert Initiative
developed in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) to introduce Merit-Based Pay
Incentives (MBPI) schemes across other areas of Cambodia. The Secretariat of the Council for
Administrative Reform (CAR) also wanted to see more MBPIs at a provincial level. The most
recent report of the consultant on MBPI proposals in the Ministries of Land and Commerce
was circulated at the meeting. The Secretary General informed that the Ministry of Land
already had a performance incentive scheme. It now needed to become a Priority Mission
Group (PMG).
The Country Manager of the World Bank noted that using the PMG and the MBPI mechanism
would lead to great transparency. The Secretary General added that while it was beneficial to
have transparency on supplementation arrangements, a greater challenge was the resistance to
change that would have to be faced and dealt within Ministries in implementing reforms. The
Secretary General informed the attendees that the CAR would continue to work on developing
a work plan for 2006 in the later part of the week at Siem Reap. He would then set up a team
to develop a draft that would be circulated to donors, and intended for the plan to be realistic
and keep expectations down. The CAR needed to finish off policy work by mid- 2006, and
then focus more on implementation. This would also include new roles for better
communication.
He further reiterated the large range of work that the CAR had undertaken over the course of
2006. Despite the consistent lack of personnel, the work program was on track. Nevertheless
the CAR Secretariat needed more qualified staff.
Right after, DANIDA’s Attaché said that more publicity was needed to be given to the
importance of the CAR’s work. Demonstrating linkages between that work and the new
National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) was one way to do this. Other sectors needed to
appreciate that reforms in governance were beneficial to them as well.
The Secretary General then informed that the CAR Secretariat needed better information from
donors, for example, on projects that they were designing where they included Public
Administrative Reform. It also needed to be better informed on Public Administrative Reform
(PAR) problems that came to the attention of donors if it was expected to help. It planned to
work with DFID and the Ministry of Health on PAR issues in the Health Sector. In this
context, Health Centers played quite a crucial role. In each of the meetings they are
repeatedly mentioned and discussed. Again, the Secretary pointed out how important it was to
have salary incentives in the provincial regions.119
The World Bank Country Manager suggested that the Secretary General might want to make a
presentation to a donor lunch early in the New Year.
After the confrontation of the preceding meeting, things seemed to be rather smooth again,
and the participants were looking for compromises. The donors did not oppose Priority
Mission Group (PMG) and the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) showed how to
combine PMG with Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) schemes, as demanded by the World
119 Why these issues are so prominent is difficult to analyze, and may have to do with certain political priorities
of the CPP.
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Bank. All participants showed their willingness to cooperate, without solving or addressing
the problems that had led to the éclat. They returned to a language of meconnaissance; all
could agree without making explicit what was meant by what the parties had agreed upon.
However, on the 5th of April, the Secretary General expressed his concern about the recent
report he had received from the consultant working on the Operational Review. He felt the
report included inappropriate comments and criticisms and that these views needed to be
corrected. The World Bank Representative noted that the consultant’s contract was with the
Council for Administrative Reform (CAR), hence he had the possibility to talk directly to him.
The CAR professional in charge of the Remuneration and Employment Studies outlined the
work that was being undertaken to manage this complex project of Operational Review,
including meeting with all ministries involved. Indeed, the communication and information
sharing -i.e. translation of the political negotiation occurring in the ministries - took more time
than the CAR Secretariat expected. The Secretary General noted that the Operational Review
was difficult to undertake in a larger Ministry and it may have been preferable to start with a
smaller one. In addition, the Secretariat was soon to contract consultants to undertake studies
on Employment, Remuneration and the Local Labor Market. This would lead to new policies
being prepared in Remuneration and Redeployment. In closing this part of the Technical
Working Group (TWG)’s discussions, the Secretary General informed that the Labor Market
Study was soon to get underway. The study would look at what was happening to new
entrants in the workforce; the results could then lead to further civil service reform to
accommodate more new entrants to the labor market. In any case, the Government had met
the targets set in 2001 for the Rationalization of the Civil Service and was maintaining the
level of civil servants at 165,000 people (see Annex 10).
In his comment to the presented information, the Representative of the World Bank noted the
need to follow-up the Merit-Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) proposals; the Ministry of
Commerce (after the Ministry of Economy and Finance) was now looking again at an MBPI
proposal. He added that he would welcome a meeting to discuss progress on the Operational
Review.
The first secretary of AusAid welcomed the presentation on the work of the Council for
Administrative Reform (CAR) and asked for information on the Priority Mission
Groups(PMG) that had been set up and whether there were any lessons to be learned up to
now.
The Secretary General outlined the PMGs created at the Council of Ministers (COM), the
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and some other Ministries. After that he emphasized that the
Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) could not achieve all the priorities set out in the
CAR’s Work Plan without significant donor support. He sought the support of all members of
the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR) for the work
that needed to be done in 2006. The Head of Aid for CIDA suggested that the TWGs should
be given guidance on the content and format for action planning for more consistency.
In the meeting, all contested issues were raised again. Obviously, the intent to compromise
was rather short lived: firstly, the Operational Review was demanded by the donors and
disputed by the CAR Secretariat; secondly, the other studies requested by donors
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(Employment, Remuneration, Labor Market) were still not under way; thirdly, the donors had
not received any information about the implementation of the Priority Mission Group (PMG),
while the donors want to introduce Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI); fourthly, the Council
for Administrative Reform (CAR) Secretariat still had not received any substantial financial
support for its work.
On May 26, 2006, five days before the scheduled meeting of the Technical Working Group
(TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR), the Secretary General of the CAR sent a
letter to all donor organizations:
It is very disappointing to see that almost half way through the year, the PAR
TWG has yet to mobilize the resources necessary to meet the objectives it set for
itself in January. These objectives were subsequently reflected in the Joint
Monitoring Indicators agreed to at the last Consultative Group meeting. We had
understood that the development partners were to make every effort to mobilize
the resources required to support implementation of the Joint Monitoring
Indicators […] Now it seems that the Technical Working Group has a
fundamental systemic problem. This is that, by comparison with the large
amounts that it has been possible to find in other areas of governance, it does not
seem to be possible for our development partners to generate the relatively
modest level of funds needed to support our common agenda on a timely basis.
Instead, the Council for Administrative Reform is expected to scrape by largely
through relatively small contributions generated from a range of sources. This is
not a satisfactory way to support a fundamental and far reaching program of
public administration reform that requires adequate and sustained support […]Is
this problem because current programming and funding practices of individual
partners seem to be overly restraining to allowing for timely support to the
reform? Or is it a lack of engagement in PAR on the part of individual PAR
TWG members or the donor community more generally?
Secretary General of CAR, letter to the donor organizations, May 2006
At the following meeting five days later, the Representative of the World Bank informed
participants about a meeting held by Representatives of the donor organizations that had taken
place the day earlier to discuss issues raised by the Secretary General’s letter. They thought
that the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR) was
working better than last year and wished to recognize the progress that was being made.
However, they also acknowledged that the resources were inadequate and that ideally the
situation should be different. They wanted to improve the funding situation and look at
mobilizing additional resources. Yet, it was difficult to generate additional resources until
those currently available had been spent. Nevertheless, he said that donors had some
suggestions on how to respond to short-term funding issues faced by the TWG and also were
prepared to work with the Secretariat of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) to
develop a long-term solution. The Representative of the World Bank answered that there may
be scope for greater flexibility in using existing funds, through reprogramming. He noted the
changes that the World Bank had already agreed to, with respect for funding studies. He also
noted that the funds of the Economic and Public Sector Capacity Building (EPSCB) could be
used for this purpose.
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One of the Deputy Secretary Generals pointed out that the EPSCB fund had already been
planned for other activities and could hardly be used to fund the recurrent expenditures of the
Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR).
Again, the Representative of the World Bank emphasized that as the donor organizations were
looking to work with the CAR in looking at longer term options, he would outlined possible
options for achieving a long-term approach to support the TWG. An interesting mechanism to
realize this could be the establishment of a joint Trust Fund. The World Bank had experience
with the use of Trust Fund mechanisms. This could be further explored but it may prove to be
a rather difficult way to manage funds. Another solution could be to establish a Merit Based
Pay Incentive (MBPI) for the Secretariat of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR). For
this, donor organizations were prepared to mobilize the necessary funds. However, the MBPI
would need to be developed to support a work program for a period longer than one year.
UNDP’s Governance Representative maintained that the donor organizations needed a better
understanding of the existing supplementation arrangements within the CAR in order to better
define the funding requirements for a MBPI. Moreover, CAR needed to develop an MBPI
proposal, together with a defined budget. While the donor agencies, were favorably disposed,
they still needed to see more detail. Likewise, the Second Secretary of AusAid and the
Attaché of DANIDA said that the donor organizations had a very useful discussion but were
frank about the limitations that they faced in mobilizing new funds quickly. While donors had
set priorities for funding in particular sectors, they recognized that the reform of the Public
Administration had to be given priority because of the impact that Public Administration
issues had across all sectors. In the absence of mechanisms to co-ordinate the relatively small
amounts of funding that was all that some donors were able to generate, there were
difficulties. She wanted the CAR to understand the constraints that donors had to operate
under. The Assistant Secretary of the EC delegation said that EU funding needed a long lead
time to get approved, usually two years. In addition, it was difficult for EU to act bilaterally
with the Government.
In sum, the letter written by the Secretary General was successful in putting the donor
organizations under pressure. The CAR Secretariat had gained the ability to define the agenda
to quite a degree, and the donors responded accordingly. However, as a response the donor
organizations engaged into postponement tactics. They seemed to be willing to support the
CAR financially, but remained unable to provide the demanded funds. They were willing to
support the CAR, but demanded a long-term perspective, as they argued that they could not
“make small amounts of funds available in the short term”.
At an informal meeting on the 20th September, 2006 the members of the Technical Working
Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR) and the Secretary General of the CAR
noted that there were difficulties sometimes with departmental Representatives reporting back
to senior levels in Ministries. He also indicated that the CAR was working with relevant
Ministries on a number of Remuneration Policy issues for 2007. These included discussions
on military and police salaries. While some increases in salary and allowances were
considered, the numbers in the civil service were likely to be stabilized at around 170,000 in
total, including the police force. Recruitment in 2007 was likely to be frozen, except in a few
priority areas or where staff retired. Targeted increases in salaries and/or allowances were
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being considered in a few priority areas such as Ministry of Economy and Finance and the
Ministry of Health.
The Government was examining remuneration options that encouraged more civil servants to
move to the countryside. In addition, it was also looking at possible ways to reform the
retirement pension scheme to increase the pension rate, with the objective of encouraging
civil servants who wanted to take retirement. The participants were informed that the
Remuneration and Employment Studies would commence in early October and would then
lead to related policy work. The Labor Market Study on new entrants to the workforce would
also commence in near future.
The Secretary General noted the difficulties associated with obtaining the necessary
ministerial support to enable the Operational Review. The World Bank expert informed the
attendees about the extension of the IDF grant until March 2007. By then, the funds had to be
spent. It was reiterated that consultation processes between the partners needed to take place
in order to address the issue of resource requirements, particularly in the context of
implementing the new civil service policy framework.
Next, the meeting discussed issues related to Health Centers, in particular, the recent visit by
the Council of Administrative Reform (CAR) Secretariat, Ministry of Health officials and
development partners to the Kampot Health Centre, which had been set up as a PMG. The
Secretary General said there were ongoing discussions with the Ministry of Health and DFID,
the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the World Health Organization (WHO), and
the World Bank on service delivery possibilities in the Health Sector. He said some
weaknesses in the Priority Mission Group (PMG) performance had been identified and these
would be addressed. The Council of Administrative Reform (CAR) wanted to clarify the
process for setting up a PMG and managing its performance. He added that the PMG
procedures were to be rewritten with the objective of simplifying them, since Health Centers
in rural areas had become an important priority. It was important that Cambodians did not
always had to go to the Capital, Phnom Penh, for treatment. He said the Government wanted
to see good quality in the services provided in the provinces. CAR intended to increase the
numbers employed in PMG for Health Centers, with some places to be paid by the
Government and the majority by donors. For his reason, a Health Merit-Based Pay Incentive
(MBPI) proposal was being considered. However, setting up MBPIs was proving to be
sensitive.
The World Bank Representative agreed that there was no point in pushing on if the ministries
were not interested. He further informed that the Public Finance Management Program at the
Ministry of Economy and Finance was confronted with emerging challenges concerning the
MBPI; in fact, the issue was raised on how to sanction staff who abused the MBPI scheme.
The CAR Secretariat’s advice was needed or perhaps a workshop was needed to be planned.
The Representative of the World Bank invited the CAR to be involved in the upcoming
independent evaluation of the MBPI in the Ministry for Economy and Finance, thus,
demonstrating his personal willingness to cooperate with the CAR.
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The Secretary General answered that he planned to call a meeting of Ministries to review
progress on MBPIs/PMGs. He said that Ministries were not familiar with how to implement
Sub Decree 98 (2005).
Again, Health Centers and the countryside are mentioned by the Secretariat of the Council for
Administrative Reform (CAR), an issue not taken up by the donors. The role of the CAR as
agenda setters became even more obvious. As a means of compromise the CAR offered an
MBPI for Health Centers in the provinces. This offer could have been taken as an attempt to
reduce pressure on all sides because MBPI was favored by the World Bank, as the PMG
clearly favored by the CAR.
On the 18th of October, the meeting discussed the importance of progressing the revision of
the Priority Mission Group (PMG) procedures to make them much shorter and easier to use.
Two related issues were also raised: the need for a training program for staff that would start
to work in a PMG; and the need to overcome capacity constraints faced by some agencies in
writing Merit Based Pay Incentive (MBPI) proposals, possibly through building up a small
panel of experienced local consultants who could advise the Ministries.
The Secretary General went on to outline the work going on in respect to proposed PMGs and
MBPIs. He planned to suggest to the Minister of the Office of the Council of Ministers
(OCOM) to convene a meeting of interested Ministries. He also described the negotiations
that were ongoing in the Health Sector with regard to the MBPI. The Royal Government had a
strong interest in establishing more Health Centers in rural areas and was itself prepared to
finance up to 300 PMG places. However, he wanted to know what support the donor agencies
could give to establish more PMGs. He urged the members of the Technical Working Group
(TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR) to help the CAR conclude the negotiation in
the Health Sector this year. The expert from DFID welcomed CAR’s demand but wanted to
ensure that the chosen solution was sustainable.
The CAR professional in charge of the Operational, Remuneration, Employment, and Labor
Market Studies informed that inception reports were being prepared for each study.
Answering the question of the Second Secretary of AusAid on the progress to date of the
Operational Review, he informed that the cooperation with the Ministries was ameliorated
after a letter was sent by the Minister of the Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM) to all
Ministries concerned. The international consultant would be involved once the local
consultant’s work was completed. The World Bank Representative emphasized that the raw
material that had been produced in these ministries needed further analysis. The Operational
Review of the Ministry of Economy and Finance was also stagnating because of the lack of
scrutiny. He asked that this should be followed up.
Interestingly, although an offer had been made to establish MBPI for Health Centers during
the preceding meeting, at this meeting the suggestion was withdrawn. The large number of
Health Centers where PMG had been introduced already is also surprising. Interestingly, the
donor organizations indirectly showed their reluctance to finance MBPI for Health Centers in
the provinces. For them, the MBPI was regarded as a tool to be used in the Ministries in
Phnom Penh. Similar to the policy of postponement of the donors with regard to financing
priorities of the CAR Secretariat, the CAR also used a policy of postponement with regard to
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the Remuneration and Employment Studies. As could be expected, this led to multiple
frustrations on both sides.
At the end of the meeting, the CAR professionals remained unsatisfied as the donor
organization professionals proposed no substantial change. Moreover, no clear financial
support for CAR’s work was provided. This deadlock combined with the impasse that had
emerged from negotiations on Joint Monitoring Indicator 1 led to the resignation of the co-
lead facilitator to the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform
(PAR) from the World Bank. This was evidence of what happened in the political tensions
described in section 4.
5.4.3 Joint Monitoring Indicator 3 and 4
While initially the discussions during the meetings were dominated by Joint Monitoring
Indicator (JMI) 1 and Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 2, Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 3
and Joint Monitoring Indicator (JMI) 4 became an issue much later on. Their relevance was
based, on using them as an exit strategy because no consensus could be reached. In order to
avoid too much influence by the donor organizations in the operationalization of these two
policy guidelines, the professionals of the CAR pursued a strategy of bilateral cooperation
with selected partners who seemed more ‘willing’ to cooperate.
Joint Monitoring Indicator 3 on Human Resource Management (HRM) was addressed quite
late in November 2005. At the meeting, the Secretary General of the CAR noted that the HRM
Guide would be completed in December 2005. Work on a Human Resource Development
(HRD) Master Plan was also well advanced. In response to the UNDP Representative’s
request for information on the HRD Master Plan, the Secretary General informed that the
information was available on the website. He explained further that as the implementation of
Civil Service Laws began, a need to improve Establishment Controls120 emerged. If the
methodology that was being tested in central agencies was effective, then the same approach
would be applied in an incremental way, agency by agency.
As shown in this meeting, the Government was already implementing potential models for
Establishments Controls. Whether donor organizations were involved remained unclear.
After the first éclat on Joint Monitoring Indicator 1 and Joint Monitoring Indicator 2, Joint
Monitoring Indicator 3 and Joint Monitoring Indicator 4 were addressed again on the 5th of
April.
At the meeting, the CAR Secretariat proposed to use the Front and Back Office concepts to
improve Service Delivery. The Secretary General added that the CAR was now involved, with
the support of France and CIDA, in developing new policies regarding the One Window
120 “Governments have devised various institutional arrangements to ensure that the right number of public
sector staff is hired, at the correct grades and with the right mix of skills for the tasks at hand. This is
conventionally referred to as establishment control. Governments have developed public service pay scales that
provide a consistent set of rules for matching personal emoluments to staff grades” (World Bank, 2008).
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Office Service and on Special Operating agencies (SOA121). He outlined staffing issues
affecting the Ministry of Health. The priority was to enhance Service Delivery in rural areas.
The Government wanted to see more qualified staff in the Health Sector; more medical
doctors needed to be transferred from Phnom Penh to rural areas. The Assistant Secretary of
the EC questioned the need to design the one window policy, given the two offices already in
existence in Siem Reap and Battambang. The Secretary General explained that these offices
were being tested and that no model for the office had been agreed on yet. Again, the
Secretary General made it clear that they were looking for their own models and were not
willing to just overtake models developed by donor agencies.
Further policies and frameworks in Human Resource Management, Human Resource
Development, and Capacity Development were also being worked on. A new curriculum for
the Economic and Public Sector Capacity Building (EPSCB) project of the World Bank had
been agreed upon. The construction of the Cambodian Distance Learning Centre was being
fast tracked during the same year. The Secretary General also referred to the CAR’s work to
build a Human Resources Information Management System (HRMIS), with support from the
EC. He said that he had recently visited Singapore to study e- Government initiatives and had
since followed up some ICT possibilities in discussion with the Deputy Prime Minister.
He informed the attendees that the Council’s website could be accessed internationally and
that it would soon contain the Official Gazette. He further stressed that while the Council had
very competent personnel and a high team spirit, they were limited in number with an average
of one to two persons working on each project. Nevertheless, they had to work with all
Ministries.
The meeting in April 2005 focused primarily on the technical issues and challenges that were
facing the professionals of the CAR. Several important pieces of information were revealed
here. First, the intention to increase the focus on bilateral cooperation with selected donor
organizations was expressed. Second, it was made clear that the CAR was looking for its own
models and was not expecting advice from the Technical Working Group on the
implementation of Joint Monitoring Indicator 4. Finally, the Secretary General revealed the
priority policy of the Government was to focus on the development of Health Sector staffed in
the rural areas with qualified personal. The deadlock of JMI 2 on the remuneration scheme
was directly connected to the reluctance of the donor organizations to support this
Government policy and the 2005 CPIA report.
After the second éclat on JMIs 1 and 2, donors were under pressure to find ways to maintain
the Technical Working Group as a joint mechanism of negotiation (31st of May 2006). In this
context, CIDA’s Head of Aid informed that his organization was considering funding the
conceptualization of the Human Resource Development (HRD) and Capacity Development
121 A model borrowed from the Canadian Public Service, the “Special Operating Agencies are operational
organisations within existing departmental structures which deliver services, as distinct from providing policy
advice to Ministers. As part of their department, they are accountable for their operations through their
respective Deputy Head and Minister Responsible. Each SOA operates under a departmentally approved
business plan. In addition, an accountability relationship within the department is defined by its framework
document, which also lays out target commitments for service levels and financial performance […]A key aim of
establishing an SOA is to give the opportunity, scope and freedom to managers and employees alike to more
effectively serve their clientele” (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2008).
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processes. The World Bank reiterated that funds from the Economic and Public Sector
Capacity Building (EPSCB) project of the World Bank could also be looked at for this
purpose. However, these funds were again indirectly connected to the Remuneration Studies.
The second secretary of AusAid then informed participants that they were considering
funding the 44,000 USD required for the immediate work on the development of the Human
Resource Management policy. However, clarification of the guidelines needed to be
completed first. DANIDA also expressed its interest in funding the HRM implementation
work, however, it was not sure what the timing would be for the funding, expressing that it
may occur later during the year.
With regard to the One Window Office Service, UNDP’s Governance Specialist hoped to raise
50,000 USD for its implementation. GTZ and EU noted that they might be interested in
funding the project. However, the GTZ expert reiterated that he would want to be sure that
there was Government support and a clear consensus on the model that was being
implemented.
He asked how the current work related to the offices being tested in Siem Reap and
Battembang. The Deputy elucidated that the Siem Reap and Battambang offices were pilot
projects to test their viability. The Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) was developing
a draft Anukret122 on the One Window Office (OWO) that was now being discussed within the
Council of Ministers (COM). He explained the different roles of the back and front offices and
the linkages between those roles. The Anukret would accommodate different variations of the
OWO, depending on the given situation, within a set of operational principles. The CAR
would chair a Committee to oversee the One Window Offices (OWO) that were created, with
the Ministry of Interior as Vice Chair. The Ministry of Interior supported the work that the
CAR had been leading. Indeed the OWO was consistent with the Government’s commitment
to Deconcentration and Decentralization.
The Representative of DFID stressed that he could not commit his organization to fund
OWOs at the CAR, although it was an important element of the Deconcentration and
Decentralization (D&D) work. He suggested that the Technical Working Group (TWG) on D
& D and the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR)
maintained strong linkages.
The reluctance to support the implementation of Joint Monitoring Indicator(JMI) 3 and Joint
Monitoring Indicator(JMI) 4 and the entailing conditions, namely precise guidelines, etc, of
donor organizations such as DFID, GTZ, World Bank and to some degree AusAid is striking
in this meeting. Interestingly, CAR’s reaction to this reluctance was rather defiant, as it
decided to leave these demands out of its agenda and form a ‘coalition of the willing’ namely,
CIDA, the EC, and the French Embassy on a bilateral basis.
The last meeting before the dissolution of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public
Administrative Reform (PAR) addressing JMIs 3 and 4 took place on the 18th of October 2006.
At this meeting, the Secretary General of CAR informed that a Capacity Development
Framework had been started with the support of CIDA; DANIDA, AusAid, and France also
assisted the policy work of the CAR Secretariat. A progress report on the Governance Action
122 Sub Decree in Khmer
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Plan 2 had been prepared, but only in Khmer, and it was circulated to donors in that form.
Donors would have to translate it themselves.
In the final stages of the negotiations, power tactics were exercised on different levels, such as
in the discussion on the disbursement and use of funds. At this point, professionals of the
CAR did not see the need to translate the Government Action Plan into English. Finally, the
former construction of the donor organizations as one homogenous group speaking with one
voice and led by the World Bank and the state professionals was blurred. In this case, along
the lines of donor organizations that were willing to cooperate with the conditions set out by
the CAR and those were not. With these bilateral arrangements, the necessity for the
Technical Working Group was reduced. Consequentially, the co-lead coordinator of the World
Bank resigned in early 2007.
In effect, the dissolution of the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative
Reform (PAR) was a result of various tensions and struggles, including those over the
economic resources of the donor organizations but also symbolic and political resources. On
one hand, not all donor organizations were willing to finance the Priority Mission
Group(PMG), the One Window Service, the implementation of the Human Resource
Management Plan and to proceed with the Strategy to Phase out their Supplementation
Practices until clear information on the structure, staffing and the internal working of the
administration was disclosed. Conversely, the Government represented by the professionals of
the CAR was not willing to disclose clear information on its internal political bargaining
processes as it saw these processes as a Cambodian affair. Additionally, the Government
pointed out the dynamic, incremental and flexile aspect of these bargaining processes. Change
and reform, in its view, was not a technical aspect but a political one.
However, because of their political nature, the unresolved dilemmas and the tensions created
in the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public Administrative Reform (PAR) spilled over
to the semi-political, semi-technical, and political levels. As the Administrative Reform was
closely connected to the other areas of development intervention, an overall political éclat had
to be avoided. As a result, a political compromise was formulated. However, this compromise
did not lead reopening the negotiations of the TWG and thus remained quite symbolic.
5.5. Consensus finding 2008
After the deadlock of negotiations during 2007, Representatives of donor organizations, the
Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC), ambassadors, and professionals agreed to find a
minimal consensus. This consensus was made public at the semi-political, semi-technical
levels (Government Donor Cooperation Committee) meeting on March 4th, 2008. During the
Government Donor Cooperation Committee meeting, the political Representatives of the
donor organizations showed their commitment to support a harmonized, Government -owned
incentive system, based on meritocratic principles to facilitate national and sub national
incentives and to improve Service Delivery. They recognized this as an important first step for
a broader systemic reform of the civil service. In the context of the Rome (2003) and Paris
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(2005) Declarations, they were looking forward to stop the implementation of projects units
and to shift toward the support of sector programs, which required a new salary incentive
scheme over the medium term.
We are therefore pleased that, in recent weeks, the Council for Administrative
Reform Secretariat and the Ministry for Economy and Finance have indicated
their willingness to recommend a unified and sustainable incentive system for all
strategic reform programs, incorporating merit based principles, and a gradually
increasing RGC contribution, with which all Development Partners can align. We
understand that the Council for Administrative Reform Secretariat and the
Ministry for Economy and Finance are recommending a redrafted Sub Decree 98
to the Council of Ministers for this purpose. In our view, this, together with the
agreement for specific arrangements in a few ministries, would be a significant
step forward towards achievement of the Joint Monitoring Indicator on the
phasing out of salary supplementation, and the establishment of more sustainable
merit based pay initiatives in other Ministries. Should this be agreed soon,
development partners would anticipate rapidly concluding agreements with
Ministries implementing strategic programs in other sectors.
Public Administration Reform Statement on behalf of Development Partners at the
12th GDCC meeting, 2008
At the end of the meeting, they were willing to first jointly reassess the current situation
covering organizational and Human Resource Management issues and then to agree on the
subsequent steps necessary to re-engage in the Technical Working Group (TWG) on Public
Administrative Reform (PAR). They were furthermore willing to assist the implementation of
the broader agenda of the Secretariat of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR). This
included the implementation of, on the one hand, the revised Human Resource Management
Policy and Framework, and on the other hand, the enhanced Service Delivery through the
establishment of One Window Offices.
As a response to the joint statement, the Secretary General of the CAR Secretariat recognized
that although increases in salaries within the civil service were an important step in its reform,
they had to be sustainable and coherent among State institutions. That is why the Royal
Government had targeted available resources to priority missions, senior management and
functions in the Ministries of Health and Education.
The fundamentals of the administrative reform were now in place and the future fiscal
framework provided room to maneuver. He welcomed the commitment of the donor agencies
to harmonize and align their practices with Government priorities using Government
instruments and to assume a significant part of the costs.
I believe partners are committed for the long term. We can now look at
deepening and widening the administrative reforms to accompany reforms such
as D&D, PFM and reforms in every sector. Last week, the Council for
Administrative Reform, the Ministry for Economy and Finance, ministries and
donor agencies met to agree on the characteristics of MBPI. I believe a document
outlining the consensus has already been broadly circulated. With the assistance
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of development partners we are now drafting a sub-decree to guide ministries in
the use of the MBPI scheme. A similar sub-decree is being prepared for the PMG
scheme. The two schemes go hand in hand. All that to say that we are well on our
way to resolving the MBPI issue. Very quickly, we will need to focus on another
instrument to enhance performance particularly in the delivery of public
services.
H.E. Ngo Hongly, Secretary General of the CAR at the GDCC meeting on the 4th of
March, 2008
In the meantime the CAR Secretariat had conceptualized a new flexible instrument: Special
Operating Agencies (SAO). They were currently piloted at the Health Centers. The scheme
was to be employed in a future Employment Agency.
Special Operation Agencies are particularly well suited for such services and
where establishing an "établissement public a caractère administratif” is neither
useful nor effective.[…]The Deputy Prime Minister is pleased with the progress
made and has asked that we keep up the good work. We have reached a
watershed point on issues of critical importance to the Royal Government and
development partners: how to enhance and manage performance given available
means? How to harmonize and phase out current dysfunctional salary
supplementation? How to ensure that performance measures are consistent with
what is and not upset the unity, stability and sustainability of the
Administration?[…]The last few weeks have shown that we can work together
and that we can overcome our misgivings. It is time we start to prepare for the
next few years of reforms. A revitalized PAR TWG could be a plus. But first, we
shall complete the work at hand.
H.E. Ngo Hongly, Secretary General of the CAR at the GDCC meeting, March 4,
2008
In sum, despite an apparent consensus with the donor agencies that implied that the Priority
Mission Groups (PMG) and Merit-Based and Pay Incentive (MBPI) schemes would respect
similar standards to manage performance, the ‘winner’ of the negotiations were the
professionals of the Council for Administrative Reform (CAR). Indeed, in 2008, they had
enough leverage to push forward their policies and priorities, such as establishing incentive
schemes to attract civil servants to rural areas, and avoid the highly contested Operational
Review. They were further able to push through their priorities, namely the conceptualization
and implementation of the One Window Service, the Public Service Delivery Policy, and their
Human Resource Development Plan. Even more, they were successful in keeping donor
organizations out of their work; as of March 2008 the Technical Working Group (TWG) on
Public Administrative Reform (PAR) had not been reintroduced.
5.6 Conclusion
Even though all professionals (donor organizations, state bureaucracy) were very close in
terms of knowledge, practice, education and objectives namely the modernization of the
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existing state institutions, their integration into different organizational settings such as f.e. the
World Bank and the Council of Ministers limited their possibilities for horizontal alliances.
As development knowledge was always dynamic and unequally shared between all actors, the
negotiation failed, the TWG PAR was dissolved and all kind of interaction put on hold. In fact
the negotiations at the TWG PAR were continuously translated into struggles over the control
of strategic resources on one hand and over meaning and representation on the other.
The failure of the Technical Working Group on Public Administrative Reform (TWG PAR)
hence partly evolved from the inability to recruit local interests, to connect actions/events to
policy and to sustain politically viable models such as the MBPI. Essentially to ensure further
funding and support, donor managers/professionals (in contrast to the CAR professionals),
had to reflect external agendas, ‘to bear the stamp of the plan’ coming from their
headquarters, rather than reflect their own organizational and social reality in Phnom Penh
(see the example of the CPIA).
In other words, their orientation was mostly ‘upward’ as policy frames, benchmarks, results
and indicators (development knowledge) came from their centers of calculation/headquarters
(Mosse, 2004). As Rottenburg puts it ‘[…]both development cooperation itself and the
organization structures it is supposed to set up, aim to establish reliable technologies for
remote sensing, monitoring and control, which enable organized actions [ by a center of
calculation] from a distance that is independent from local loyalties and priorities. This is in
essence an issue of representing reality though technologies of inscription and organizational
procedures that have detached from other subsystems of society in such a way that they
cannot be subjected, for instance, to social, political or economic criteria […] ’ Rottenburg,
2009:xxiii. Without this interpretation practice, generally by consultancy work (for f.e. the
operational review, labor study etc), actions and events at the TWG PAR remained without
meaning in themselves.
The failure of the TWG PAR can also be traced back to the rejection by the CAR
professionals of the technical code/metacode of the donor organizations. Essentially Donor
and recipients of development aid can maintain the reciprocity of perspectives only thought a
metacode, i.e. a universal code that is comprehensible in all frames of reference (Rottenburg,
2009).Without this reciprocity of perspectives no cooperation can take place. During
negotiations in the metacode, all statements are regarded as true. Therefore, negotiation
processes can only function under the premise that players observe a code of objectivism. In
the TWG PAR, this premise was often abandoned before and after negotiations, as the
professionals of the CAR refrained from providing reliable information to the donor
organizations and sustain what Rottenburg (2009) has coined the technical game.
Indeed the concrete work of a center of calculation (namely making information transferable
without deformation for the purpose of control from a distance by introducing a metacode) is
generally concealed through the public performance of a technical game. A successful
technical game always implies the skilful avoiding of irresolvable contradictions between the
accessible and inaccessible sides of the work. In order to do this, cooperation is performed
with two different scripts: the official script and the unofficial script. The official script
implies the transfer of a socially and culturally neutral knowledge, accessible to everyone
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through appropriate training. The unofficial script implies the transfer of a knowledge system
that addresses basic forms of social order such as political legitimacy, accountability and good
governance (Rottenburg, 2009).
At the same time the technical game renders invisible all of the hegemonic effects on the local
frames of reference / cultural codes: ‘the conceptualization of a project/program as a technical
game is a hegemonic process insofar as the locally self determined definition of how one
wishes to live and work does not appear at all in this model’ Rottenburg, 2009:184. At some
point, when the commitment from the donor representatives to provide adequate financial and
technical resources was put into question and the implementation of the CPP agenda was
threatened, the CAR professionals rejected the dominance of the technical game, by
demonstrating on one hand their fundamental differences in their implicit orientational
knowledge and by expressing their interest in developing their own self determined reform
concept on the other. Thereby they stopped switching from one script to the other and
refrained to contend themselves with a new provisional consensus.
On a more general level, the meetings indicate an interesting cyclic dynamic of
compromise/hope, conflict, and technical procedures which is probably common in all such
negotiation processes. The starting point is a common goal/vision, a consensus on policy
strategies that mobilizes metaphors (of for example partnership, governance) ‘whose
vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required to conceal ideological
differences, to allow compromise and to distribute agency’ Mosse, 2004:230. Soon, these
strategic issues have to be interpreted into action plans based on the organizational
backgrounds that create quite distinct meanings. A phase of meconnaissance sets in. In this
case, the terminology is still used; however, the meaning attached to these terms is already
different. As a consequence, when it comes to practices resulting from what has been agreed
upon, the different interpretations become obvious, generating conflicts at the technical level.
However, due to the interdependency between donors and recipients, such a conflict cannot be
maintained for long and a new and slightly different compromise in the strategic sense is
reached on the political level with the whole cycle starting all over again.
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6. Conclusion
The conclusions are, in a way, quite paradoxical. The modernization of administrative
systems implies that these institutions evolve into a functionally differentiated system based
on purpose and success orientation. In general, it means that the administration/bureaucracy
becomes professional. However, in the Cambodian case, the question remains whether the
professionals are the agents of modernity that push forth modernization or if modernization is
itself as process of functional differentiation.
Although professionals have played a major role in political and social change at times and
have been essential for the development of the culture of parliamentary democracy before
and after independence, their role has changed from independent professionals to
technocrats. Technocrats who present themselves as the exclusive producers of a particular
status culture which is based on academic/intellectual culture and educational credentials.
Thereby they use cultural resources and symbols as strategic means to monopolize key
organizational positions and to form distinct ‘consciousness communities’. Hence, instead of
being the most ‘modernized’ section of the society they tend to become a conservative force.
Though they may add to economic growth they do not foster political and social change.
Moreover, they do not constitute the most powerful group and are rather positioned in an
intermediate position. As wealth, prestige, and power constitute scarce resources and as their
self-reproduction, i.e. obtaining higher salaries, higher social status etc. is intertwined with
that of the organization/vertical networks, their aspiration for more than just an equal leads
them to integrate powerful patron-client networks. Clientelism is then perceived as an
important pragmatic avenue of controlled freedom, useful for advancing in social, economic,
and political domains that are regulated by competition for access to power, resources, and
services (Roniger, 1994). Thereby, they follow exclusionary strategies towards on one hand
other social groups who do not have the relevant credentials by excluding them from
privileges or rewards and on the other hand, towards other professionals who do not belong to
their networks. As a consequence, they have instrumentalized/restrained themselves from
discussing the aims of their agency and use their technical-economic knowledge to pursue the
interests of their organizations/vertical networks.
In fact, on the basis of their functional specialization and expertise, they have integrated large
scale organizations such as the Cambodian People Party (CPP), where they are encouraged and
rewarded with public offices in accordance with politically sensitive stances. In that way they
convert their clientelistic commitments into political influence and, once power is achieved,
use their new power base to effectively formulate and implement policies for administrative
reform (Roniger, 1994). This however reduces significantly their possibilities to organize
politically on a horizontal level. In other words with increasing specialization, and thus, with
increasing technical and expert knowledge, professionals tend to use their organization’s
capability and technical knowledge to serve the needs of their organizations/vertical networks.
Hence although professionals in Cambodia share the same vision of how Cambodia should
‘develop’, far reaching differences associated with the means and strategies persist. Without a
mutual understanding of the strategies, chances to evolve as a ‘strategic’ group are therefore
limited.
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A potential exists though for the professionals working in the state administration to form a
strategic group through processes of hybridization. They already make a career in the
bureaucracy and occupy important office positions, secure their private economic interests
though material coverage (e.g., marrying into business families) and hope to enter the political
stage in the near future to secure their long-term power base. However, this would imply more
intensive networking. At the same time, another potential exists to form of ‘neutral’ rational
administration: after the ceding of the ‘old guard’ and thus the ‘disentanglement’ from old
clientele structures. The civil servants could then find synergetic means with the professionals
from the Human Right NGO’s and from the private sector. However, for the time being, they
all start from different points of reference for their agency. This is specially the case for the
professionals at the interface of development cooperation.
For the professionals working within the Cambodian administration, personal politics within
the state system are the main reference for action. Their performance is measured by their
ability to secure the economic and political reproduction of their networks. For the
professionals of the donor organizations’ specific guidelines are the main reference. Political
proceedings become troublesome factors in the smooth running of the development program
(Bierschenk, 1988). Hence, their agency is limited by predefined technical reports that have to
be sent to their management units at headquarters. These reports, which for the donor
organizations constitute the ‘Cambodian reality’, determine the nature and work of the
professionals working ‘in the field’. Korff (2004) points out that the more organizations
depend upon flows and networks, the less they are influenced by the social contexts
associated with their locations. From this follows a growing independence of the
organizational from the societal logic -the predominance of the rationality of means over the
rationality of goals.
This ambivalence between the rationality of means and the rationality of goals is most
obvious at the interface of development cooperation. There the Royal Government aims at
influencing national politics whereas international aid organizations systematically exclude
politics from their systems of reference. Thereby the Government is unable to define policies
of the donor organizations, in formal terms, and conversely, the donor organizations are
unable to define the political system or interfere in Khmer politics. As a result the political,
moral and social dimensions (ends) are excluded from the direct negotiations at the interfaces
of development cooperation.There political processes are essentially defined by donor
organizations as solely technical (means).
For donor organizations technologies (means) have a clear advantage over cultural
movements. Technologies do fulfill promises to quite a large degree more or less to the
satisfaction of most people, as they increase agency to a very high degree and connect
incentives to economics. In the combination of economy and technology both are
disembedded and produce their own aims and objectives in the sense of more (growth), better,
faster, etc. Furthermore, technologies, and similarly economics, allow for modeling,
simulation, and calculability. Effects can be analyzed and function as base for political
decision-making. Discussion is hence limited to professionals over the most appropriate
technical model Thereby problems are naturalized and defined as technical. Through the
translation of issues and problems to developmental jargon, policies and programs, the
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political dimension is then isolated. Problems resulting from development policies can be
defined simply as a wrong selection, not as a fault of their ontological assumptions.
Interestingly Ferguson (1994) advances that ‘development’ programs are set up to provide
technical solutions to problems that are not technical in nature. Thereby, the proper policy
becomes a selection of the technique defined as appropriate. In this sense, it is hardly possible
for donor organizations to make the political context and nature of their intervention explicit.
Similarly, as they exclude the political dimension, so too do they exclude the moral
dimension. Reform always implicitly refers to morality as it aims at defining a better future or
a ‘better life’. In consequence, if no references to spheres external to society are possible, the
definition of ‘better life’ is a social process in which ideas of good and bad are contrasted.
Morality, in this sense is not an individual issue but is shared by cultural collectives. Thereby,
‘moral’ has to be institutionalized. Indeed, the moral definition of better life is the
institutionalization of power differentials within a society. Sometimes ideas that are linked to
promises of a better life contradict each other, because the understanding of ‘better life’ is
connected to the social positioning, culture (in the sense of what persons can think about or
imagine, cognitive structures), interests and opportunities (which are as shown above already,
connected to power in the sense of what can be done).
Additionally, as they exclude the political and the moral dimensions, so do they exclude the
social impacts of their intervention on social configurations. Through ‘development
intervention’ existing power differentials are either enforced or modified (in the sense that
new opportunities generated by development intervention are used by some actors) ,which
implies at least relative decline of the current power holders.
In sum, while meaning is defined as apolitical benchmarks for development actors, relevant
meaning for the Cambodia population is defined by the political elites (businesses and
bureaucrats). Due to a lack of a public sphere, the general population is hardly included.
Consequently, instead of an overall consensus, particular groups (high officials from the
Cambodian Government, CPP, professionals or donor organizations), have their own specific
idea of a better life and thus of development. This has an implication on the perception on the
political system, as well as for the groups and the role they play in that political system.
Instead of defining reform and developmental intervention as political, moral and social
matters -ideas of a better life – they are defined as benchmarks and indicators. This poses a
problem in so far that these benchmarks and indicators can be ‘sinnstiftend’, i.e., provide
meaning to acting.
Indeed, when we look at the governance system in Cambodia, we realize that different
meaning systems with different practical implications compete with each other with regard to
how ‘good’ administrative governance and thus state reform should be implemented.
Professionals from donor organizations have argued that enhancing the salaries of civil
servants along criteria of efficiency and effectiveness combined with a process of de-
bureaucratization has positive effects as they create incentives for qualified personal. This
however leads to an automatic process of rationalization of the civil service and thus to an
important reduction of the number of civil servants. Normally, de-bureaucratization occurs
when the bureaucracy becomes less relevant as both a decision-making and decision
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implementing (executing) organization. Thereby, it occurs when development is resulting
from economic and social changes with little control by the administration. In an ‘imposed’
process of de-bureaucratization, the professionals of the CAR contend that if no other avenues
for participation are open to departing bureaucrats, opposition emerges which can destabilize
the state. In other words, in a post-conflict context where over-bureaucratization serves as a
means for pacification by powerful bureaucrats, reducing the number of civil servants can
become a political source of conflict. In addition, de-bureaucratization does not necessarily
imply that a modern-bureaucracy exists. In fact, in patrimonial systems the bureaucracy can
remain very small. Consequently, de-bureaucratization might also indicate return to
‘traditional pattern’. In addition, they argue that, while de-bureaucratization is critical on a
general and national level, it can have its value and relevance for local and district levels,
because ‘communitarism’ implies de-bureaucratization. The rationalization of the civil service
or de-bureaucratization can thus be useful in decentralization giving more autonomy to
communities. However, this only works, if these local levels are integrated into a national
administration or within the framework of a modern bureaucracy.
These different rationales can coexist for a long period of time until they need to be
operationalized. The debate about the Joint Monitoring Indicators provides a telling example.
Initially, there was a consensus among all actors on technical dimensions that should be
implemented. Then a dynamic of meconnaissance evolved, when both sides demanded the
implementation of their policies. A way to break this cycle and thus to avoid meconnaissance
could be to find new forms of ‘cooperation’ that would focus on processes and their
reflections rather than on predetermined technical outcomes.
This would imply the democratic creation of communities of meaning (not values) around
public agencies to redefine the past and present in terms of an imagined future; meanings that
would keep global and national agencies turned to the purposes emerging from and grounded
in the public interest. It would also imply encounters with the administrative politics of
international development practices to avoid sole technicism and to generate reflexive and
creative practices that analyze the uncertain link between intention and outcome on one hand,
and that place both programs and policy making back into fields of social relations on the
other.
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Annex 2. Interview Questionnaire
1. When and where were you born?
2. Where did you grow up?
3. Where did you go to school?
4. How long did you go to school?
5. Where did you study?
6. Where do you live in Phnom Penh?
7. Do you have your own house?
8. How large is the house?
9. Do you rent houses to third parties?
10. With whom do you live in your present house?
11. How important is religion for your parents?
12. Are you married?
13. Do you have sisters and brothers? What do they do for a living?
14. What do your parents-in-law do for your living? Do you stay at your wife’s house?
15. How would you define a good father? How would you define a good mother?
16. Do you want to become like your parents?
17. Who inspires you? Who is an example for you?
18. Do you possess land or a farm outside Phnom Penh?
19. What does your family do for a living?
20. Who decides in your family about financial issues, personal issues?
21. Which ethnicity do your parents belong to (do you have Sino Khmer members in your
family?)
22. What status has the woman compared to that of the man?
23. Whom do you respect in your family?
24. What was for you the most remarkable change during the last 5 years?
25. Who is a role model for you?
26. What do you need to be happy?
27. Do you know someone who is happier than you presently are?
28. What do you hope for the future?
29. Where should your children go to school? To study?
30. What were the most important events in your lives?
31. What is a good life?
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32. Do you know any proverbs on respect?
33. Where would you like to be in 5 years?
34. Do you think you might have a better life in 2 years?
35. How often do you go to the shopping malls?
36. How often do you travel abroad, have you ever seen snow, when?
37. Do you have a car? A motorbike? Whose idea was it to buy the item?
38. Do you have friends? Since when do you know them? What do they do for a living
now?
39. How important is friendship?
40. How often do you meet with friends? Where do you usually meet (Karaoke,
restaurants, bars, at home)?
41. Who is it important to know if you need any kind of service?
42. Who will help you find a better job? Help you if you need money? If you are in
trouble?
43. Who do you respect very much and how do you show this respect?
44. Who is invited during wedding and funeral ceremonies?
45. What does a normal day look like for you? What do you usually do on WE?
46. How often do you eat per day? With whom and where?
47. When do you go to bed?
48. How important is religion for you? For your family?
49. What kind of journals do you read? Which radio stations do you listen to? Do you
watch TV? How often, and which is your preferred program?
50. Why did you come back from the country where you studied and why did you come
back?
51. Could you imagine living in that country?
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Annex 4. Short biographies of selected professionals
Son Ngoc Minh (Alias achar Mean, Pham Van Hua)
 Born in Tra Vinh (former Cambodian territory in South Vietnam, known as
Cochinchina by the French or Kampuchea Krom, by the Khmer) in 1904, of a
Cambodian father and a Vietnamese mother, died in 1972 in Beijing
 Professor of Pali at Wat Unnalom
 1942 leaves the capital following the Monks' Demonstration.
 1946 takes the nom de guerre Son Ngoc Minh by capitalizing on Son Ngoc Thanh's
heroic reputation and to link himself in people's minds with Ho Chi Minh
 1951 President of the newly-formed Kampuchean People’s Party of Kampuchea
(KPLC) ; in this function Commander of the political arm of Cambodia's Communist
resistance in the first Indochina war
 1955 exile in northern Vietnam
 1972 dies in Beijing
 1980s honored post mortem as the father of Cambodian Communism in Vietnam,
Laos, and the PRK
Tou Samouth (alias achar Sok)
 Born in ca.1915 to a wealthy family in the former Cambodian territory in South
Vietnam, known as Cochinchina by the French or Kampuchea Krom, by the Khmer,
killed in 1962, probably on the orders of Sihanouk
 Monk at Wat Unnalom
 1930es works as a outstanding Buddhist scholar and preacher with Son Ngoc Thanh
and Suzanne at the Institut Buddhiste in Phnom Penh
 1945 joins a communist cell of the Indochinese Communist Party created by Son Ngoc
Minh after the Bombing of Wat Unalom by American airplanes
 Works as Interior Minister of the Committee of Liberation of the Southeast in eastern
Cambodia
 1948 takes the revolutionary name of Tou Samouth
 1962 renames the Kampuchean People’s Party of Kampuchea into the Workers Party
of Kampuchea
 1962 arrested by Sihanouk secret police and murder while in custody
Son Ngoc Thanh
 Born into a prosperous Khmer Krom family in Tra Vinh
(former Cambodian territory in South Vietnam, known as
Cochinchina by the French or Kampuchea Krom, by the
Khmer), died in Vietnam in 1977
 Secondary and tertiary studies in law in Montpellier and in
Paris
 Returns to Cambodia in 1933 to join the colonial civil
service as secretary of the Institute Buddhist in Phnom Penh
 1936 founds of the first intellectual platform and newspaper
Nagaravatta, closed in 1942 by the French administration
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 1942 exile in Japan under the protection of Emperor Hirohito to represent the
Cambodian population except the king and his close associates, the royal family, and
the functionaries loyal to France in the Khmer Nationalist Party
 1945 returns to Cambodia to be Foreign Minister
 Reforms the education system by replacing French with Khmer as the language of
instruction in the schools and enactment of laws to support the king and the Buddhiste
Sangha
 Nomination as Prime Minister by Sihanouk
 Negotiations to integrate Cochinchina back into Cambodia
 1945 arrested by the returning French administration after WWII
 1947 trial in Saigon and condemnation to twenty years' imprisonment
 House arrest in the Poitiers/ France where he completes his law degree
 1951 returns to Cambodia after the intervention of King Sihanouk
 Refuses the ministerial appointment by the young Democratic Party
 Founds his second newspaper Khmer Krauk (Cambodians Awake); the French ban the
publication a month later in February 1952
 1952 escapes into the maquis in the forest of Siem Reap where he joins the Khmer
Issaraks (independence fighters), demanding for immediate independence and declares
the Republican Government
 1970 returns to Phnom Penh after the coup against Prince Norodom Sihanouk by
general Lon Nol
 Appointed as Senior Adviser and then as Prime Minister in the Government of the
Khmer Republic
 1972 forced out of office in a cabinet shake up
 Exile in Vietnam
 Dies in 1977 in Hanoi
Dr. Sisowath Youtevong
 Born in the old royal Cambodian capital city of Oudong in
1913 and died at Calmette Hospital in Phnom Penh in1947
 married to a French National Dominique Laverne; double
Nationality: French and Khmer
 1941 graduates from the Faculty of Sciences in Montpellier/
France with a Doctorate Degree in Physical Sciences with
high honour (mention très honorable).
 Delegate at the Conference in Hot Springs, USA.
 French Official at the French Ministry of Outre-Mer.
 Active member of the French Socialist Party
 1946 founds the Democratic Party (along with Son Sann,
Chhean Vam, Sim Var, Ieu Koeuss, Huy Kanthoul and Penn Nouth) which wins the
first free elections
 Drafts the first Cambodian constitution modelled on the constitution of the French
Fourth Republic that introduces civil liberties and parliamentary democracy to
Cambodia (he is later known as the Father of Liberal Democracy and Father of the
Cambodian Constitution).
 Dies suddenly at the age of 34 at the height of his political career
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Son Sann
 Born in 1911 in Phnom Penh into an old ‘aritocratic’ family
(Oknha) originally from Cochinchina/ Kampuchea Krom,
died in 2000 in Paris/ France
 Primary schooling a the French primary school Ecole Miche
in Phnom Penh
 Secondary schooling in France at the College Saint-Aspais
in Melun
 Baccalaureat at the elitist Lycee Louis le Grand in Paris
 1933 graduate at the École des Hautes Études Commerciales
(HEC) in Paris/ France
 Brief stay in London, learning English in the process.
 1935 official in the French civil service serving in the provinces of Prey Veng and
later Battambang as vice governor
 1939 joins the business of his wealthy Indian father in law
 1941 member of the Cambodian Economic Mission to Tokyo to negotiate the rice
price
 1946 joins the Steering Committee of the Democratic Party
 1946- 1948 Vice-president of the Council of Ministers
 1946-1947 Minister of Finance in the Sisowath Youthevong Government from 1946-
47
 1950 Foreign Minister
 1952 crushing of the Democrat Party in 1952, resignation from the leadership of the
party
 1954 advisor to Sihanouk during the negotiations for Cambodia’s independence
 Late 1950es member of Prince Sihanouk’s Sangkum Party
 1954- 1966 president of the National Bank of Cambodia
 1971 exile to France
 1975 president of the Association of Overseas Cambodians
 1979 formation of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) to unite
anti-communist refugees on the Thai-Cambodia border following Vietnamese invasion
of Cambodia
 1982 Prime Minister of the tripartite Coalition Government of Kampuchea with
Sihanouk and Democratic Kampuchea
 1992 formation of the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party
 1993 minority member in the Coalition Government between the CPP and
FUNCIPEC, and personal Advisor to King Sihanouk
 1995 renames the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party into the Son Sann Party
 1997 return to France
 Dies in 2000 in Paris
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Hor Namhong
 Born in 1935 in Phnom Penh, current Minister of Foreign
Affairs in the Royal Government of Cambodia
 Graduate of the Royal School for Administration (RSA)in
Cambodia
 Studies at the Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales of
Universite Paris II/ France
 1967 First Secretary of the Cambodian Embassy in France
 1970 joins the GRUNK
 1973 ambassador in Havanna/ Cuba
 1975 imprisonned at Boeung Trabek ( B-32)
 1979 Co-founder of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)
 1981 Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 1982 Ambassador in Moscow
 1993 Ambassador of the Royal Government of Cambodia to France
 1998 Deputy Prime Minister and Ministr of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation
Keat Chhon
 Born in 1934 in Kratie, currently Minister of the Ministry
of Economy and Finance
 Schooling at the College Norodom Sihanouk in Kompong
Cham
 1950 student at the Ecole Nationale Superieure du Genie
Maritime in Paris/ France
 Member of the Khmer Students' Union (KSU)
 1958 studies at the Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique
(CEA) in Saclay/ France
 Engineer at the Ministry for Industry, Public Work and
Telecomunication
 1965 Secretary of State at the Ministry of Economy
 1967 Minister at the Ministry for Industry and Trade; joins the Communist Party of
Kampuchea
 1970 joins the GRUNK of Sihanouk
 1975 official at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the Government of Democratic
Kampuchea
 1979 delegate in the Khmer Rouge delegation to the United Nations in New York
 1981 employed at UNIDO in Vienna
 1984 UNDP consultant; he breaks all contact with the Khmer Rouges
 1986 takes the French Nationality
 End of 1980es rapprochement to Hun Sen ; becomes his personal advisor
 1994 Minister at the Ministry for Economy and Finance of the Royal Government of
Cambodia
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Ieng Sary (alias Kim Trang, Sou Hav and Comrade Vann)
 Born as Kim Trang into a prosperous landowning Khmer
and Sino-Vietnamese family in 1925 in Tra Vinh province
(former Cambodian territory in South Vietnam, known as
Cochinchina by the French or Kampuchea Krom, by the
Khmer), married to Khieu Thirith; still alive as to January
2009
 At the age of 15 he is sent to live with relatives in the
Cambodian province of Svay Rieng. During this time he is
given the name Ieng Sary, which sounds more Khmer than
his real name, Kim Trang
 1942 having done exceptionally well as a student, he goes to Phnom Penh for further
education
 1945 scholarship to the prestigious Lycee Sisowath. He soon attracts attention for his
intellectual powers and his interest in political action. At the Lycee he befriends the
talented Keng Vannsak
 1946 founds the Cambodia’s Liberation Group from the French Colonialism (Groupe
de Liberation du Cambodge du colonialism Francais)
 Democratic officials in the Ministry of Education reward him for standing up to the
French by granting him a scholarship to study in France
 1950 arrives in France and looks for his mentor Keng Vannsak who helps him settle
 1951 marriage with Khieu Thirith in Paris in the 15th arrondissement; joins the Cercle
Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers and the French Communist Party; member of the
Khmer Students Association(KSA) and then of the Khmer Students' Union (KSU)
 1957 returns to Cambodia
 1960 becomes teacher for history and geography at Lycee Sisowath and at Kampuch’
Bot ‘Son of Kampuchea’, founded by Hou Youn a former student of the Cercle
Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers in France
 1960 introduction to the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Kampuchea
 1971 delegate sent from the Communist Party of Kampuchea to meet with Sihanouk in
Beijing
 1975 Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs
 1979 Chief Diplomatic Negotiator of the Khmer Rouges with China
 1998 surrender to the Royal Government of Cambodia
 2007 arrested at his home in Phnom Penh on an arrest warrant from the Cambodia
Tribunal for war crimes and crimes against humanity
Khieu Ponnary
 Born in Battambang in 1920 to a aristocratic family (her
father Norodom Sutharot is a judge with the rang of Preah
Ang Machas), dies in 2003. Elder sister of Khieu Thirith.
Their father run off to Battambang with a Cambodian
Princess, leaving their mother to raise the family. Married to
Saloth Sar alias Pol Pot
 Student at the French Lycee Sisowath
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 1940 first Cambodian woman to receive a baccalaureate degree
 1949 studies of Khmer linguistics in Paris/ France; joins the Cercle Marxiste des
Etudiants Khmers in France, where she meets Saloth Sar; joins the Khmer Students
Association(KSA)
 1951 returns to Cambodia to work as a teacher at Lycee Sisowath;founds the woman’s
magazine Neary
 1956 marriage with Saloth Sar (at the anniversary of the French “prise de la Bastille”,
14th of july)
 Editor at the English Newspaper Kambuja
 1965 escapes into the maquis with her husband
 1970 Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea
 1973 Party Secretary of the CPK in Kompong Thom
 19756 President of the Democratic Kampuchea Women’s Association; diagnosed
chronic schizophrenia
 1979 divorce from Pol Pot
 1996 granted amnesty from prosecution by the Royal Government of Cambodia
 2003 death in Pailin
Kieu Thirith
 Born in Phnom Penh in 1931 to a relatively privileged and
wealthy family, wife of Ieng Sary and sister of Khieu
Ponnary
 Schooling at the French Lycee Sisowath in Phnom Penh
 1949 studies English literature at the Faculté des Lettres of
the Sorbonne in Paris/France; she majors with Shakespeare
 Member of Khmer Students Union (KSU )
 1951 marriage with Ieng Sary at the Town hall of the 15th arrondissement in Paris
 1957 returns Cambodia to work as an English professor at Lycee Sisowath
 1960 starts her own private English school the Institut Superieur Khmero-Anglais de
Boeung Trabek
 1975 Minister of Social Affairs and Action
 1985 Vice president of the Women’s Association of the Democratic Kamouchea; later
Head of Democratic Kampuchea's Red Cross Society
 2007 arrested for crimes against humanity
Keng Vannsak
 Born to a less privileged family, although he enjoyed some
connections with the royal family in 1925 in a village in
the Kampong Chhnang province; dies in December 2008
at the Montmorency hospital in Paris/France
 Married to a French national Suzanne Colleville, who
holds several diplomas in the Cambodian, Lao and Thai
languages and Physical Science
 Student at the prestigious Lycee Sisowath during World
War II, where he excelled in literary studies. There he
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befriended the talented young radical Ieng Sary
 1946 baccalaureate in Philosophy at Lycee Sisowath
 Study of Cambodian linguistics in Paris/ France. During his studies Khmer-language
assistant at the National School of Modern Eastern Languages (Ecole Nationale des
Langues Orientales)
 During his studies, Khmer teacher at the School of Oriental and African Studies,
University of London
 Mentor of Saloth Sar’s and Ieng Sary’s.
 1950 launchs at his home the Cercles Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers
 1951 graduates of the Faculty of Literature and Human Science University of Paris
 1952 returns to Cambodia with his wife as teacher at the prestigious Lycée Sisowath
in Phnom Penh and where he stayed until 1958; in the same year (1952) he developed
the first typewriter keyboard with Khmer signs in 1952
 1954 member of the Democratic Party, aiming at launching an internal reform of the
Party
 1955 leads of the Democratic Party and representing it in the 1955 legislative elections
 September 13th to October 10th 1955 imprisonment ordered by Prince Sihanouk.
After his release, he published poems he had written while in jail, which had a very
strong influence on Khmer writers at the time
 1958 teaches at the National Pedagogical Institute, and member of the Secondary
Education Khmer Language and Literature Programme
 1960s campaigns for the simplification of the Khmer language, thus spurring a
decisive will for reforms
 Professor of Khmer Literature, Culture and Civilisation at the Buddhist University of
Phnom Penh
 1968 after the Samlaut Uprising, followed by severe reprisals, he is placed under
house arrest with an interdiction to teach after being accused inciting sedition among
his students
 1969 in charge of the Khmer Inscriptions Department at the University of Fine Arts
 1970 rehabilitated after Lon Nol's military coup and leader of a Khmer-Mon Institute,
founded by Lon Nol ;in the same year he went back to France to prepare a PhD Thesis
entitled “Recherche d'un fond culturel khmer” (Research on a Khmer cultural
inventory), which he presented the following year in Paris
 1971 Deputy Representative of Cambodia's Permanent Delegation to UNESCO and
Chargé d'Affaires of Lon Nol's Khmer Republic in France
 1974 Cambodian Ambassador to France in 1974
 After 1975, exile in France
Thiounn Mumm
 Born to one of the most powerful non royal family (Khmero-Vietnamese) in Phnom
Penh. His grandfather amassed a fortune as the Minister of Palace Affairs under King
Norodom, King Sisowath, and King Monivong. His father was the first Cambodian to
earn a Lycee and university qualifications in France
 Enrolls at the French Lycee Chasseloup-Laubat in Saigon
 Studies at the University of Hanoi until 1945
 1946 student at the elitist Ecole Polytechnique in Paris; first Cambodian student to a
diploma in Telecommunication Engineering
159
 Member of the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers and the Khmer Students
Association (KSA) where becomes the mentor of Saloth Sar
 PHD (Docteur ès Sciences) at the Sorbonne
 1951 joins the French Communist Party (Mumm was probably responsible for
bringing Sar into the party in 1952)
 1954 returns to Cambodia to work with Keng Vannsak and Sichau in the Democratic
Party. He also renewed contact with Saloth Sar
 1955 leads the bloodless coup in the Democratic Party, pushing aside several of its
founding members and taking over the executive committee.
 Escapes to France
 During the 1960es researcher in nuclear physics in Paris
 1970 after the coup against Sihanouk in Cambodia he joins the newly formed GRUNK
in Beijing as Minister for Economy and Finance
 1975 Director of the Institute for Science and Technology in Phnom Penh; trains the
Government technicians
 1976 Minister of National Committee of Sciences and Technology
 1980 Minister of Science and Technologies in the exiles Government of Democratic
Kampuchea
 1983 retirement from public life
Saloth Sar (alias Pol Pot)
 Born in Prek Sbauv in Kampong Thom Province in
1925 to a moderately wealthy family of Sino-Khmer
descent; married to Khieu Ponnary; dies in 1998; his
cousin Sowath-chhom Norleak Meak is the third wife of
King Monivong
 1935 schooling at the private École Miche, a French
Catholic school in Phnom Penh ( attended by the sons of
French officials and wealthy Chinese, Sino-Khmer and
Vietnamese Families)
 1941 schooling at Norodom Sihanouk
 1947 student at the Technical School at Russey Keo in Phnom Penh; in this year he
meets Ieng Sary who introduces him to the Democratic Party
 1949 earns a Government scholarship to study radio electricity at the École Française
de Radioélectricité (EFR) in Paris/ France
 1950 participation in an international labour brigade team to build roads in Yugoslavia
 1951 member of the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers and the Khmer Students
Union (KSU) which had taken control of the Khmer Student's Association (KSA) that
same year; Member of the French Communist Party
 1954 returns to Cambodia without having finished his studies
 1953 member of the Indochinese Communist Party
 1954 travel to the Viet Minh Eastern Zone headquarters to work for the mass
propaganda section and attend the cadre school in the eastern Part
 1955 liaison work with radical Democrats such as Thioun Mumm and Keng Vannsak
in Phnom Penh on behalf of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP= and making
preparations for the 1955 elections
 Publications of articles in the radical newspaper Sammaki (Solidarity), edited by his
brother Saloth Chhay
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 1956 marriage with Khieu Ponnary
 1956 teacher for French poetry (Hugo, Rimbaud, Verlaine, Vigny, Rousseau) history,
geography, and civics at the private Lycee Chamraon Vichea (‘Progressive
knowledge’), in Phnom Penh. About three hundred students attended the four year
course at Chamraon Vichea. Both school Chamraon Vichea and Kambuj’Bot soon
became a forum for radicals who lacked credentials to teach in the more prestigious
and better paying state system
 1962 arrest and murder of Tou Samouth; Sar becomes the acting leader of the Workers
Party of Kampuchea (WPK)
 1963 election to Secretary of the Central committee of Workers Party of Kampuchea
 1963 escapes to the Vietnamese border region to make contact with Vietnamese units
fighting against South Vietnam
 1964 he breaks with Marxism by declaring rural peasant farmers to be the true
working class proletarian and the lifeblood of the revolution
 1966 he renames the Workers Party of Kampuchea (WPK) into the Communist Party
of Kampuchea (CPK)
 1976 Prime minister of Democratic Kampuchea
 1977 nominates officially Nuon Chea as Prime Minister
 1985 official resignation as chief of the Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea (CGDK)
 1997 sentenced to life long house arrest
 1998 death in his home at the Thai border
Hou Youn
 Born in 1930 to a landowning Sino-Khmer family, assassinated by the Khmer Rouges
in 1975
 Enrolls at Lycee Sisowath
 1949 studies of Law in Paris/France
 One of the 5 founder of the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers
 Member of the Khmer Students' Association (KSA) and of the French Communist
Party
 1952 sends with Saloth Sar, Ieng Sary, and other leftists an open letter to Prince
Norodom Sihanouk calling him the "strangler of infant democracy"; Sihanouk
terminates his scholarship
 PhD in Economics at the University of Paris on “The Cambodian Peasants and Their
Prospects for Modernization” which challenges the conventional view that
urbanization and industrialization are necessary precursors of development
 1956 founds with Khieu Samphan the Khmer Students' Union
 Returns to Cambodia as Director of the private Lycée Kambuj’bot, which he helped
establish
 1958 Sihanouk appoints him Secretary of State at the Ministry for Trade and Industry
 1959 appointed Secretary of State at the Ministry of Planning and then at the Ministry
of Public Health
 1960 Professor at the Faculty for Law and Economics
 1962 Minister of Finance
 1964 Director of the private Lycée Kambuj’bot; creates the Sino-Khmer ( Maoiste)
Association
 1967 escapes to Tram Kak with Khieu Samphan after being threaten by Sihanouk
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 1970 Minister of Interior of the GRUNK
 1974 after raising critics against the other Khmer Rouged he is discharged from his
post and forced to work on a farm
 1975 murdered on the orders of Pol Pot
Hu Nim (Alias Comrade Phoas)
 Born in 1932 to a rather poor Sino-Khmer family, purged from the Communist Party
of Kampuchea and killed in 1977 in the prison of Tuol Sleng ( S21)
 Schooling at the College Norodom Sihanouk
 1952 baccalaureat at the Lycee Sisowath
 Teacher at Kambuj’bot
 1955 studies of law at the Sorbonne
 PhD on ‘Les Services Publics et Economiques
 1967 escapes from Sihanouk returns to Cambodia; works as lawyer and journalist at
the Pracheachun Serei
 1970 Minister of Information in the exiled GRUNK Government of Prince Sihanouk
 1975 Minister of Information in the Government of Democratic Kampuchea
 1977 arrested and killed in Tuol Sleng on the orders of Pol Pot
Khieu Samphan
 Born in 1931 to a Sino-Khmer family, still alive as to
January 2009; his father was a judge in Tuk Meas
 Enrolls at the College Norodom Sihanouk
 Enrolls at the Lycee Sisowath and later at the French
Lycee Descartes
 1953 studies law and political economy in Montpellier
 1956 moves to Paris where he starts his PhD in
Economics
 Is introduced to the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants
Khmers by Ieng Sary
 Founds the Khmer Students' Association (KSA); the KSA is closed down in 1956
 1956 founds with Hou Youn the Khmer Students' Union (KSU)
 1959 PhD entitled ‘Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development’ in which he
advocates national self-reliance and generally sides with dependency theorists in
blaming the wealthy, industrialized states for the poverty of the Third World
 1959 returns to Cambodia to hold a faculty position at the University of Phnom Penh
 1959 launches l’Observateur, a French-language leftist publication that was viewed
with hostility by the Government
 1960 l’Observateur is banned, Khieu arrested and forced to undress and get pictured in
public on the orders of Prince Sihanouk
 1970 after the Government of Prince Sihanouk is ousted, he joins forces with the now-
deposed monarch in establishing an anti- Government coalition known as the
Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchea (GRUNK)
 1973 appointed Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Commander-in-
Chief of GRUNK military forces
 1975 President of the Central Presidium in 1976
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 1976 president of the State Presidium of Democratic Kampuchea
 1979 Leader of Democratic Kampuchea in Thailand
 1982 Vice-President for Foreign Affairs of the Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea (CGDK)
 1998 surrender to the Royal Government of Cambodia
 2008 first appearance in front of the Cambodia Tribunal and charged with crimes
against humanity and war crimes with his lawyer Jacques Vergès
 Publications:
o Samphan, K., 1979: Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development.
Cornell University Southeast Asia: Cornell
o Samphan, K., 2007: Reflection on Cambodian History Up to the Era of
Democratic Kampuchea. Phnom Penh
Son Sen
 Born 1930 in Cochinchina to a rather wealthy landowning
Sino-Vietnamese Family; assassinated 1997 on the orders of
Pol Pot
 Schooling in Phnom Penh
 1953 studies philosophy at the Sorbonne
 Joins the Cercle Marxiste des Etudiants Khmers through Ieng
Sary
 1956 returns to Cambodia to work as a teacher at the Lycee
Sisowath
 1957 Vice- Director of Studies at the National Teaching Institute
 1960 leading member of the reconstituted Workers Party of Kampuchea.
 1964 escapes to the southwest of Cambodia
 1968 escapes to the Northeast
 1972 Chief of Staff of the Khmer Rouge Forces
 1975 Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense of Democratic Kampuchea and
chief of the Santebal - the Khmer Rouge secret police
 1979 Supreme Commander of the insurgent National Army of Democratic
Kampuchea
 1980 president of the Defense Committee of the Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea (CGDK)
 1991 negotiation with Khieu Samphan for a peace treaty with UNTAC and the Royal
Government of Cambodia in Phnom Penh
 1992 removal from power after a dispute with fellow Khmer Rouge leaders over
whether to continue the negotiations
 1997 assassinated alongside 13 members of his family, including women and children,
on the orders of Pol Pot
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Nuon Chea (Alias Long Bunruot, Runglert Laodi)
 Born into a prosperous Sino-Khmer family in
Battambang in 1926 ( his father Han Chinese migrated
to Battambang trades with rice and corn), still alive as
to January 2009
 1944 law student at Thamassat but he doesn’t
complete his law degree
 Official at the Thai Ministry for Foreign Affairs
 1950 becomes member of the Communist Party of
Thailand
 1951 resigns from the Ministry and joins the communist insurgents in Ta Sagn
 1960 elected Deputy General Secretary of the Workers Party of Kampuchea (later
renamed as the Communist Party of Kampuchea)
 1970s second most important member of the Communist Party of Kampuchea after
Saloth Sar
 1976 'Brother Number Two' during Democratic Kampuchea in charge of Propaganda
and Political Education
 1976 Interim Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea
 1978 Commander of the Easter Zone
 1998 surrender to the Royal Government of Cambodia
 2007 arrested at his home in Pailin and flown to the Cambodia Tribunal in Phnom
Penh where he is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity.
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Annex 5. Statement of the general the Democratic National United Movement January 1999
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL UNITED MOVEMNET KINGDOM OF
CAMBODIA(DNUM)NATION RELIGION KING
STATEMENT OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SESSION 2
OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL UNITED MOVEMENT
(Unofficial translation by Lay Putheara of the Documentation Center of Cambodia)
A delegation of 245 people from the capital city Phnom Penh and provinces all over the
Kingdom of Cambodia met January 25, 1999 in the General Assembly, Session 2 of the
Democratic National United Movement (DNUM) under the chairmanship of His Excellency
Ieng Sary, Head of the DNUM. After listening and discussing on various reports from all the
sources, the Summit unanimously worked out a general declaration as follows:
On December 25, 1998, His Excellency Khieu Samphan, Former Head of State of the
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) Regime, and His Excellency Nuon Chea, Former Chairman of
the People's Representative Assembly of the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) Regime, jointly
sent a letter to Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia,
solemnly declaring their recognition of the royal leadership of His Royal Majesty Norodom
Sihanouk, King of Cambodia, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, and the
incumbent Royal Government of Cambodia. They also declared their return into the society as
simple citizens in order to help contribute to the national healing and reconciliation by ending
the country's internal division and joining in the restoration and building of Cambodia.
Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen has warmly welcomed into the fold of society His
Excellency Khieu Samphan and His Excellency Nuon Chea, and he formally reported this
favorably significant event of national importance to His Royal Majesty Norodom Sihanouk,
King of Cambodia, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Acting Head of State of the Royal
Government of Cambodia, and Samdech Heng Samrin, Acting Head of the National
Assembly.
King Norodom Sihanouk also was very happy with "this good news", and most profoundly
admired Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen for having further succeeded in his new move
toward the implementation of the national reconciliation and pacification of the Royal
Government of Cambodia, which is aimed to provide the people and the country of Cambodia
a thorough peace as well as make progress at a great pace.
Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Acting Head of State and Head of the National Assembly, and
Samdech Heng Samrin, Acting Head of the National Assembly, both also applauded this
significant event.
Former UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali met with His Excellency Khieu
Samphan December 30, 1998, and welcomed and congratulated the latter for having decided
to come and live within society. In addition, while he was in office, the Paris Peace Accords
had not been thoroughly implemented, and national healing and reconciliation remained
uncompleted, said Boutros Boutros Ghali. He also added that he is happy that now His
Excellency Khieu Samphan is back in society and Cambodia has anew yielded a peace and
harmony. Other problems in the future are internal ones of Cambodia, and there should be no
interference by foreigners.
"Within a short time, however, there have been inspirations for a trial of this person, that
person", said His Excellency Ieng Sary adding that, "the wound that has not been completely
healed is being poked with a stick." Given this situation, the DNUM would like to declare as
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follows:
1. On January 21, 1999, Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Royal Government of the
Kingdom of Cambodia, gave a memo "with ideas and considerations in regard to a formula
finding approach towards a trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders" to the UN Ambassador Thomas
Hammarberg, UN Secretary General's Special Representative for Human Rights in Cambodia.
The memo addresses in full details and seriously a wide range of related problems. This
Session 2 of the DNUM Summit is totally in favor of the concept and stance set forth in the
memo, especially on points as such:
-Anything that leads to the national reconciliation breakup again should be avoided.
-We need both peace and justice. If a civil war breaks out again as a result of a trial, who will
hold the responsibility and how will the problem be settled?
-The cause of the fact between 1970-1998 is the whole of "events" which cannot be separated.
2. The return of His Excellency Khieu Samphan and His Excellency Nuon Chea into society
marks the end of the old unfortunate epoch and, in turn, opens a new era for the history of
Cambodia. Nonetheless, creating new complex problems in Cambodia is contrary to our
common tendency to ensure that the people of Cambodia remain in peace and in the state of
relief following the prolonged war and tension of nearly 30 years. When Khmer get in conflict
with Khmer, it is said Khmer never get united, but are only good at fighting. But when Khmer
get united, Khmer are instigated to fight each other.
3. Cambodia had problems since 1970. It was previously known as "the Island of Peace". In
1970 the Island of Peace was destroyed, replaced with ruins of destructive wars. In 1973,
following the existence of the peace agreements between the United States and Vietnam,
Cambodia was under heavy bombardments for nearly seven months--two hundred days and
nights--without any reason. Cambodian society was turned into upheavals; a phenomenon of
violent culture existed and intensified during the war period of 1970-1975. Therefore, given
the situation in Cambodia, judgments or experiments should be all made to cover all epoches,
starting right from the 1970's, not just confined to any selected option only in favor of or for
the sake of any Great Power country's strategy or ideology.
4. The United Nations was the broker of the peace talks in Paris and the Paris Peace Accord,
the final product of three years of most tense and repeated negotiations. Every provision and
each term in the Accords was very well weighed, that is the 23 October 1991 Paris Peace
Accords was an approach most appropriate to the actual situation in Cambodia. The spirit and
essence of the Accords was about peace and national reconciliation, not a trial of anybody.
Democratic Kampuchea had been a full-right member of the United Nations from 1975 to
1991. As one of the signatories to the Accords, Democratic Kampuchea is equal to the other
three Khmer parties. The speech, also based on the spirit of the Accords, as excerpted above
of the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali in the 30 December 1998 meeting
with His Excellency Khieu Samphan is evidence of this. So, now if they [parties] proceed
contrary to the spirit and essence of the Accords, what shall we understand of the role of the
United Nations. Those [parties] opposing to implement the second phase of the Accord
rationalized that some alliances have used the Accord to deceive [others]. Now, some Great
Power countries are burying the Accord and resorting to a trial of some people. Does not this
act prove that there has been deception?
5. The historical mistakes made in leading the country should not be forgotten. Yet, the
sufferings from the very painful deaths of [our] siblings, children, relatives and friends will
never die out easily. The house where people used to live with their grandparents since
childhood until the time when they had children of their own, and which has been lost, is an
undying regret, though perhaps it may be easy for those born after the year 1979 to forget.
This is a human sympathy, which we all should know and respect. But, in reality, in order for
our nation to free itself of all the problems and live in harmony together as one, what should
we do? What [are the problems] we can solve? What [are the problems] we cannot solve?
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What [are the problems] we should settle immediately? What [are the problems] we should
leave unsolved for a while? Given the situation in our country where firm stability has yet to
be found, with some Super Power countries that never take responsiblity [for what happened]
pressuring us to follow them in order to serve their strategy and ideology; and given the
political atmosphere infested with internal irrational ire in our nation, can justice be possibly
found? Can [we] clearly and objectively learn from our past? These are all the problems we
need to think about with a sense of responsibility.
4. The historical mistakes must not be allowed repeated. They are, however, such a huge
problem that requires a span of time and most comprehensive research as well as scholars in
fields like History, Sociology, Law, etc. Given the fragile situation and the current political
atmosphere in our country, the Democratic National United Movement (DNUM) sees that a
trial of this person or that person is not the solution to the problem. It is only by making
judgments and learning lessons from our history in a scientific and objective way that our
later generations of children would be able to learn and understand so that the recurrence of
the historical mistakes are prevented.
From now on, after the July 26, 1998 election and the nomination [establishment] of a [new]
coalition government presided over by Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen, Cambodia once
again has enjoyed the light of peace. Favorable factors have just existed, following 30 years of
the dragged-out civil war. Anything bringing about a loss of the results we have acquired
from years of perseverance should be averted, as emphasized in the memo of Prime Minister
Samdech Hun Sen saying, {dl;kMBg; lg;TUk}, which means "the boat collapses just as we
arrive at the harbor."
Pailin, 25 January 1999
On behalf of the General Assembly,
Session 2 of the DNUM
Signature
Ieng Sary
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Annex 6. Cambodian Tycoons in the senate and their activities
Source: Global Witness, 2007
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Annex 7. ‘It’s a Family affair’
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Annex 8. Sincere Congratulations To His Excellency SOK AN, Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister in charge of the Office of Council of Ministers On The Occasion of the Ceremony to
Confer His Honorary Doctoral Degree of Public Policy and Management Chamroeun
University of Poly Technology (CUP). Delivered By H.E Om Yentieng
His Excellency Sok An was born on 16 April 1950 in Kampong Village, Preah
Bat Chuan Chum Commune, Kirivong District, Takeo Province. He married to
Her Excellency Annie Sok An with one daughter and four sons. He finished his
upper secondary education in 1967 and soon after started his public employment
as a lower secondary school teacher and in 1969 he was promoted to be the
principal of Tunlorp College, Kirivong District of Takeo Province.
In 1972, he graduated with a Bachelor Degree of Geography, History and
Sociology from the Royal University of Phnom Penh and an Advanced Diploma
in Educational Pedagogy from the Ecole Normale Supérieure. From 1973 to
1975, he continued his study in Diplomacy at the National School of Administration.
During the Pol Pot Time, His Excellency Sok An and his family were displaced to Trapaing Thmar
village, Poy Char commune, Phnom Srok District, Banteay Meanchey province. His family was living
in slavery conditions like all Cambodian families. After the collapse of Pol Pot Regime and in his
willingness to serve the people and to contribute to the restoration of the devastated nation, His
Excellency Sok An, a surviving intellectual from the regime, started his public employment in the
government of Cambodia.
In 1981, he was appointed to be the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chief of
Office of the Cabinet of Samdech Hun Sen. In 1983, he was appointed Secretary General of the
Cambodian National Committee for Peace.
In 1985, he was appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Cambodia to India. In
1988, he was appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1991, he was appointed the Chief of the
Cabinet Office of Central Committee of Cambodian People’s Party and Vice Minister of Interior and
at the same time, he was appointed Secretary General of the National Supreme Council representing
the Cambodian People’s Party to work on the national reconciliation and peace for the nation.
From the 1993 general election up to the present, His Excellency Sok An has been appointed Minister
in charge of the Office of Council of Ministers and elected member of the National Assembly for
Takeo constituent. In 1998, he was appointed Senior Minister and in 2004 he was appointed Deputy
Prime Minister. He is also appointed Chairperson and President of National Committees and
Authorities, which play an important role in implementing the public policies of the Royal
Government of Cambodia and in contributing to the poverty reduction and the sustainable
development of the country.
He is also appointed Chairman of Special Taskforce for Khmer Rouge Tribunal of the Royal
Government of Cambodia to negotiate with the United Nations on the establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic
Kampuchea.
The purposes of the establishment are to (1) bring justice to the victims; (2) prevent the reoccurrence,
to make remembrance and share knowledge with the future generations; (3) If the Court is successful
in undertaking its role, it will be used as a case model for the Cambodia Courts and for the World
Court of Genocidal Crimes; and (4) ensure peace, political stability, national reconciliation, social
order and protection of national sovereignty.
In serving the nation and the people, His Excellency Sok An actively negotiated with neighboring
countries to address bordering issues successfully and to initiate the development of natural resources.
With these efforts, he brought considerable achievements to the nation. The Royal Government of
Cambodia, under the leadership of Samdech Hun Sen, has expressed high commitment, political
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willingness and firm positioning in establishing, maintaining and protecting peace and safety for all
Cambodian people.
The immediate needs of the Cambodian people after the availability of political stability and peace are
to improve the quality of life and wellbeing, which will ensure the prosperity and sustainable
development of the nation. In response to these needs, the Royal Government of Cambodia, under the
state reform framework, has firmly and constantly established “a united public administrative system”
by implementing the public sector reform program. For instance, all political parties, especially the
Khmer Rouge, integrated into the public sector process. The efforts bring historical results to
Cambodia and contribute to the national reconstruction after years of internal conflicts.
To better serve the citizens, the Public Sector Reform Program aims to change public sector behavior
and traditional practices from acting as “a manager and controller” to being an effective service
provider. In order to achieve the goal, the Royal Government of Cambodia requires a qualified,
creative, ethical and strategic leader with a balanced state of mind in the process of implementing the
public sector reform program.
Under the political guidance of Samdech Hun Sen, His Excellency Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, a
Permanent Member of the Supreme Council of State Reform and the President of the Council of
Public Sector Reform, is a political leader who actively contributes to the formulation and
implementation of policies, strategies and programs that ensure the achievement of the goal of the
Rectangular Strategy of the Royal Government of Cambodia.
The public institutions at both national and sub-national levels are smoothly functioning under the
principles of the rule of law, resulting from the effective implementation of the public sector reform
program. Given the unified environment of the public sector performance, all citizens are better able to
receive public and effective problem-solving services.
This type of environment facilitates all parties and stakeholders to participate in voicing their concerns
and in decision-making, affecting their daily lives. For instance, all political parties, civil society,
associations, communities and grass-root people are able to participate in decision making in various
ways. Political parties participate in general elections and in Commune/Sangkat elections. Civil
society, associations, community and grass-root people can voice their problems and concerns via
media and public forums.
Given the effective implementation of the public sector reform program, public institutions at all
levels are more transparent and closer to the citizens, more effectively serving their citizens by
applying multiple formulas and viable strategies. The Royal Government of Cambodia ensures the
existence of transparency in the public sector functioning so that it sustains the use of resources and
contributes to the national development.
To ensure the effective functioning of the public sector, the Royal Government of Cambodia has been
implementing the Governance Action Plan I (2001-2004) and Governance Action Plan II (2005-2008)
as well as other reform programs in consistency with Samdech Hun Sen’s principle “Good
Governance is a pillar of the Poverty Reduction Strategy of the Royal Government of Cambodia”.
A decision to confer the Honorary Doctoral Degree of Public Policy and Management upon His
Excellency Sok An, Deputy Prime Minister, is made based on the results of the implementation of the
public policies of the Royal Government of Cambodia, the public sector reform program, the
management and leadership of public sector institutions as well as other responsibilities and
achievements undertaken and accomplished by His Excellency Sok An in serving Cambodian people,
under the creative guidance of Samdech Hun Sen, and based on the evaluation initiated and
participated by the Representatives from the Handong Global University of Korea, the
Bansomdejchaopraya Rajabhat University of Thailand and the Edith Cowan University of Australia,
Cambodian intellectuals, the Governing Board and Scientific Academic Council and Management
Board of Chamroeun University of Poly-Technology, of his capability and achievements, conducted
on 5 April 2007 at Phnom Penh Hotel, related to the academic subject of public policy and public
management.
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This conferral is in honor to and in appreciation of His Excellency Sok An’s efforts and leadership.
This conferral makes him a model for his qualified, creative, ethical leadership of the country that the
public servants can use to better serve the people and to ensure the achievement of the goal of the
Rectangular Strategy of the Royal Government of Cambodia, leading to prosperity and progress.
Source, CAR, 2007
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Annex 9. Key professional figures of the ‘Russian generation’: Dr Moniroth and Dr. Chuon
Naron
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Name AUN PORN MONIROTH
Date of Birth 01 January 1965
Place of Birth Phnom Penh
Nationality Cambodian
Marital Status Married with three children
Languages Khmer (Fluent), English (Fluent), Russian (Fluent)
CURRENT POSITIONS:
Secretary of State, Ministry of Economy and Finance
Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Office (with the rank of Minister)
Chairman of the Supreme National Economic Council (with the rank of Minister)
Member of the Board of Governors of the National Bank of Cambodia
Member of the Board of Governors of the Royal School of Administration.
Alternate Governor for Cambodia on the Council of Governors of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA) .
ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS:
(1990-1993) Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Philosophy, Political Sciences
Moscow State University
(1991-1992) Diploma on International Business
Moscow School of Business
Russian Economic Academy
(1984-1990) Master of Arts
Philosophy, Social and Political Sciences
Moscow State University
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCES:
(13/01/03) Alternate Governor for Cambodia on the Council of Governors of the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
(11/09/01) Chairman of the Supreme National Economic Council (with the rank of Minister)
(1999) Member of the Board of Governors of the National Bank of Cambodia.
(23/09/1999) Member of the Board of Governors of the Royal School of Administration.
(06/02/99) Secretary General of the Ministry Economy and Finance (with the rank of Secretary of state)
and Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Office
(02/12/98-06/02/99) Economic Adviser to the Prime Minister (with the rank of Under Secretary of State),
Prime Minister's Office, Policy Planner and Senior Economic Official, Ministry of Economy and Finance,
Director of Cabinet of the First Chairman of Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC), Adviser to Senior
Minister in charge of Rehabilitation and Development and Minister of Economy and Finance.
(6/1996-02/12/98) Policy Planner and Senior Economic Official, Ministry of Economy and Finance
Director of Cabinet of the First Chairman of Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC) Adviser to Senior
Minister in charge of Rehabilitation and Development and Minister of Economy and Finance.
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(2/1994-6/1996) Adviser to Senior Minister in charge of Rehabilitation and Development and Minister of
Economy and Finance.
(9/1993-2/1994) Assistant to H.E. Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the State of Cambodia, and following the
election, Co-Prime Minister of Provisional National Government of Cambodia.
PUBLICATION:
(1/1995)"Democracy in Cambodia: Theories and Realities"
(1/1996)"Economic Development in Cambodia: Challenges and Opportunities".
(11/1996) "Strategy for Cambodia's participation in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)"(Discussion
Paper)
(6/1998)"Economic Development of Cambodia in the ASEAN's Context: Policies and Strategies" (Co-author
with Keat Chhon)
(1/1998)"Managing the Challenges of Globalization"(Co-author with Keat Chhon and Vongsey vissoth)
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PERSONAL DETAILS
Name: HANG CHUON NARON
Date of Birth: 2 January 1962
Place of Birth: Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Sex: Male
Nationality: Cambodian
Marital status: Married with two children
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND
1988-91: Ph.D. degree in economics (international economics), Moscow
State Institute for International Relations, Russia;
1985-88: Masters' degree in economics (international economics), Moscow State Institute for
International Relations, Russia;
1984-85: Kiev Institute of Foreign Languages (Ukraine), French Language Courses;
1982-85: Faculty of International Relations and International Law, Kiev State University, Ukraine;
1981-82: Cambodian Institute of Technology, Preparatory courses;
1980-81: High School Certificate, Sisowath High School, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
OTHER TRAINING
2004: Executive Program, JF Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University;
WORKING EXPERIENCE
Present- Secretary General, Ministry of Economy and Finance;
Secretary General, Supreme National Economic Council;
Chairman, Board of Directors and Management Board, Cambodian
Reinsurance Company;
2001-2004 Deputy Secretary General, Ministry of Economy and Finance;
Economic Assistant to the Prime Minister;
Director, Economic and Financial Policy Planning and Monitoring Unit, Ministry of Economy and Finance,
responsible for coordinating fiscal reform programs with the international financial institutions (ADB, IMF,
World Bank);
2000-2001 First Deputy Director, Budget and Financial Affairs Department; Economic Assistant to the
Prime Minister;
Research Fellow, Cambodian Institute of Cooperation and Peace;
1999-2000 World Bank consultant to the Ministry of Economy and Finance; Research Coordinator,
Economic Advisory Team;
1995-98: Senior Research Officer, Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh;
1993-95: Research Assistant, Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh;
1992: Training Assistant, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI);Staff member, Supreme
National Council (SNC) Secretariat;
1991-92: Part-time consultant, Australian Permanent Mission in Phnom Penh;
1988-90: Attache, Cambodian Embassy in Moscow, USSR.
CONSULTING EXPERIENCE
1. World Bank. 1999-2000: Research Coordinator, Economic Advisory Team, Ministry of Economy and
Finance,Kingdom of Cambodia;
2. International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). 2001: Economic Planning and Protected Areas:
Toward the Sustainable Management of Natural Resources.
3. Institute of Health Sciences.
LANGUAGES:
Mother tongue: Khmer
Foreign Languages: English, French and Russian
OTHER APPOINTMENTS
175
1. Deputy Chair, Committee on Financial Sector Development in Cambodia;
2. Member, Board of Directors, Electricity of Cambodia (EDC);
3. Member, Board of Directors, Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI);
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Royal School of Administration
2001/02 Public Finance
Economics and Finance Institute
2000/02 Public Finance
2003-Present Academic Adviser, MBA Program for the Economics and Finance Institute/
Charles Sturt University;
PUBLICATIONS
Dissertation
Cambodia's Economic Development. 1988. Masters' degree dissertation.
Cambodia's Foreign Economic Policies. 1991. Ph.D. degree dissertation.
Policy Papers
Royal Government of Cambodia. 2000. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, October 2000, Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.
Royal Government of Cambodia. 2001. The Cambodian Economy: A Mid-Term Review and Renewed Efforts to
Combat Poverty. May 2001, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Royal Government of Cambodia. 2002. National Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron (2002). Cambodia: Public Expenditure Management. 23 April 2002, Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron (2002). Economic Planning and Protected Areas: Toward the Sustainable Management of
Natural Resources. May 2002. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia’s Economic and Financial Reforms: Challenges and Opportunities.
January 2003, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia: Macroeconomic Outlook, Fiscal and Monetary Policies, and Structural
Reforms. 7 April 2003. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia: Industrial Development. 21 April 2003. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia: Key Development Challenges. 14 May 2003. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Royal Government of Cambodia. 2004. Annual Report on the Implementation of the National Poverty Reduction
Strategy. Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Ministry of Economy and Finance. 2004. Draft Medium-Term Expenditure Framework. Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.
Conference Papers
Hang Chuon Naron (2003). Cambodia: Economic and Social Performance and Outlook for 2003. Presented at
the Cambodia-Japan Policy Dialogue on ODA, 24 March 2003, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron (2002). Basing Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper on a Realistic Expenditure Plan. Presented
at the National Workshop on the PRSP Outline and Matrices, organized by the Council for Social Development
of Cambodia and supported by the World Bank, 28 June 2002, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron. 2002. Trade Liberalization: A Cambodian Perspective. Pre-Conference Workshop “WTO:
Issues for Developing Countries”, February 2002, Canberra.
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Hang Chuon Naron. 2002. The Effects of WTO Membership on the SMEs and Garment Sector of Cambodia.
Presented at the Public Forum on Cambodia’s Membership in the World Trade Organization, 21 August 2002,
Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron. 2001. Poverty Reduction in Cambodia: Achievements and Challenges. Presented at the
Workshop on Sustainable Development, Poverty Reduction and Good Governance in Cambodia, jointly
Sponsored by the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace and the World Bank Institute, 20 September
2001, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
Hang Chuon Naron (2001). Cambodia: A Decade of Nation-Building, Institution Development and Reform. A
presentation at the National Conference on Peace, National Reconciliation and Democracy Building: Ten Years
After the Paris Peace Agreements. Phnom Penh. 22 October 2001.
Hobbies: Tennis and Swimming
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Annex 10. Number of central and provincial servants by ministry
Source: ADB, 2000
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Annex 11. Structure of the Royal Government of Cambodia
Source: ADB, 2000
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Annex 12. List of the Joint Technical Working Groups in Cambodia
1. Legal and Judicial Reform
2. Partnership
3. Public Administration Reform (PAR) (doesn’t exist anymore since 2007)
4. Public Financial Management
5. Land
6. Decentralization and Deconcentration
7. Gender
8. Health
9. Education
10. Food Security and Nutrition
11. Mine Action
12. Agriculture and Water
13. Fisheries
14. Forestry and Environment
15. Private Sector Development
16. HIV/AIDS
17. Infrastructure and Regional Integration
18. National Strategic Development Planning
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Annex 13. Action plan of the Technical Working Group on Public Administrative reform 2007
TWG Action Plan 2006 presented at the Government-Donor meeting in early 2007
The TWG reported that 7 activities were planned to be implemented, and satisfactory progress has been
reported on 5 activities:
1. Dissemination of strategy on phasing out of salary supplementation.
Complete information gathering on salary supplementation (behind schedule). Staff has yet to be
deployed to develop the data base. More support is therefore needed from individual TWGs for
implementation of the Strategy on Phasing Out of Salary Supplementation.
Remuneration and Employment Studies (behind schedule). The studies are underway and will be
completed in coming weeks.
HRM Policy Outline. A concept paper was circulated to TWG. A draft policy paper is being prepared
for consultation with Ministries and partners.
One Window Office Legal Status. A draft Anukret has been prepared and extensively consulted on
within Government. It now awaits COM approval.
HRD Policy Outline. A draft concept paper has been prepared and will be consulted on with Ministries
and the TWG.
2. Joint Monitoring Indicators
Implement the approved "Joint Government-Donor Strategy for Phasing Out Salary
Supplementation Practices in Cambodia" by: (a) implementing approved sectoral action plans;
and (b) establishing Priority Mission Groups (PMGs), and PMG/Merit Based Pay Initiatives
(PMG/MBPIs) in MEF, MOH, and at least one other ministry/agency. Recruitment of staff to set up
a salary supplementation data base is underway. An MBPI proposal for the health sector involving
about 160 Central Office staff has been developed and is being discussed between MOH, the health
partners and CAR. Following an independent evaluation, lessons in the MEF with the MBPI have been
drawn out and acted on. PMGs covering another 170 civil servants have been approved, with
consultations ongoing on other possible PMGs, including in the health sector. There have also been
recent discussions on how to improve the operations of the PMG based on experience to date. There has
been little progress in implementing action planning under the Strategy for Phasing Out of Salary
Supplementation. Greater and more timely support is needed from TWGs.
Improve pay and employment conditions in the civil service by developing and implementing: (a)
a medium term strategy and action plan to enhance remuneration; and (b) a redeployment policy
and action plan. Non-objection from the WB to the recruitment of technical assistance to undertake the
consultancy was received in the week commencing 11 September. The policy work is a priority for
completion in 2006.
Design and implement an HRM policy and action plan to improve merit and performance
management by introducing an HRM Guide and further developing the Human Resource
Management Information System (HRMIS) for the Civil Service. The draft HRM Policy Concept
paper has been developed, as well as a draft HRM Manual. AusAID has provided funding for
conducting further consultations within Government on the new policies and recruitment of the
necessary staff is now underway. Extension of TA to support the HRMIS has just been approved by EC
as part of its ISP project.
Enhance service delivery through developing a One Window Offices (OWOs) policy, legal
framework and implementation plan, including establishment of at least 5 OWOs across
Cambodia. A draft Anukret on OWOs has been prepared. Consultation within Government on the draft
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Anukret is ongoing. Arrangements for establishing a number of OWOs in Phnom Penh and Takeo are
being readied for implementation, with French support.
Implementation status of the H-A-R Action Plan
Within the framework of NSDP, sector ministries and agencies develop sector plans and
prioritized results based programs, and a sector MTEF. National Public Administration Reform
Plan in place. Governance Action Plan No 2 approved by the Government in early 2006. CAR Work
Plan also in place. The CAR Secretariat has initiated the development of a medium term plan for public
service reform to implement the NPAR.
All sector plans and development programs/projects include an assessment of the existing
capacity gaps and a capacity development plan to fill the gaps to achieve targeted development
results. CAR’s Capacity Plan has been developed and is being implemented, with support from CIDA.
Six development modules were delivered to CAR staff within the reporting period. A TA project is
being developed to assist CAR in developing a capacity development policy for the Civil Service.
Concerned TWGs develop an implement an action plan to strengthen the technical and policy
capacity of relevant institutions to carry out environmental analysis and to enforce legislation.
This is a part of the CAR Capacity Plan.
Development partners provide financial support for the application of MBPI/PMG schemes as an
element of capacity development strategy. This is envisaged by the Strategy on Phasing Out Of
Salary Supplementation that is now being implemented. Active discussions are underway in the health
sector.
3. Resource mobilization
The TWG reported that resources to support the JMIs have yet to be fully deployed. Consultations are
needed on the resources required to support implementation of the civil service policy framework in
2007 and beyond.
Source: minutes of the PAR TWG, 18 october 2006
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Annex 14. The Office of the Council of Ministers (OCOM)
Prime Minister
Deputy Prime
Minister=
Minister in charge of
the Council of
Ministers
Secretary General of
Royal Government of
Cambodia
Human
resource
Natural
Resource
Management
Depart.
Financial
Depart.
Economic
Depart.
Social
Depart.
Environ
ment
Depart.
Industry
Energy
Conseil des Juristes
Food Security
Anti- Corruption Unit
Council for Administrative
Reform
Cambodian National Petroleum
Authority
APSARA Authority
UNESCO
Khmer Rouges Trial Task Force
National Authority for Land
Dispute Resolution
Tourism Unit
Border Affairs
Cambodian Mine Action
Authority
OBSES
NIDA Small and Medium Enterprises
Civil Aviation
Civil Service
Office of the Council of Ministers
Council of Ministers
…. ….
MinisterMinister Minister Minister
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Annex15. List of interviewees
NGO, think tanks Donor agencies Private sector State agencies
President of the Khmer
Youth Association
Programme Manager
Governance cluster UNDP
CEO MAXIMA rural and
small business credit
CEO USK Group co. ltd
Advisor to Phnom Penh
Chamber of Commerce
Director of the Planning
Investment department
Ministry of Planning
Deputy Director of the
Cambodian Center for
Human Rights
Radio Director Voice of
Democracy
Cambodian Center for
Human Rights
Programme Officer for
Human Rights and
Democracy
European Union, Delegation
of the European Commission
to Cambodia
Entrepreneur, Consultant for
Komatsu a Japanese
Construction company
Founder of agribusiness
trading company in Pray Veng
province
Director of the IFAD project
implemented by the GTZ
Deputy director general at the
ministry of rural development
Secretary General of
Alliance for Freedom of
Expression in Cambodia
(AFEC)
CCHR's Officer for
Advocacy and Public
Relations
Governance Programme
Assistant, JICA
Financial Controller
Canadia Bank
Chief of Budget Consolidation
Liaison Official in the Reform
Committee
Ministry of Economy and
Finance
Project Officer Programme
for People’s Initiatives
Village Focus International
Research Assistant of the
Resident Representative of the
IMF
Financial Controller, Canadia
Bank PLC.
Deputy Director General of
the Reform Committee of the
MEF
Head of Monitoring Section,
Cambodian Human Rights
and Development
Association ADHOC
Judicial Assistant of the
Office of the High
Commissioner for Human
Rights
United Nations
Finance Manager DHL
Express Cambodia LtD
Deputy Director in Charge of
Personel
Ministry of Culture and Fine
Arts
Professor a the Faculty of
Business and Economics,
Panasat University of
Cambodia
Economist,
Poverty reduction and
economic management unit,
East Asia and Pacific Region,
World Bank
Secretary General of the Royal
School for Judicial Professions
Researcher at the Economic
Institute of Cambodia, EIC
Coordinator of the Technical
Working Group of the
Ministry of Health,
Consultant at the UNFPA
Director of the Economics and
Finance Institute
Ministry of Economy and
Finance
Director of the International
Institute of Cambodia
Poverty Specialist of the
World Bank/CDRI researcher
Information and Public
Relation Officer
Seila Task Force Secretariat,
UNDP and CDC
Research Associate
Decentralization
Programme
Cambodian Development
Resource Institute (CDRI)
Programs Officer Economics
and Finance
ADB Cambodia Resident
Mission
Assistant to the Prime
Minister
Cabinet of the Prime Minister
Assistant Auditor of Audit
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Office 1-1
National Audit Authority
Manager software sales &
support ACCPAC
ICS smart accounting
consultant
Deputy Director General of
Finance and Accounting,
Ministry of Labor and
Vocational Training
Deputy Secretary General of
the Council of Administrative
Reform (CAR)Council of
Ministers (COM)/ Team
Leader at the Khmer Rouge
Tribunal
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Annex 16. The Rectangular Strategy
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Annex 17. Timeline of Lycée Sisowath's History
Traditional education in Cambodia was limited to boys and was carried out by Buddhist monks in
wats, or temples.
Wat-school education served a broader purpose than literacy. Wat-school education emphasized
the importance of work, as students "worked with the monks to build temples, dwellings, roads,
bridges, and water reservoirs and to manufacture...furniture and other things" (Torhorst, 1966, p.
154).
Wat-school curriculum usually consisted of "reading and writing Khmer [the Cambodian
language], principles of Buddhism, rules of propriety, [and] some arithmetic" (Gyallay-Pap, 1989,
p. 258).
Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1863 (Osborne, 1969).
1873 The first of "modern" Franco-Cambodian schools was the French-language School of theProtectorate, in Phnom Penh (Morizon, 1931, p. 178)
Franco-Cambodian schools came to be dominated by Vietnamese immigrant children (Forest,
1980). In 1883, for example, only 8 of the 100-plus students at the School of the Protectorate were
Cambodians (Forest, 1980, p. 150-151).
1893 The School of the Protectorate was renamed Collège of the Protectorate (Bilodeau, 1955).
Following the establishment of the Franco-Cambodian Norodom School in Phnom Penh in 1903
(Forest, 1980, p. 152), schools were opened in most provincial capitals.
Sisowath ascent to the throne after King Norodom's (his brother) death in 1904.
1905 The Collège of the Protectorate in Phnom Penh, renamed Collège Sisowath (Forest, 1980, p.152).
A school for girls was opened within the Norodom School in 1911 (Morizon, 1931, p. 185).
At the Norodom School for Girls in 1912 & Norodom School for Boys in 1917, the choice of
Vietnamese as the language of education was authorized" (Forest,1980, p. 156).
A 1916 decree required the attendance of all boys living within two kilometers of a French school
(Bilodeau, 1955, p. 17).
1923 The French opened a four-year training course for instituteurs at the Collège Sisowath(Morizon, 1931, p. 187).
1925 The French initiated at the Collège Sisowath a shorter course for instituteurs auxiliares(Morizon, 1931, p. 187)
Only six Cambodians had graduated with baccalauréats from French Lycées in Vietnam by 1930
(Chandler, 1993, p. 160)
As in the 19th century, the Collège prepared students for service in the French colonial
administration. The Collège prepared students for the judiciary and the indigenous administration,
including the offices of the survey, public works, and post and telegraphs. Students were [also]
introduced to mechanical engineering, physics, chemistry, and natural history. Cambodian law and
accounting were also taught. (Morizon, 1931, p. 186)
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1933 The Collège Sisowath became the Lycée Sisowath (Népote, 1979, p. 775)
1935 Lycée Sisowath instituted an upgraded secondary curriculum in 1935 (Népote, 1979, p. 775)
1939 The first Cambodian students graduated from the Lycée Sisowath with baccalauréats
1953 Kingdom of Cambodia became independent State.
Only 144 [Cambodians] had completed the full baccalauréat by 1954 (Kiernan, 1985, p. xiii).
1967 Introduction of Khemarak-yeanakkam. Ministry of Education took all the measures to use theKhmer language in all education levels (Le Sangkum, 1967).
1970 Khmer Republic
1970 Lycée Sisowath renamed the Lycée 9 October.
1974 Lycée Sisowath renamed the Lycée Phnom Daun Penh.
1975 Democratic Kampuchea
1979 People's Republic of Kampuchea
Before 1975, the education is a 13 years (6+4+2+1) education system.
After 1979, a 10-year education system (4+3+3) was adopted, expanded to an 11-year education
system from 1986 and 12-year education system (6+3+3) in the 1996-97 school year.
1989 State of Cambodia
1993 Kingdom of Cambodia
1996 Reintroduction franco-khmere section at Lycée Sisowath.
Source: http://pages.prodigy.net/skchao/lsa/history/timeline.htm, 2008
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Annex 18. Key Cambodian universities
The National University of Management
(NUM)
Currently, more than 10,000 students attend
courses at NUM's main campus in Phnom
Penh.
 1983 founding as the Economics
Science Institute (ESI), and until 1991
received assistance from the National
Economics University in Hanoi,
Vietnam. During this period, students
were enrolled in a five-year undergraduate program with the Vietnamese language
serving as the main language of instruction. The curriculum, set by the visiting faculty
from Hanoi, included major fields in Finance, Commerce, Agriculture, Industry, and
Socialist Planning.
 1990’s the ESI is renamed to Faculty of Business (FOB). Initial support for the FOB
was provided by the Asia Foundation and later through a three years USAID grant
(1994 to 1997) by the Georgetown University and the University of Sanfrancisco.
Marketing and Accounting majors were introduced during this period, and the length
of the undergraduate program was reduced from five to four years of study.
Commercial law course were also added to the curriculum by the University of San
Francisco Law school
 2004 the FOB is transformed into the National University of Management (NIM) and
program offerings are expanded to include the fields of Tourism and Hospitality
Management, Finance & Banking and MIS. NUM also openes the first MBA program
in Cambodia in cooperation with the University Utara Malaysia (UUM). The NUM
also maintains a five year faculty exchange and research program with the University
of Antwerp. Belgium and has just recently opened a Center for Entrepreneurship and
Development in partnership with Fisk University (Nashville,U.S) and Tennessee State
University, sponsored by UNCF/USAID
 NUM also operates a full Bachelor of Business Administration degree program in
Battambang with more than 700 students attending courses at NUM 's provincial
campus.
Source: www.num.edu.kh, 2008
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The Royal University for Law and
Economics
 1948 founded as the National
Institute of Law, Politics and
Economics
 1975 the institute is renamed
into the Faculty of Law and
Economics by Royal Decree
 2003 the Faculty of Law and
Economics is reorganized as the
Royal University of Law and
Economics (RULE).
 Besides Law and Economics as the core disciplines, the university introduces social,
natural and computer sciences
 Currently, the university has four faculties, two graduate schools and one centre.
RULE still maintains her position as the premier national university and the leading
university in the area of law, economic and business education.
Source: http://www.rule.edu.kh/Brief_His.htm, 2008
The Royal School of Administration (RSA)
 1956 founded as the Royal School of
Administration (RSA).
 1975 closed by the Khmer Rouge
 1995 reopened by the RGC under the umbrella of
the Council of Ministers (COM).
 Students from this elite school specialize in
administration, diplomacy or business.
 At the end of their studies, students have to pass
an exam, from which scores are ranked. Students
with the highest scores go to the Council of
Ministers, the second best go to the Ministry of
Interior and the last group goes to the line
ministries.
 Before 1975 and after 1996 higher civil servants were/are trained at the Royal School
for Administration and were sent to study abroad. Since the mid 1990s, competition
for civil service offices is more difficult and higher civil servants are increasingly
recruited from wealthy and well-connected families.
